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"Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:"'
The Mass Media, Law, and African Americans
ADENO ADDIS*
The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also ... one of [Europe's]
deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has
helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, person-
ality, experience... [Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one
1. The first part of the title of this Article is taken from a story recounted by Derrick
Bell:
A few years ago, I was presenting a lecture in which I enumerated the myriad
ways in which black people have been used to enrich this society and made to
serve as its proverbial scapegoat. I was particularly bitter about the country's
practice of accepting black contributions and ignoring the contributors. Indeed, I
suggested, had black people not existed, America would have invented them.
From the audience, a listener reflecting more insight on my subject than I had
shown, shouted out, 'Hell man, they did invent us.'
Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its Legal Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 VILL.
L. REV. 767, 767 (1988) (emphasis added). Two important insights emerge from the
listener's comment. Specifically, the comment draws attention to how European
Americans might have produced what it is to be an African American. The African
American who is the subject of discourse among European Americans is in fact largely the
invention of European Americans. Second, and more generally, the comment alerts us to
the fact that, quite often, dominant groups invent the "Other." The Other is a relational
invention. At this general level, Bell's listener is wearing a postmodernist hat.
It is the dominant group's tendency to incorporate the dominated or the less power-
ful as the Other that Oscar Wilde was resisting when he observed that "the whole of
Japan is a pure invention. There is no such country, there are no such people." OSCAR
WILDE, The Decay of Lying, in INTENTIONS 3, 47 (1905), cited in Kwame A. Appiah, Is the
Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?, 17 CRrrICAL INQUIRY 336, 347 (1991). It
may be argued that this is the theme that guides Edward Said's work. See EDWARD SAID,
ORIENTALISm 1 (1978) ("The Orient was almost a European invention, and has been since
antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes,
remarkable experiences.").
As I hope will be made clear during the course of this article, the claim here is not
that there are no such things as an African American, or Japan or Africa. The point is
that the images of each of these subjects, which are prepared for the consumption of
European Americans, are the invention of Europeans and European Americans. In its
consumability each subject is incorporated into the value system of the "appropriator,"
where the appropriated subject is defined as the objective Other in the cognitive and so-
cial map of the appropriator.
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University. I am grateful to friends and col-
leagues for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I would especially like to thank
Kathryn Abrams, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Robin Barnes, Ruth Colker, Michael Collins,
Madeline Morris, Thomas Ross, Louis Seidman, Joseph Singer and Keith Werhan. I also
thank Cathleen Cooper, Lisa Evans, David Matchen and Leon Rittenberg for their
excellent research work.
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cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which
European culture was able to manage-and even produce-the Orient po-
litically, sociologically, .. and imaginatively .... 2
PROLOGUE
It was a Monday evening, April 6, 1987, and I sat down to watch
the ABC news program Nightline on the occasion of the fortieth
anniversary of the day Jackie Robinson became the first African
American 3 to play major league baseball. The guest was introduced
as Al Campanis, the vice-president for player personnel of the Los
Angeles Dodgers. He had been a Dodger executive when Robinson
broke the color barrier, and he spoke about Robinson's professional
life. Then came the following exchange between Ted Koppel, the
program's host, and Campanis:
Koppel: Why are there no black managers, general managers, or
owners? Is there still that much prejudice in baseball today?
Campanis: No, I don't believe it's prejudice. I truly believe [African
Americans] may not have some of the necessities to be, let's
say, a field manager or perhaps a general manager.
Koppel: Do you really believe that?
Campanis: Well, I don't say that all of them, but they certainly are
short. How many quarterbacks do you have, how many
pitchers do you have that are black?
Koppel: Yeah, but I got to tell you, that sounds like the same gar-
bage we were hearing forty years ago about players.
Campanis: No, it's not garbage, Mr. Koppel, because I played on a col-
lege team, and the center fielder was black, and in the back-
field at NYU was a fullback who was black. Never knew the
difference whether he was black or white. We were team-
mates. So it might just be, why are black men or black peo-
ple not good swimmers? Because they don't have the buoy-
ancy.4
During the above exchange, my feelings vacillated between
rage and despair. Rage, because this man who had come on the pro-
gram supposedly to celebrate the strength and courage of an African
American who had suffered enormous pain and humiliation from
2. SAID, supra note 1, at 1-3. If one substituted the word "African American" for "the
Orient" and "European American" for "Europe," Edward Said's comment would aptly de-
scribe part of the concern of this article.
3. In this article I use the terms "African American" and "black" interchangeably.
4. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1987), reprinted in PHILLIP M. HOOSE,
NECESSITIES: RACIAL BARRIERS IN AMERICAN SPORTS xv-xvi (1989).
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racism simply because he wanted to play baseball, was reproducing
and repeating the very stereotypes against which Jackie Robinson
struggled. Despair, because if a man who introduced himself as a
friend of an African American could not only hold but express such
views without the slightest hesitation, and apparently without feel-
ing that he was being racist, then perhaps stereotypes about African
Americans have become an accepted part of everyday life and a
normal part of doing business.
There was another dimension to my despair that led me to re-
flect on the role of the media in the constitution of the identities of
African Americans. It is people like Campanis, former athletes and
coaches, mostly white, who are hired as sportscasters in the elec-
tronic media. If those sportscasters, share Campanis's view of the
black people whose activities as athletes they describe daily, then
sportscastirg might be a process which simply recycles myths and
stereotypes about African Americans. Indeed, Campanis's descrip-
tion of African Americans is remarkably similar to the sort of de-
scriptions about which African American athletes, especially male
athletes, complain; white sportscasters5 often describe African
Americans as physically gifted, but lacking mentally.6
Less than a year later, in January 1988, 1 read the transcript of
an interview given by Jimmy (the Greek) Snyder, then a CBS sports
commentator. Snyder, with the confidence of the historian, the ge-
neticist, and the anthropologist all in one, declared,
The black is a better athlete to begin with, because he's been bred to be
that way. Because of his high thighs and big thighs that go up into his
back. And they can jump higher and run faster because of their bigger
thighs, you see. I'm telling you that the black is the better athlete and he
practices to be the better athlete and he's bred to be the better athlete be-
cause this goes all the way to the Civil War when, during the slave trad-
ing, the owner, the slave owner, would breed this big woman so that he
would have a big black kid, see. That's where it all started.7
Was this damaging stereotype limited to only some
sportscasters in the media? Part of me desperately wanted to believe
that it was just this handful of people who held these stereotypical
views, but that the media on the whole presented a reasonably accu-
rate view of African Americans. I wanted to believe this, because the
alternative was to accept the rather depressing proposition that
American society is locked into a cycle of racism in which the media
5. In this article I use the terms "European American" and "white" interchangeably.
6. See HOOSE, supra note 4, at 10-20; Tony Kornheiser, A Hue and Cry of Celtics'
Gain, WASH. POST, June 3, 1987, at C1.
7. Leonard Shapiro, 'Jimmy the Greek' Says Blacks are 'Bred' for Sports, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 1988, at Al, AO.
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and real life reinforce each other in the invention of a stereotypical
view of African Americans, and where that view is in turn employed
to justify the daily exclusion of African Americans from the social
and political life of the polity. But as I continued to follow the main-
stream media's presentation of the lives of African Americans, I saw
a pattern that seemed to dispel any hope that this stereotypical viev
of African Americans was a phenomenon isolated within the sports
media. Indeed, the mainstream media has played an enormous role
in the invention and reproduction of what the majority culture re-
gards as the African American character. The picture portrayed of
African Americans by the media is one that also enables the major-
ity to hold a largely virtuous picture of itself and its institutions.
The invention of the African American as the problem allows the
majority simultaneously to acknowledge the predicament of African
Americans and to absolve itself and its institutions from responsibil-
ity for that state of affairs. This is a phenomenon that William
Connolly has termed "the second problem of evil.., the evil that
flows from the attempt to establish security of identity for any indi-
vidual or group by defining the other that exposes sore spots in one's
identity as evil or irrational."'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about how the mainstream media produces and
reproduces a largely negative image of African Americans, and how
that image is used to justify the continual exclusion of African
Americans from the various social and political spheres of existence,
and ultimately, to devalue their lives. The public discourse on
African Americans has as its theme, at times implicitly and at other
times explicitly, what can be referred to as the rhetoric of "collective
fall."9 The daily narratives about African Americans, whether the
debate is about crime, drugs, politics, welfare or education, reinforce
8. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFDERENCE 8 (1991). Connolly's book is devoted
to the exploration of the politics of identity and hence, of difference. Connolly argues that
politics pervades the relation of identity to difference; he calls this relation "the site of two
problems of evil." Id- at ix.
On the political level, the first problem of evil issues in a series of attempts to
protect the purity and certainty of a hegemonic identity by defining as inde-
pendent sites of evil (or one of its many surrogates) those differences that pose
the greatest threat to the integrity and certainty of that identity. The second
problem of evil emerges out of solutions to the first one. It flows from diverse po-
litical tactics through which doubts about self-identity are posed and resolved by
the constitution of an other against which that identity may define itself.
Id. at ix-x.
9. What I mean to refer to by the rhetoric of "collective fall" is the daily narratives
and images that suggest that race, and in particular, blackness, represent social disorder
and civil decay.
[Vol. 41526
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that perception. It is this rhetoric of "collective fall" that has made
possible another prominent theme of public discourse, the rhetoric of
"white innocence."'0
The debate about affirmative action is the clearest example of
these themes, although not the only one. The rhetoric of the inno-
cent white victim of affirmative action is compelling to many whites
in part because of the familiarity of the discourse of the intellectu-
ally undeserving black. The public discourse about crime closely
identifies crime with black people and has made the daily rhetoric of
the white victim of black crime part of the general consciousness,
even though the reality is quite different." This Article argues that
the media, an important cultural institution, continues to produce,
reproduce, and legitimize a certain identity of African Americans
that has enabled the discourse about the innocent white victim of
black transgressions to become pervasive in this polity. This exami-
nation of the media is, therefore, partly an exploration of how the
majority produces the public identities of minorities and how by this
very process the majority produces a largely virtuous identity for
itself.
This Article also explores how the public identities of African
Americans are constructed in their absence. The daily narratives in
the media about African Americans and the general community are
told mainly by European Americans. The representation of African
Americans as communicators in the media, electronic and print, is
depressingly low.'2 Indeed, part of the claim of the Article is that the
rhetoric of white innocence and of black collective fall are possible
because African Americans have not been allowed to tell their story,
what I call the "corrective story." The stereotypical pictures of
African Americans painted daily in the mass media are made possi-
10. The concept of "white innocence" is taken from Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical
Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2
(1990). Professor Ross uses the term "the rhetoric of white innocence" to refer to "the in-
sistence on the innocence of contemporary whites" for the current condition of African
Americans. Id. In this sense innocence refers to the claim by an individual or a group that
it has not caused or contributed to the unfavorable condition of another. The resistance of
many whites, especially young whites, to affirmative action is premised on this notion of
innocence, that they were not responsible for slavery or segregation, and therefore
affirmative action that disadvantages some of them punishes innocent people.
There exists another sense of innocence. The term "innocence" can also be used to
describe.purity and virtuosity. Thus, when I use the term "rhetoric of white innocence" I
refer to both aspects of innocence: the attempt by the majority to absolve itself of
responsibility for the current condition of African Americans, and the tendency of the ma-
jority to avoid dealing with difference by converting that difference into otherness.
11. See infra part IlI.A.2.a.
12. See Black Journalists Report Progress in Hiring But a Lag in Promotion, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1988, § 1, at 7 [hereinafterBlack Journalists].
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ble because African Americans are seen and treated as subjects of
deliberation, rather than as deliberating subjects. Both as victims
and resisters, stories about African Americans are largely told by
others. 3
If the image the majority constructs of African Americans is
erroneous, as this Article contends, then the image the majority has
of itself is consequently erroneous. Identities are relationally con-
structed, and thus James Baldwin was right when he said, "If I'm
not who you say I am, then you're not who you think you are."'4 For
its persuasive force the rhetoric of white innocence assumes the
validity of its correlative rhetoric device, the rhetoric of collective
black fall.' 5
This Article further examines whether the current policies of
the Federal Communications Commission 16 regarding minorities
provide the means for the constitution of a less stereotypical image
of African Americans. If identities are relationally constructed, then
the measure of the "authenticity" of the product, identity, must rest
to a large extent on the inclusiveness of the process. Policies prom-
ulgated by the FCC to further diversity in the electronic media by
including more minority owners and broadcasters can be seen as
part of the struggle to subdue "the second problem of evil""7 by ena-
bling minority narratives to challenge the majority's view of the
13. W.E.B. DuBois characterized this predicament as "this sense of always looking at
one's self through the eyes of others." W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, in THREE
NEGRO CLASSICS -07, 215 (J.H. Franklin ed., 1965).
14. Interview with James Baldwin, CBS News (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 1967),
cited in JANNETrE L. DATES & WILIAM BARLOW, SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
THE MASS MEDIA 5 (1990). Frantz Fanon expressed the same point when he commented
"The Negro is not. Any more than the white man." FRANTz FANoN, BLACK SKIN, WHITE
MASKS 231 (C. Markmann trans., 1967). John Dewey made a similar point when he
observed, "There is no self until you ask what the self is called to do in relation to other
people." JOHN DEWEY, 1 THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882-1898, at 207 (1969).
What Baldwin, Fanon and Dewey suggest is that identity and reality are the results of
human labor, and that politics must therefore be understood not so much as a way to in-
terpret reality but as a contest to create reality. Under this interpretation, democracy can
properly be understood as the framework or process within which reality is collectively
determined.
15. The rhetoric of white innocence and black collective fall may serve more than
political and economic interests; they may have psychological functions. To quote James
Baldwin again,
What is ghastly and really almost hopeless in our racial situation now is that
the crimes we have committed are so great and so unspeakable that the accep-
tance of this knowledge would lead, literally, to madness. The human being,
then, in. order to protect himself, closes his eyes, compulsively repeats his
crimes, and enters a spiritual darkness which no one can describe."
JAMES BALDWIN, BLUES FOR MISTER CHARLIE 6 (Dell Pub. 1970) (1964).
16. Hereinafter "Commission" or "FCC".
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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minority, as well as of itself. It is a way to contest the tendency of
the majority to assure self-certainty by defining that which deviates
from it as intrinsically evil or unworthy.
Before recounting the structure of the Article, I think it might
be useful to set out briefly why I chose the media and the communi-
cation industry from among numerous other exclusionary institu-
tions as the focus of my inquiry. The most obvious reason is that this
is the area I know best, but this is not the entire story. By choosing
the media I mean to suggest that the media and the cultural indus-
try warrant our special concern, and that we should take those insti-
tutions more seriously than we have in the past. There are a number
of reasons, some general and others specific to this polity.
First, communication is a vital political activity. 'Politics is not
simply about the manner in which power adjudicates competing
claims for resources. It is also a contest over who we are to become, a
contest in which identity" becomes the objective.18 Communication is
a crucial subject, for communication is the political activity through
which the contest for the constitution of identity is explicitly fought.
Communication is "[tihe politics of becoming."" For too long the
focus of analysis in the legal academy has been on the politics of
distribution, to the near exclusion of the politics of identity forma-
tion, the daily contest over how to define oneself and others. This is
not to say that the communication process is the only process by
which identities are constituted and reconstituted; we produce our-
selves and others through all of our various activities. But the com-
munication process is one in which we explicitly engage in that en-
deavor.20 Through communications and discursive formations we
18. SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 8 (1986).
19. Id. at 22.
In rejecting the premise of exogenous interests, we argue that an adequate con-
ception of action must be based upon the notion that people produce themselves
and others through their actions. According to this conception, action is neither
instrumental toward the satisfaction of given wants nor expressive of objective
interests, but it is an aspect of the very generation of wants and specification of
objective interests. Individuals and groups, accordingly, act not merely to get
but to become. The politics of becoming, we believe, provides a central corrective
to both the normative and the explanatory dimensions of traditional political
theory.
Id.
20. 1 think Raymond Williams was right when he wrote, "I think that a political
strategy which doesn't take account of cultural questions is living in the past." RAYMOND
WmIJAMS, RAYMOND WRIAMS ON TELEVISION 215 (Alan O'Connor ed., 1989). Williams
goes on to observe that the argument for taking cultural practices seriously does not
mean that cultural practices take precedent over other societal spheres, but that they
must be seen as implicating, and implicated by, other spheres. Id. One cannot fully un-
derstand disputes in the political and economic spheres unless one also understands that
those disputes are about cultural institutions. Id.
529
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identify, and hence bring into existence, factors and traits we deem
central to our being, and we specify their domain of operation and
consequently the nature of our very identity.
Second, in this country race relations are in such a poor state
that often the only sustained contact one racial group has with the
other is through the mass media. Neighborhoods are segregated.2 '
Despite the efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, schools are largely seg-
regated.22 And often the workplace is segregated also, partly struc-
turally and partly intentionally.' Given this limited contact, whites
and blacks obtain information about each other largely from the
media, rather than from individual contacts.' To ignore the media
21. A 1991 study of census figures found that 30% of African Americans live in
neighborhoods which are at least 90% black. Blacks in Cities Still Are Isolated, New
Study Shows, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 10, 1991, at A3. The study also
found that 68% of whites live in almost all-white neighborhoods. Douglas Massey, a
University of Chicago sociologist, observed that "[amny way you look at it, blacks are still
very segregated .... At this rate, blacks will stay segregated for a long time." Id.
22. A 1992 study sponsored by the National School Boards Association determined
that segregation in the nation's schools is increasing. See Karen DeWitt, The Nation's
Schools Learn a 4th R: Resegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, at E5 ("[S]egregated
schools are on the rise again .... [lin the North's urban centers and suburbs and in the
West... minority youngsters find themselves increasingly in separate and unequal
schools.") Segregation is also increasing at the college level, where due to recent increases
in racial hostility on many college campuses, African American students are declining to
attend predominantly white colleges and are instead choosing traditionally black colleges.
See Isabel Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1990, at Al ("The perception of racial hostility is inducing more families to
send their children to historically black colleges to avoid the issue altogether, while oth-
ers are scrutinizing predominantly white schools more carefully to weed out those that
appear less racially tolerant.... But the choices seem to be getting narrower for blacks
looking for predominantly white schools not touched by racial turmoil.") See also infra
note 37.
For a critique of justifying the continuation of racial segregation in schools on the
basis of individual "free choice" and the right of free association, see Wendy Brown, The
Convergence of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the State's Affirmative Duty to
Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L. REV. 63 (1993).
23. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMiENT OPPORTUNITY COMISSION, JOB PATTERNS FOR
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY: 1990 (1991).
24. One of the best social indicators of the state of relations among racial groups
might be the extent to which interracial marriages and couples exist. It is interesting to
note that more than twenty five years after the Supreme Court invalidated state statutes
that outlawed interracial marriages, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the number of
interracial marriages, especially between blacks and whites, is extremely low.
Conveying a sense of progress, a 1993 analysis of census data indicates that now one
out of fifty marriages are interracial, and that the number of interracial couples has al-
most doubled in the last twelve years. Tim Bovee, Interracial Marriages Now 1 in 50, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 12, 1993, at Al. The article observed:
There were 246,000 black-white couples last year, nearly four times the
number in 1970, the Census Bureau said.
An additional 883,000 couples represented marriages between white people
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and the cultural industry is therefore to ignore a crucial process of
identity formation in American society.
Third, those able to define the identity of the political contes-
tants are consequently able to define the relationship of the contes-
tants. One of the most important modes of resistance to domination,
therefore, is to deny the dominator the power to unilaterally define
the public identity of the dominated. In any case, to be an agent
must mean at a minimum having a part in the constitution of one's
own identity.' To be produced in one's absence is to lose the claim of
agency. This observation is premised on the proposition that the
conventional way of accounting for communication, that "there is
life, and then afterwards there are these accounts of it,"26 is errone-
ous and fails to fully capture the role of communication in constitut-
ing sociality and identity.
Fourth, the communication process should be of great interest
to lawyers and legal scholars, because in many ways the media and
the communications process perform the same sort of functions that
the law performs. Understanding the communication process might
in fact enable legal scholars to better understand the law itself. The
media, like the law, bases its legitimacy largely on the claim of neu-
trality, on not taking sides in relation to the various interests and
disputes that exist in the social world that is being described. The
media, like the law, also bases its legitimacy on serving the public
interest. The media and the law therefore both claim to be simulta-
neously neutral and partial.7 In addition, both claim that the stories
and people of other races, such as Asian, Pacific Islander, or American Indian;
32,000 between black people and people of other races; and 1.2 million couples
were Hispanics and non-Hispanics.
Id. If my calculation is correct, the number of black-white marriages is one in five
hundred. This does not show spectacular progress. It does, however, demonstrate the
level and intensity of the divide that still exists between blacks and whites.
25. To lead a life or occupy an identity that one does not critically endorse is to live
the life of a robot. It is to surrender the very thing that makes humans who they are. To
be produced by others, both in terms of one's identity and the purposes which animate
that identity, is to lead a life relegated to non-human beings or objects. Gerald Dworkin
notes that "[i]t is characteristic of persons that they are able to reflect on their decisions,
motives, desires, emotions, habits, and so forth. In doing so they may form preferences
concerning these. Thus, a person may not only desire to smoke. He can also desire that he
desire to smoke. He may not simply be motivated byjealousy or anger. He can also desire
that his motivations be different (or the same)." Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior
Control, in 6 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 23, 24 (1976), cited in Lawrence Haworth,
Dworkin on Autonomy, 102 ETHICS 129, 130-31 (1991); see also HARRY G. FRANKFURT,
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11-25 (1988). Ronald Dworkin makes a
similar point. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 484-87
(1989).
26. RAYMOND WLIAMS, COMMUNICATIONS 11 (3d ed. 1976).
27. See RICHARD V. ERICSON ETAL., REPRESENTING ORDER: CRIME, LAW AND JUSTICE
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they tell are informed by the requirements of certain procedural
proprieties," rather than being one of the choices among several
possibilities.
Furthermore, the media and the law are two of the institutions
by and through which we engage explicitly in a discourse about the
basic terms and conditions of social life. Both the law and the media
often frame moral and social questions in individual or group terms,
where stories are presented "as serial narratives involving leading
actors"29 and responsibility is allocated to "troublesome persons [or
troublesome groups] rather than troublesome social structures.""
Systemic and structural accounts do not often have a place in the de-
scriptive process employed by both institutions. In terms of their
claims for legitimacy, the nature of the stories each tells, and the
process by which each tells its stories, the law and the media share a
great deal in common. Therefore, an intertextual and interspheral
inquiry might enable lawyers and legal scholars to better under-
stand their discipline.
Although this interconnection of the media and the law is not
the explicit concern of this Article,3' the issue has some importance
for the concerns addressed here because the media and the law have
long been prominent both in the construction of a certain identity of
African Americans and in the use of that image to exclude African
Americans from certain spheres of existence, and to thereby devalue
their lives. Indeed, there is remarkable consistency in the stories
IN THE NEWS MEDIA 7 (1991) ("The news media and law also share an affinity in claiming
that their policing is in the public interest. The basis of this claim is the appearance of
neutrality."). Thus, while the media and the law both claim to derive legitimacy from neu-
trality, they also, at least partly, seek to ground the force of their authority on their par-
tiality to what they regard to be the public interest.
28. See id. at 9 ("Both news and law can be described as social discourses of proce-
dural propriety.").
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id. at 8; see also SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANY ONE RESPONSIBLE? HOW TELEVISION
FRAMES PoLrrIcAL IssuEs (1991).
[Niews about political issues almost invariably takes either an episodic or the-
matic frame. The episodic news frame focuses on specific events or particular
cases, while the thematic news frame places political issues and events in some
general context. It is well known that television news is distinctively episodic in
its depiction of political issues .... The predominance of episodic framing in
television news affects not only the.., selection of news items, but also the pub-
lic's attribution of responsibility for political issues.
Id. at 2. Iyengar's research suggests that episodic-style reports of societal problems leads
viewers to attribute responsibility to individual actors, while thematic reports are more
likely to lead the public to attribute responsibility for the problem to political institutions
or leaders. Id. at 2-3.
31. I take up this issue in another work. See Adeno Addis, Law as Dialogue
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also Adeno Addis, In Defense of
Crookedness, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 1993).
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these two institutions tell about African Americans. In their daily
representation of African Americans, the communication process and
the legal process assume a normal and moral order to which African
Americans are regarded as its negation. This normal and moral or-
der is one that closely describes and represents the social world in a
way that roughly accords with the world view of the majority.
Having briefly set out in Part I the reasons for selecting the
focus of my inquiry, let me now outline the structure of the Article
and the nature of the argument. Part II sets out the social and intel-
lectual context to my specific concern and to which my argument
responds.
Part II explores the mainstream media's description and cov-
erage of young black males, black politicians and black athletes.
This section argues that these images are overwhelmingly stereo-
typical and extremely negative, as a result of what I have referred to
as "structural propaganda."32 Structural propaganda works by omis-
sion as well as by inclusion. In relation to African Americans it
takes three forms. First, the media omits from its agenda issues that
are of interest to African Americans. Second, when African
Americans are the subject of discourse, they are typically presented
in stereotypical and negative ways. Third, both in their moments of
invisibility and in their moments of caricatured presence, African
Americans have virtually no role in the communication process and
the production of their identity.
Part IV will inquire into the FCC's policies with respect to mi-
norities to examine whether those policies do in fact provide the
basis for a more inclusive communication process. In that regard,
the section will examine in detail the current policies of the FCC, in
terms of how those policies are structured and how they are en-
forced. 3 The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the
FCC policies can provide the means of controlling "the second prob-
lem of evil."
32. For a. discussion of structural propaganda, see Adeno Addis, International
Propaganda and Developing Countries, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 491, 516-20 (1988).
33. As is apparent from the nature of the discourse in both the political and the
judicial arenas, attacks on such policies are becoming increasingly intense. It was only by
the narrowest of margins, 5-4, that the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of two of the Commission's minority policies. Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Today, the author of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan,
and two of the five who voted with him, Justices Marshall and White, are no longer on the
Court. Given the current composition of the Court, it is safe to assume that City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), will become the paradigmatic case, not
Metro Broadcasting. Therefore, even after Metro Broadcasting, the challenge to
affirmative action is going to continue and even intensify, and hence, the need to develop




Part V is devoted to an exploration of the justifications for
affirmative action in the communications industry. In agreement
with the majority of the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC,34 I will argue that policies such as those adopted by the FCC
need not be justified on the grounds of remedying past discrimina-
tion. Indeed, the focus on past discrimination, and the fashioning of
affirmative actions to remedy such discrimination, is unhelpful for
two reasons. First, this approach wrongly leads us to assume that
discrimination is a thing of the past. Second, the notion of past dis-
crimination, at least in this area, prevents us from seeing the com-
plete picture of exclusion; it turns the issue of discrimination into
what it is not, a simple employment discrimination concern. The
larger problem, however, is that the majority, through the media,
continues to invent an African American character which is viewed
as the negation of the identity of the majority. It makes little sense
to fashion remedies to such a problem by invoking the notion of past
discrimination.
I will argue instead that the justification for affirmative action
is diversity, the encouragement of a multiplicity of narratives. On
this level the Article is in agreement with the majority in Metro
Broadcasting. But Part V attempts to do more than endorse the
proposition that diversity is the most secure foundation for inclusive
policies in the area of communication; it also explores the objectives
which make diversity necessary and constructs a scheme of justifica-
tion around those objectives. As such, the section serves simultane-
ously as an endorsement of the general claims of the majority in
Metro Broadcasting and as an attempt to develop a theoretical
scheme upon which to ground those claims.
The notion of diversity that I develop in this Article draws from
recent postmodernist writings that have attempted to construct con-
ceptual schemes for dealing with the issue of the ethic of responsibil-
ity toward otherness. As I shall show in Part V, the ethic of respon-
sibility underlying the writings of many postmodernists is linked to
a critical -ontology of the self. What I have termed "critical plural-
ism" is the precise condition that simultaneously acknowledges the
ethic of responsibility toward otherness and provides the condition
for the critical examination of the self that an affirmative attitude
toward otherness will require. The diversity inherent in critical
pluralism makes a gesture toward the postmodernist concern for the
affirmation of difference, while retaining the critical ontology of the
self. The two are linked in a continuous process of dialogue, what
Michel Foucault has called a "logic of discourse" that ties the ques-
34. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 547.
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tioner and the replier.5 But both an affirmation of difference and a
critical ontology of the self require not an ahistorical conversation
between the dominator and the dominated, for that will simply per-
form the present with an imagined past. That can hardly be trans-
formative. Rather, as I argue in Part V, the sort of dialogue that is
needed is one that takes critical genealogies seriously. The only way
we can successfully check the tendencies of the dominant discourse
in this country to define African Americans as the Other and to
exclude them from various spheres of existence is to understand how
the discourse about the Other has historically constituted itself. The
reconstitution of genealogy will allow us to provide the space in
which the subjectivity of the African American Other will emerge by
revealing the suppressed alterities that have made possible the
dominant historical narrative.
The Article will conclude with a backward glance in Part VI.
These concluding remarks will attempt to respond briefly to some of
the familiar objections that critics of affirmative inclusion of minori-
ties typically advance. In some sense these brief responses will be
merely a revisitation of arguments made earlier in the Article, but
they will also emphasize the importance of taking seriously commu-
nicative representations. Only when we realize fully that we con-
tinually produce ourselves and others in the very process of present-
ing and representing ourselves and others will we be able to under-
stand the importance of providing institutional structures that en-
able minorities and majorities to interrogate each other's narratives,
and in the process develop a more defensible scheme of association.
II. THE CONTEXT
The 1980s were not good for minorities,3 6 and saying good-bye
35. See Michel Foucault, Politics, Polemics and Problemizations: An Interview, in
THE FOUCAULT READER 381, 381-82 (P. Rabinow ed., 1983).
In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucida-
tion, the rights of each person are in some sense imminent in the discussion.
They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is
merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to
perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different
postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, etc. As for the person answering the
questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself;
by the logic of his own discourse he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by
the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the other. Questions
and answers depend on a game-a game that is at once pleasant and difficult-
in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him
by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue.
Id.
36. See generally Michael Lerner, Looking Forward to the Nineties, 4 TIKKUN,
Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 37, 37. In fact it was not only minorities who found the 1980s difficult.
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to them was not too difficult. The anti-minority, or to be precise,
anti-black, mood of the era expressed itself in many different ways
and in a variety of institutions. From racial violence and tension in
some of the national universities"7 to the election of a former Grand
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan to a state legislature," from the resis-
tance to the brink of bankruptcy of a northeastern city to an inte-
grated neighborhood 39 to the racially motivated murders in New
York City,4" people seemed to act out their racism with little
Women, the poor, and other groups who did not enjoy meaningful access to power and its
processes also lost ground. While their needs and aspirations were defined by those in
power as "special interests," the desires and wishes of the powerful were declared to be
the "general interest." Id.
37. The University of Michigan, Brown University, Wesleyan University, the
University of Massachusetts, and Dartmouth College are some of the institutions where
there have been serious incidents of harassment, including racial slurs, fire-bombings,
and physical attacks on minority students, committed by white students and by campus
police officers. For an account of race relations at the nation's universities, see Darryl
Brown, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295 (1990). According
to the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, violence and harassment
against minority students has been reported at more than 300 colleges and universities.
See Wilkerson, supra note 22, at Al, B10.
38. David Duke, former national Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,
was elected to the Louisiana House of Representatives in February 1989 on an undis-
guisedly racist platform. See Tony Freemantle, Duke Advances One-Issue Platform-The
White Race, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1992, at Al. In 1991, running as the Republican
candidate for governor of Louisiana in a runoff election against former Governor Edwin
Edwards, Duke received nearly 40% of the total vote, and a majority of the white vote.
See Peter Applebome, Duke: The Ex-Nazi Who Would Be Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1991, § 1, at 26.
In 1985, Duke declared that, "[wie don't have a program to send [African-Americans]
back to Africa [but] an ideal ... would be geographic separation of the races, either within
this country or on an extra-continental basis...." Id. In 1986 he declared, "the Jews have
developed a disease and given it to us. It's called race mixing." Id. As recently as 1989 he
stated that "Ithere is only one country anymore that's all white, and that's Iceland, [and
that] is not enough." Id. He was nevertheless elected to the Louisiana legislature in 1989
and came close to being elected governor in 1991. See id.
39. In the early 1980s the Department of Justice sued the City of Yonkers, New York
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, charging that the city had engaged for 40 years in
a pattern of intentional segregation in the siting of subsidized public housing units. U.S.
v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The city was found liable, id.,
and was directed by the court in a remedial decree to site 200 units of public housing in
East Yonkers, a predominantly white area of the city. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1580-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Yonkers City Council voted to dis-
regard the court's decree, and the court imposed a series of fines on the city that began at
$100 and doubled each day that the city failed to comply with the court's decree. The fines
reached a total of $820,000, nearly bankrupting the city, before the City Council relented
and implemented the court's plan. See Marianne Arneberg, Cuomo Gets Tough With
Yonkers, NEWSDAY, Aug. 30, 1988, at 5; Neil A. Lewis, High Court's Support Asked on
Yonkers Housing Fines, N.Y. TINES, Oct. 3, 1989, at B4.
40. The Howard Beach murder and the Bensonhurst incident are perhaps the two
most well known cases. For a discussion of the Howard Beach incident, see James Barron,
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inhibition.4'
A number of reasons have been advanced to account for this
resurgence of racism and racial violence.42 An obvious and often
invoked reason has been the attitude of the federal government,
particularly the administrations led by Ronald Reagan and George
Bush.43 Those who make this argument contend that the Reagan
Police Search Queens for Attackers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at B2. For an account of
the Bensonhurst case, see Clem Richardson, Racial Tensions Usher in New Year,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 2, 1988, at 2; see also JOHN DESANTIS, FOR THE COLOR OF HIs SKIN: THE
MURDER OF YusuF HAWKINS AND THE TRIAL OF BENSONHURST (1991). In the Bensonhurst
incident, Yusuf Hawkins, a 16-year-old African American, was murdered by a mob of
young white males in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn, New York as he and three of
his friends were on their way to look at a used car that had been advertised for sale.
Hawkins's assailant, Joseph Fama, is reported to have said before pulling the trigger, "To
hell with beating them up. I'm gonna' shoot the nigger." See David K. Shipler, 'A Gentle
Young Man Who Would Be 16 Forever,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 7 (Book Review), at
11 (reviewing DESANTIS, supra).
41. Race relations in the 1990s are not noticeably better. Racism continues to mani-
fest itself in various ways, sometimes quite openly and at other times in the routine ways
institutions treat African Americans. The brutal beating of Rodney King, an African
American, by white members of the Los Angeles Police Department in 1992, and the offi-
cers' subsequent acquittal by a jury with no African American members, are only the
most brutal examples of how the white majority and institutions in this country continue
to devalue the lives of African Americans.
A 1990 survey by the National Opinion Research Center found that 78% of whites
believed that blacks were more likely than whites to prefer living on welfare, and 74%
thought the same of Hispanics. The survey also found that 62% of whites thought that
blacks were less likely to be hard-working (56% for Hispanics); 56% believed that blacks
were more violence-prone (50% for Hispanics); 53% thought blacks to be less intelligent
(55% for Hispanics); and 51% believed that blacks were less patriotic (61% for Hispanics)
than whites. Paradoxically, the survey also found that most whites believe in and support
racial equality and a fair society. See Survey: White Racism Alive and Well, THE
TIMIES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 9, 1991, at A4 (citing NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH
CENTER, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (1990)).
42. I use the term "racism" throughout the course of this article to refer to those
negative beliefs and attitudes that people from one race hold about members of another
race. Such beliefs and attitudes can, and quite often do, lead to discriminatory and
exclusionary behaviors against members of the group about whom those attitudes and be-
liefs are held. Sie GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 48 (1966); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Racist attitudes and beliefs may be consciously held,
or they may simply be part of a belief system upon which those that hold them never re-
flect, part of what Charles Lawrence has called "the unconscious." Lawrence, supra at 330
("Racism is in large part a product of the unconscious.... [It] is much more complex than
either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant
bigots. It is a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our
culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world,
ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities.").
For the victims of racism, it does not make a great deal of difference whether the racist
attitude is of conscious or unconscious origin. They both inflict pain and death on the victim.
43. The Bush campaign's use of Willie Horton as a campaign issue in the 1988
538 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
and Bush Administrations lacked a commitment to civil rights and
to the institutions through which such rights may be realized. They
conclude that this lack of commitment sent signals to white America
that there would be no collective sanction against racial violence and
racial discrimination. Indeed, it might even be argued that in rela-
tion to the Reagan administration, these signals were significantly
more permissive of racial intolerance. One need only consider the
kinds of appointments the Reagan Administration made44 and the
vigor with which the administration advocated before the Supreme
Court for the reversal of many long-standing civil rights laws.45
presidential election, and the manner in which it used him, was a thinly disguised
strategy to exploit racial tension in order to procure the white vote. Horton, an African
American criminal who raped a white woman while on furlough from prison, was not cho-
sen at random to make the point about the problem of crime and the supposed ineffi-
ciency of the criminal justice system, nor because he was the only criminal who had en-
gaged in such brutal acts. Rather, Horton was chosen for his value as a symbol to remind
white voters about the African American Other. Willie Horton served as a useful
reminder to white voters that to preserve the normal and moral order threatened by the
African American Other, the choice was clear- vote for George Bush and the Republican Party.
Bush's attack on the 1991 Civil Rights Bill as a "quota bill" before he signed it was
another way of making the black community a target of resentment by the white
community. See, e.g., Michael F. Frisby, Danforth Urges Bush to Abandon His Opposition
to Civil Rights Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1991, at 5. See also supra note 32. This effect
was recognized in a 1991 report of the bipartisan Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights,
which contended that President Bush "escalated racial tensions in the nation" and that
"the actions of the administration continue to be shaped less by principle than by
calculation of the political advantage to be derived from using the 'quota' label." Linda P.
Campbell & Linda M. Harrington, Report: Bush 'Escalated' Racial Tension, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 18, 1991, § 1, at 5 (quoting CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CML RIGHTS, LOST
OPPORTUNITIES (1991)). Arthur Flemming, the Commission's Chairman and the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare in the Eisenhower Administration, stated that the
President's use of the term "quota" when talking about the Civil Rights Bill was "a code
word designed to inflame relationships between groups in our nation." Id. at 5.
44. See Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went
Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785. President Reagan, for example, appointed as Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, William Bradford Reynolds, who was hostile to existing
civil rights laws and policies and who was actively engaged in dismantling what members
of the Administration saw as the civil rights status quo. See William B. Reynolds,
Individual vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984).
45. In one case, for example, the Reagan Administration moved to dismiss a suit
initiated by the Carter Justice Department seeking to maintain an Internal Revenue
Service policy of denying tax-exempt status to private schools which practice racial dis-
crimination. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In another it re-
versed a prior Justice Department stance to oppose a suit challenging a state anti-busing
statute. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 9, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). See Kimberl6 W.
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). Justice Thurgood Marshall
spoke for many African Americans when he ranked Renald Reagan at the bottom of his
list of presidents supportive of civil rights, "down with Hoover and that group-Wilson-
when we [African Americans] really didn't have a chance." ALTON HORNSBY JR.,
CHRONOLOGY OF AFRIcAN-AMERIcAN HISTORY: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND PEOPLE FROM
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Undoubtedly, the Reagan Administration's, and arguably the
Bush Administration's, hostile posture towards civil rights laws did
encourage much of the racist activity and discourse .that have been
seen and experienced in recent years. When President Reagan re-
ferred repeatedly to "the welfare queen,"46 his audience knew what
the message was: a message of the undeserving black on the shoul-
ders of the hardworking white. The Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions lent legitimacy to the rhetoric of the innocent white victim of
black transgression. But it would be naive to attribute the increas-
ing racial violence and hostility of the 1980s and early 1990s solely
to the lack of commitment by the federal government to civil rights
and the concerns of minorities. The Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions were able to act as they did precisely because they felt that
there was substantial support from their white constituencies for
their hostile policies and rhetoric. In some sense it could be argued
that what the Reagan and Bush Administrations did was merely
reflect publicly the many private conversations that exist among
many white Americans. Of course, that public constitution of many
private discourses accomplished two things: (1) it gave legitimacy to
those private convictions and conversations,47 and (2) it unified them
into a coherent voice, into discourses with a theme, telling a story to
disenfranchised whites that their disenfranchisement was a result
of "the new privilege" granted to African Americans and other mi-
norities. This act of giving public legitimacy to private perceptions
and stereotypes played a major role in the current resurgence of
racism and racial violence and intolerance, but it would be errone-
ous to think of it as the sole cause.
Other commentators, such as neo-conservative black scholars, 8
1619 TO THE PRESENT 350 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamps Program: How it Grew and How
Reagan Wants to Cut it Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1981, § 1, at 11.
47. See PHiLOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY RAcISM: AN
INTERDIscIPLINARY THEORY 27 (1991); James E. Blackwell, Dynamics of Minority
Education: An Index to the Status of Race and Ethnic Relations in the United States, 2
TROTTER INST. REV. 5, 11 (1988).
48. Two of the more prominent neo-conservative black intellectuals are Glenn Loury
and Thomas Sowell. Both are economists by training, but their extensive writings have
been concerned mainly with political economy, including issues that directly concefn
African Americans. For a discussion of the works and thoughts of contemporary African
American neo-conservatives, and particularly Loury and Sowell, see Symposium, Special
Section on Black Neoconservatives in the USA, 7 PRAXIS INT'L 133 (1987).
For a sample of Loury's and Sowell's writings on the issue of race and race relations
in America, see Glenn C. Loury, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, 79 IN PUB.
INTEREST 9 (1985); Glenn C. Loury, Internally Directed Action for Black Community
Development: The Next Frontier for 'the Movement," 13 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 31 (1984);
THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REAIxTY? (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC
AMERICA: A HISTORY (1981); THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES (1981); THOMAS
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regard the current racial tension primarily in terms of what they
regard to be the failure of the "civil rights agenda." These intellectu-
als argue that the affirmative action policies pursued by the nation
during the last few decades have failed to improve the condition of
the majority of blacks, and that the civil rights establishment has
been unable to justify to whites why these policies should be main-
tained. Therefore, they argue, the current racial tension is primarily
the result of the liberal civil rights agenda, which punishes innocent
whites while failing to come to grips with the real problems which
hold back blacks from entering the mainstream of American society.
For these neo-conservative scholars, the problems of African
Americans are primarily to be understood as cultural problems that
have emerged as a result of the crisis of values within the black
community.49 These cultural problems are seen to be a cause, rather
than a result, of the exclusion of blacks from the social and economic
life of the community. For neo-conservative blacks the solution to
racism is, as Robert Gooding-Williams has put it, two-fold: blacks
must "overcome their -cultural deficiencies" and must engage in
self-help enterprises20 According to this view, respect and recogni-
SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS (1975).
Shelby Steele, an English professor from San Jose State University, has recently
emerged as the most visible conservative critic and commentator on affinmative action,
appearing frequently in the national media. See Shelby Steele, THE CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AIERICA (1990); Peter Applebome, Stirring a
Debate on Breaking Racism's Shackles, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1990, at A18; Shelby Steele,
I'm Black, You are White, Who is Innocent: Race and Power in an Era of Blame, HARPER'S,
June 1988, at 453.
49. See THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (1983); Glenn C. Loury, Who Speaks for American Blacks?, COMMENTARY,
Jan. 1987, at 34. That a lack of self-discipline and personal responsibility are, for
example, said to create a culture where teenage pregnancy, dropping out of school, and
criminal behavior are prevalent.
In a speech following the 1992 Los Angeles uprisings, Vice President Dan Quayle
worked to develop the theme of "family values" as an election slogan by attempting to
convince the residents of South Central Los Angeles that their plight was primarily a re-
sult of their lack of appropriate values. See William Raspberry, Dr. Dan's Diagnosis is
Much Better than His Prescription, CHIC. TRIB., May 25, 1992, at 9. His speech was but
another episode of "blaming the victim."
Some prominent white politicians who call themselves conservatives have spoken in
recent years in terms that suggest that blacks are inherently deficient, and that whites
are thus free of responsibility for the plight of blacks. Patrick Buchanan, the well-known
newspaper columnist and television commentator who challenged George Bush for the
Republican nomination for president in 1992, in a discussion of race and poverty, claimed
that "[wihat the poor need more than anything today is a dose of the truth. Slums are the
products of the people who live there. Dignity and respect are not handed out like food
stamps; they are earned and won .... " Thomas B. Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, When the
Official Subject is Presidential Politics, Taxes, Welfare, Crime, Rights or Values... the
Real Subject is Race, THE ATLANTIC, May 1991, at 53, 80.
50. Robert Gooding-Williams, Black Neoconservatism: A Critical Introduction, 7
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tion by the majority will then follow. But both of these explanations
for the resurgence and persistence of racism, the "blame the
Republican federal government" and the "blame the victim" perspec-
tives, are too narrow. Each concerns itself only with individual acts,
and each is therefore oblivious to the institutional and structural
situations which make those individual acts possible, indeed ines-
capable.
There are other explanations for the resurgence of racism.5 The
purpose of this Article, however, is not to detail the numerous possi-
ble reasons for the persistence of racism in this country. This Article
instead considers one social process, the communication process, to
see how racism reproduces itself and whether the communication
process may be used for transformative politics.
Thus, the context that has given rise to the reflections in this
paper is one in which racism and racial violence increasingly define
social and political life in this country, and in which the traditional
explanations for the causes of the resurgence of racism and racial
violence seem to be increasingly unconvincing. This Article does not
claim that the role of the communication industry in the constitution
of the identity of African Americans can account for every ill that
defines race relations in the United States; indeed, no one social
process or factor can provide a complete explanation for social ills
such as racism, because the identities of the racist and the victim of
racism are defined by complex and interwoven social processes.
Rather, the contention of the Article is that in so far as most, if not
all, of the explanations for the persistence and resurgence of racism
omit an important social process, the communication process, which
explicitly defines the identities that link the racist and the victim of
racism, then those explanations are necessarily incomplete and any
remedies that emerge from them will be ineffective.
I. RACISM AND THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS
If they can define you, they can confine you.
52
PRAXIS IML 133, 134 (1987); see also Cornel West, Demystifying the New Black
Conservatism, 7 PRAXIS INTL 143, 144 (1987).
51. See ALLPORT, supra note 42, at 367-71 (discussing the connection between eco-
nomic insufficiency and racial anxiety); BRUNO BETrELHEim & MORRIS JANOWrMz,
DYNAMIcs OF PREJUDICE 80-81 (1950) (discussing the relationship between economic ap-
prehension and intolerance); Oscar Handlin, Prejudice and Capitalist Exploitation, 6
COM ENTARY 79 (1948) (discussing theory of prejudice as an exploitative tool of
capitalism); see also Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991).
52. J.H. O'Dell, Preface to CARL GINSBURG, RACE AND MEDIA: THE ENDURING LIFE OF
THE MOYNIHAN REPORT xiii (1989) (quoting Jesse Jackson).
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A. Racism in the Communication Industry
The media report and write from the standpoint of a white man's world.
The ills of the ghetto, the difficulties of life there, the Negro's burning sense
of grievance, are seldom conveyed. Slights and indignities are part of the
Negro's daily life, and many of them come from what he now calls "the
white press"--a press that repeatedly, if unconsciously reflects the biases,
the paternalism, the indifference of white America.
5 4
No institution in this country is or can be free of the culture of
racism that has so thoroughly defined America,"5 so the fact that the
communication industry is infected with racism can be of no great
revelation to anyone. Indeed, the communications industry has been
one of the most effective institutions in perpetuating a particular
image of African Americans in the consciousness of European
Americans. Given the highly segregated nature of social life and the
workplace, 6 the media is often the only means through which blacks
and whites have sustained contact with each other. The media, how-
ever, often fails to bridge the social space between the two groups,
and in many ways it has continued to institutionalize that gap.57
Unconscious, or structural, racism in the media has had three
consequences for African Americans. First, African Americans are
largely excluded as mass media communicators. Second, subjects of
interest to African Americans have been systematically omitted
from the mainstream media. Third, even when African Americans
enter the discourse as subjects, they are usually cast in an unfavor-
able light.
1. Racism I: Exclusion of Minority Communicators. The latest
available statistics indicate that the presence of minorities as com-
municators in the electronic media is depressingly low.58 There are
two ways in which people can be active participants in the commu-
nication industry: as owners and as employees. The number of mi-
norities is very low in both areas. Minorities own and control only
53. See supra note 42.
54. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 366 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT].
55. As Justice Marshall wrote in his Croson dissent, "IT]he tragic and indelible fact
[is] that discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has per-
vaded our Nation's history and continues to scar our society." City of Richmond v. J.A
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
57. It would be unrealistic to believe that there are no instances of intentional dis-
crimination in the communication industry. What is undoubtedly more pervasive,
however, and more harmful, is what has been referred to as "unconscious" racism, what
can usefully be referred to as "structural" racism. See supra note 41.
58. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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3.5 percent of the television and radio broadcast stations in the con-
tinental United States,59 and African Americans own and control
less than 2 percent. 0 The situation has not been improving.' Even
when minorities enter broadcasting, the nature of that entry is gen-
erally unsatisfactory. For example, the overwhelming majority of the
television stations owned by minorities-about 78 percent-are in
the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) bands, rather than the more desir-
able Very High Frequency (VHF) bands.62
The minority employment situation is no better. The FCC
Equal Employment Opportunity Trend Report for the period be-
tween 1986 and 1990 indicates that during that period African
Americans held less than 6 percent of broadcast management jobs,
and the figures have remained virtually stagnant for the five-year
59. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610-11 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("It is undisputed that minority participation in the broadcasting industry
falls markedly below the demographic representation of those groups.... IM]inority own-
ers... [have] a controlling interest in 3.5 percent of stations and this shortfall may be
traced in part to the discrimination and the patterns of exclusion that have widely af-
fected our society.") (citations omitted). The 3.5% ownership level cited by Justice
O'Connor includes ownership interests held by all minorities, not just by African
Americans. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J.). The FCC defines
"minority" to mean "those of Black, Hispanic surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, Amer-
ican Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership
of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978); see also Commission Policy
Regarding Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 849 n.1
(1982) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(C) (1982)). Compare the 3.5% figure with statistics
from the 1990 census, which indicate that whites comprise 80.3% of the United States
population. Of the remaining 19.7%, Blacks comprise 12.1% of the population (as opposed
to 11.7% in 1980), Hispanics comprise 9.0% (6.4%), Asian and Pacific Islanders comprise
2.9% (1.5%), and American Indians, Eskimos and Aleut comprise 0.8% (0.6%). Other
non-whites comprise 3.9% (3.0%) of the population. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 17 t.16 (112th ed. 1992).
The level of minority ownership of cable television outlets is less than 1%, lower even
than minority ownership of over-the-air broadcast outlets. Thomas H. Billingslea Jr.,
Monday Memo:A Tax Certificate Commentary, BROADCASTING, May 28, 1990, at 25.
60. There are approximately 12,000 radio station licenses and approximately 1,200
television station licenses outstanding in the United States. Of that number, only 182 ra-
dio stations (1.5%) and 17 television stations (1.4%) are licensed to black-owned
companies. See Jeremy Gerard, For Minority Broadcasters, A Role in What Is Seen and
Heard, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1990, at 11; see also Jeremy Gerard, Minority Role in
Broadcasting Yields Far Bigger Effect on Radio Than T.V., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at
B6; HoWARD UNIVERSITY SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER, COMMUNICATIONS AND
MINORITY ENTERPRISE IN THE 1990S, App. 5 at 1-2 (1990).
61. See infra part IV.B.1.
62. See William Mahoney, Obstacles Remain for Blacks in TV, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
May 19, 1986 at 1. VHF bands are more desirable than UHF bands because they are less
expensive to operate and transmit higher quality video and audio signals. See T. BARTON
CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 50 (2d ed. 1989).
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period.' The situation is one the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit characterized in a 1984 decision as "extreme un-
derrepresentation."14
Access to the print media remains limited as well. A 1988 sur-
vey conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors re-
ported that "[t]he majority of U.S. dailies still have no minority
professionals on their staffs."65 For newspapers with circulations
under 10,000, "the percentage... with minorities on staff dropped
from 24 percent two years ago to 20 percent this year."6 In the cru-
cial category of management personnel, only four percent were mi-
norities." In 1988 the president of the National Association of Black
Journalists characterized the minority employment situation as
depressing.68 Given the fact that there is relatively little regulatory
structure directed at the print media, prospects for improvement in
the print media appear even less encouraging than in the broadcast
media.
The fact that there is extreme underrepresentation of minori-
ties generally, and African Americans specifically, in the communi-
cation industry does not necessarily prove the existence of discrimi-
nation. Statistical evidence of underrepresentation may be attribut-
able to factors other than discrimination against the underrepre-
sented. Indeed, this seems to be Justice O'Connor's point in her
63. See inf-ra note 216.
64. West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("Because of the extreme underrepresentation of minorities among the nation's
broadcasters, minority perspectives are conspicuously absent from the broadcast media.")
65. American Society of Newspaper Editors, Press Release 1 (April 13, 1988) (on file
with author); see also Dick Haws, Tracking Progress Toward an Elusive Goal, COLUM.
JOURNALISt REV., JaniFeb. 1992, at 24 C T]he overall newsroom picture... remains
bleak.").
66. American Society of Newspaper Editors, supra note 65, at 1.
67. Id.
68. DeWayne Wickham, president of the association, said, "we came to the [Associa-
tion's annual] convention somewhat depressed by the state of change that has occurred in
the industry." Black Journalists, supra note 12, at 7. The American Society of Newspaper
Editors' 1989 employment survey showed only a negligible increase in the number of mi-
nority newspaper reporters, editors, and photographers. Jay Mallin, Newspapers Still
Reflect Predominance of Males, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1990, at A4. Commenting on these
figures, the chairman of the Society's Minorities Committee declared that they were "not
only unfortunate, but embarrassing for our industry...." Eleanor Randolph, The
Newspaper Editors, At a Loss for Words, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1990, at B1. The observa-
tion of the Kerner Commission more than twenty years ago seems to be as relevant today
as it was when it was made: "The journalistic profession has been shockingly backward in
seeking out, hiring, training, and promoting Negroes .... The plaint is, We can't find
qualified Negroes.' But this rings hollow from an induistry where, only yesterday, jobs
were scarce and promotion unthinkable for a man whose skin was black." KERNER
REPORT, supra note 54, at 384-85.
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opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co.6"
In Croson, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Richmond, Virginia ordinance that required prime contractors
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 per-
cent of the dollar amount of the contract to minority business enter-
prises. The City Council justified the plan as remedial in nature,
designed to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the con-
struction industry and promote "wider participation by minority
business enterprises in the construction of public projects." 0 Writing
for the majority, Justice O'Connor struck down the ordinance as
inconsistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, finding "no direct evidence of race dis-
crimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or any evi-
dence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against
minority-owned subcontractors."7'
Justice O'Connor argued that a number of possible causes other
than discrimination existed for the underrepresentation of minori-
ties, and that until these alternative reasons were eliminated, dis-
crimination could not be adopted as the sole plausible explanation.
"It is sheer speculation how may minority firms there would be in
Richmond absent societal discrimination,"7 and the extremely low
representation of minorities standing alone "is not probative of any
discrimination in. the local construction industry."7 Why? Because
"[t]here are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority par-
ticipation ... ." According to Justice O'Connor's reasoning, there-
69. 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
70. Id. at 872 (citing RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-158(a) (1985)). Justice Marshall
in his dissent refered to the objective of the statute as the furtherance of the interest of
"governmental non-perpetuation." Id. at 537, 539 (Marshall, J., dissenting). By the term
"governmental non-perpetuation" Justice Marshall meant the government's interest in
"preventing the city's own spending decisions from reinforcing and perpetuating the ex-
clusionary effects of past discrimination." Id. at 537. For a discussion of the
non-perpetuation doctrine, see Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96
HARV. L. REv. 828 (1983).
71. Croson,488 U.S. at 480. The requirement of direct evidence of discrimination is
irrelevant for purposes of affirmative action if the justification for affirmative action is
something other than the remedy of past discrimination. Such evidence is necessary only
if one assumes, as Justice O'Connor assumed, that the only legitimate justification for af-
firmative action is the remedy of past discrimination. A better justification, however, is
diversity. For a further discussion of the justifications for affirmative action, see infra
Part V.
72. 488 U.S. at 498-99.
73.Id. at 503.
74. Id.; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.) ("It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is the




fore, it is impermissible to infer discrimination in the communica-
tion industry from statistical evidence of "depressingly low" minority
representation.
Justice O'Connor suggested two alternatives that might explain
the "dearth of minority participation" 5 in the construction industry,
alternatives that might also apply to the broadcast industry. The
first alternative is the existence of "past societal discrimination in
education and economic opportunities."76 The second is that "blacks
might be disproportionately attracted to industries other than con-
struction."77 Suppose the first explanation were true; would that
invalidate a program such as the one adopted by the City of
Richmond, whose purpose was to remedy past discrimination? For
Justice O'Connor, the answer is "yes." This answer is plausible to
her because she sees clearly separated and autonomous spheres of
existence (e.g., education, economic life, the construction industry)
within which acts of individuals and groups are to be confined and
evaluated. If there has been discrimination in the education field,
for example, the construction industry may not be made to carry the
burden of remedy. When spheres are seen to be autonomously con-
stituted, then it makes sense not to make one sphere accountable for
the acts and sins of another. The concept of the autonomy of spheres
is analogous to that of the autonomy of offspring, the often made
claim that people ought not be made accountable for the wrongdoing
of their ancestors.
The problem with the argument of autonomy is that it miscon-
ceives the complex relationship between both parent and progeny
and among spheres. To say that the construction industry is sepa-
rate from the education system is at some elementary level correct.
The two have different short-term objectives: one is engaged in the
general training of people, the other in the specific business of con-
struction. In a deeper sense, however, the two spheres assume each
other. The education system affects the way the construction indus-
try is constituted, as Justice O'Connor is prepared to accept, and it
may be plausibly argued that the way in which economic life in the
construction industry is constituted will to some degree determine
the way in which the education system deals with various'members
of the community. Those who have better access to jobs in the con-
struction industry and other industries are better able to provide
their children with better access to education. Thus, in some signifi-
cant sense the construction industry is not a passive recipient of
products of the education system but is, at least partly, determina-
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live of who goes through that system. The relationship between the
education sphere and the economic sphere, such as the construction
industry, is not one of mutual demarcation and seclusion, but rather
one of mutual reinforcement and redefinition.
What we have in this country is a system, not just various
spheres of existence. The various spheres achieve their distinctive-
ness by virtue of the fact that they are constituent parts of the sys-
tem and are connected in a complex web of relationships. 7 8 To reform
and improve the system requires that these various spheres be
treated as a unit and be dealt with as a whole.79 Once the problem of
discrimination is seen as system-wide, then the argument that it
ought to be dealt with in another sphere becomes unavailable. There
is no natural place where to start re-arranging the system; that
starting place is anywhere and everywhere.
The second possible explanation offered by Justice O'Connor
raises more questions than it settles. Suppose it were true that
African Americans are disproportionately attracted to industries
other than construction, as she suggested was at least possible. The
question then becomes one of why it is that African Americans as a
group are disinclined, relative to European Americans, to enter the
construction industry, or, analogously, why it is that there are more
African Americans than European Americans in many of the major
sports? There may be two possible responses.
The first response might suggest that there is something about
being African or African American, culturally or otherwise, that
somehow dissuades them from entering the construction industry,
just as there may be something about them that attracts them to
athletics. While one may assume this, the assumption must be ex-
plained, as it is at odds with both our intuitive feelings and the
ideological commitment of American society. The official ideology in
the United States teaches that people ought to be treated as indi-
viduals rather than as representatives of groups, and that people's
choices must be regarded as individual decisions rather than the
inevitable outcomes of their membership in particular groups. 0 The
78. Commentators have noted the inherent interdependence of the various spheres of
society. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 215 ("There is none of these sectors
[economic, cultural, political] that does not immediately involve the others .... Whenever
there's a move to concentrate on just one sector, it's often understandable in the context
of the time, but it's always theoretically wrong.").
79. The alternative will lock us into a vicious cycle of deferment. By this I mean that
problems that manifest themselves in one sphere will be treated as having their genesis
in another sphere, and hence be dealt with in that sphere. But one sphere may in turn
blame another sphere, and so on.




individualist account of the self tells us that choices are not inher-
ently constrained by the group in which one is a member. It is ironic
that the current Supreme Court, which has been hostile to the no-
tion of group rights, finds it appropriate to assume group attributes
when it denies remedies to a particular group. Perhaps it is not so
ironic, for the history of this country amply demonstrates that group
treatment has been embraced when African Americans are to be
summarily excluded and disadvantaged, while the notion of group
rights is vilified when it is seen to benefit African Americans.
Indeed, despite the official ideology that people are to be treated as
individuals rather than as members of a group or of a race, the ac-
tual practice in the United States in relation to African Americans
has been very similar to the attitude of the colonial power towards
the colonized that Albert Memmi so powerfully described. Memmi
observed that one of the means by which the colonized is depersonal-
ized is through "the mark of the plural," by which he meant that
"[tihe colonized is never characterized in an individual manner; he is
entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity ('They are this.'
'They are all the same.')."8 1 One of the ways by which a dominant
group humanizes itself while simultaneously robbing the dominated
of its humanity is by concretizing its own members as individuals,
with their differences, virtues, and vices, while members of the
dominated groups are seen merely as representatives of the group,
rather than as individuals. 2
The second response to the assertion that the cause of under-
representation is a "disproportionately low attraction" of blacks to
the industry is to argue that even if that disinterest were true, the
cause of it is to be found not in the rather irrelevant attribute of
81. ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 85 (Howard Greenfeld
trans., 1965).
82. It is interesting to note that when it was discovered that the Milwaukee serial
killer, Jeffrey Dahmer, had killed and performed gruesome acts on his numerous victims,
the media and the general public treated the acts of the serial killer as the acts of a de-
ranged individual. See, e.g., Christian B. Gagnon, There Are No Monsters-Not Even
Jeffrey Dahmer, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 14, 1991, at A8; Rogers Worthington & Colin
McMahon, A Gruesome Pattern Emerges: Money Was the Lure, Spiked Drink Sprang the
Trap, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1991, at C1. Any attempt to characterize his acts as representa-
tive of what white people are capable of doing or are likely to do would have been seen as
preposterous. Even though most serial killers are white, the idea of defining the identity
of the white community by the acts of a few individuals would be to deny the individuality
of members of the white community. But imagine if the Milwaukee murderer was instead
a black man. My hunch is that both the media and the white community would not have
seen his acts as merely those of an individual; instead his acts might have been
generalized as representative of the larger community. When an African American acts in
a particular way, his act is quite often regarded as generalizable and an indicator of the
proclivities of African Americans. African Americans exist as an abstract group, not as
individuals. This is one way to dehumanize a people.
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color, but in the social and political processes which shaped the expe-
riences and expectations of a group of people in a particular way.
Once the issue is reformulated this way, then the argument I have
advanced against Justice O'Connor's first speculation applies.
Therefore, unless one is prepared to assume that there is some-
thing inherently defective about African Americans, statistical
disparities such as those found in the communications industry lead
to only one conclusion: systemic exclusion does exist. In an era when
exclusionary practices have become subtle and sophisticated, where
the system continually legitimizes its disenfranchising practices as
part of the normal course of doing business, statistical evidence may
be the only available means to demonstrate illegitimate exclusion.
As in the construction industry, the extreme underrepresentation of
African Americans in the communications industry cannot be un-
derstood in terms other than the systemic exclusion of African
Americans. Racism is not merely a conscious individual or group at-
titude towards other individuals or groups;' it is also a culture
which continues to provide the matrix within which people act daily.
If we fail to understand, as Justice O'Connor clearly does, that this
cultural consciousness continues to structure the circumstances and
conditions within which actors operate, quite often with those actors
being unaware of them, then we will never come to grips with the
issue of racism and otherness in late twentieth-century America.
Statistical evidence will quite often be the only means which will
enable us to both understand and deal with this cultural conscious-
ness.
Consider, for example, the comments of Al Campanis with
which I introduced the Article.8 Here was a man who appeared on
national television to celebrate the achievements of his friend, an
African American. I doubt that he saw himself as a racist, and evi-
dence suggests that Campanis is a decent man who never intended
any racial slur with his comments.85 In any case it seems unlikely
that given the sensitive nature of racial remarks in American society
Campanis would have made remarks he believed to be racist when
83. See supra note 42.
84. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
85. Not long after he was dismissed by the Dodgers, Campanis was enlisted by
Professor Harry Edwards, an African American sociologist at the University of California
and consultant to the Commissioner of Baseball, to assist him in devising means of
improving minority representation at baseball's administrative and coaching levels.
Murray Chass, Edwards Enlists Campanis's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1987, at A25; see
also Robert Lipsyte, An Outsider Joins the Team, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1988, § 6, at 34
(quoting Edwards as having said of Al Campanis, "He's an educator, like me, and he's a
very nice man."); Dennis Wyss, Fighting From the Inside; Former Jock and Campus
Radical Harry Edwards Now Works to Put Minorities into the Front Offices of
Professional Baseball, TIME, Mar. 6, 1989, at 62.
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he certainly would know that such remarks would jeopardize his job.
He would have instead expressed his racist views privately, while
making nonoffensive remarks in public. Campanis's comments indi-
cate how stereotypical attitudes can structure and inform people's
daily decisions, with those people being unaware that they in fact
hold stereotypical and racist views. 6 Once racism is viewed in this
way, statistical disparities might be considered more probative than
courts and other public officials are presently prepared to accept.
8 7
From the excluded's point of view, it makes little difference whether
the discrimination is of conscious or unconscious origin.88
2. Racism II: Omission of Issues Which Are of Concern to
Minorities.
There is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about, and
that is not being talked about.
8 9
Just over two decades ago, in the wake of a series of racial dis-
turbances and riots which swept the United States, a national com-
mission was formed by the federal government to inquire into the
causes of the disturbances. The National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission,9" is-
sued its report in 1968 in which it stated that a lack of presentation
of minority issues contributed partially to those disturbances.9 The
Commission observed that:
86. As Charles Lawrence observed, "we all harbor prejudiced attitudes that are kept
from our consciousness." Lawrence, supra note 42, at 339.
87. Some have recognized that many of today's decisions are based on yesterday's
perceptions. Judge Spottswood Robinson III of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has noted, for example, that "[B]ehind today's failure to think of
minority interests is yesterday's deliberate decision to discriminate." Bilingual Bicultural
Coalition on Mass Media v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 637 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson, J.,
dissenting).
Justice John Paul Stevens has expressed that idea even more bluntly. "Habit, rather
than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and fe-
male, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was
the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence, supra note 42.
88. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub
nom. Smuck v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) ("[Tihe arbitrary quality
of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and as unfair to private rights and public
interests as the perversity of a willful scheme.").
89. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 2 (Isobel Murray ed., 1974) (1891).
90. The Commission took its popular name from its Chairman, Otto Kerner, then the
Governor of Illinois. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 54, at xvii.
91. See id. at 366 ("[Tlhe news media have failed to analyze and report adequately on
racial problems in the United States, and, as a related matter, to meet the Negro's
legitimate expectations in journalism.").
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[The media] have not communicated to the majority of their audience-
which is white-a sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of
living in the ghetto. They have not communicated to whites a feeling for
the difficulties and frustrations of being a Negro in the United States.
They have not shown understanding or appreciation of-and thus have
not communicated-a sense of Negro culture, thought, or history.
92
In the intervening twenty-five years very little seems to have
changed. As the Los Angeles disturbances of 1991 clearly demon-
strated, the despair of African Americans, especially the young, and
the failure of the mainstream media to communicate to the general
polity that despair and misery, seem to be remarkably similar to the
conditions noted by the Kerner Commission. 3 The media's neglect is
not limited to the conditions of the inner cities and the issues that
most concern poor African American residents of the ghettos, al-
though those are the most glaring omissions. African Americans
seem generally invisible in the mainstream media unless they are
resurrected as the problem. Although in most large urban areas,
minorities, especially African Americans, now constitute the major-
ity or make up a significant minority, and although this strong pres-
ence has manifested itself in the election of many African American
mayors and council members,9 it is painfully obvious that blacks are
almost invisible when it comes to the mainstream media taking up
issues of significant concern to blacks. In major cities with large
African American populations, the majority of social items in the
daily papers are still about whites. 5 Recent evidence shows that in
92. Id. at 383.
93. For example, the Los Angeles Times publishes community sections devoted to
such areas of Southern California as the suburbs of Los Angeles County, Orange County,
and Ventura County, but none devoted to South Central Los Angeles or other predomi-
nantly African American communities. See Carol B. Shirley, Where Have You Been?,
COLUM. JOURNALSM REv., July/Aug. 1992, at 25.
94. At the end of 1991 African Americans had been elected the mayors of seventeen
American cities with populations of 100,000 or more, including many of the largest cities,
such as Los Angeles, New York, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Cleveland. R. BENJAMIN
JOHNSON & JACQUELINE L. JOHNSON, THE BLACK RESOURCE GUIDE 279-84 (10th ed.,
1990-91)
95. The Washington Post, a newspaper published in a city that is over 70 percent
African American, has been criticized and even boycotted by African Americans for its
lack of coverage of the city's African American community. In 1986, for example, a
coalition of Washington community groups staged a three month protest over the Post's
coverage of the black community. David Shaw, Circulation Surprises Critics; Washington
Times Works to Attract Black Readers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, Pt. 1, at 1. Ronald
Walters, chairman of the political science depaitment at Howard University, noted that
in terms of the Post's coverage, "It is almost as if there is no vibrant black culture in the
city. [The Washington Post] does not cover life at the community level. Washington, D.C.,
has the largest black middle class in the world, and you would never know it from reading
The Post." David E. Rosenbaum, An Editor Is Retiring, Leaving His Mark, N.Y. TIMES,
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the broadcast media, programming on issues of concern for minori-
ties is virtually non-existent. 6
This omission can possibly be attributed to factors other than
racism. It can be said that the omission of minority-focused pro-
gramming is simply a sound business decision, rather than a deci-
sion influenced by conscious or unconscious racial animus. The me-
dia, which is financed by advertisers, is necessarily conscious of
which segments of its audience do the most consumer spending, and
what programming sells to those segments. It is undeniable, the
argument goes, that advertisers target the white consumer because
of its purchasing power. In fact, minorities, especially residents of
inner cities, are referred to by many in the communication industry
as "bad demographics."97
This reliance on the demands of advertisers to defend selective
coverage is curious. First, this reliance directly contradicts the im-
age which the media seeks to project: that the media is an institu-
tion that serves the public interest, not just another business enter-
prise driven by profit motive. In the case of the electronic media, the
"public interest" requirement is a statutory mandate." There is no
necessary convergence between the economic interest of a particular
media and the public interest which the media is required, or pro-
fesses, to serve. 9 Second, and more to the point, the economic argu-
ment does not explain the fact that in most instances it is not only
issues that are of interest to poor African Americans that are absent,
but also issues that are of concern to more well-off African
Americans who have the disposable income to purchase the adver-
tised items.
To be sure, it is not entirely correct to say that the mainstream
media does not concern itself with issues that are of concern to mi-
norities. It does.' Quite often an issue, such as drugs, becomes im-
portant for the media when the problem is seen to be one with a
wider reach and with an effect on the dominant racial group of the
society. Even in this specific sense, however, blacks enter the dis-
course not so much as victims but as part of the problem, even as
June 22, 1991, § 1, at 6.
96. A 1983 study shows that "network affiliates produce an average of less than 30
seconds of minority-oriented programming a day." Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of
Minority Advocacy Before the FCC: Using Marketplace Rhetoric to Urge Policy Change, 41
FED. COm. L.J. 133, 140 n.23 (1989) (citing HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF TELEVISION DATA
SURVEY (1983)).
97. Shirley, supra note 93, at 26.
98. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
99. See text accompanying infra notes 243-44.
100. See text accompanying infra notes 112-18.
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"The Problem." When the media focuses on Washington, D.C. as "the
murder capital of the nation," for example,' 10 the tone of the dis-
course is usually one of contemptuous accusation of the black com-
munity rather than an acknowledgment of the pain of the commu-
nity.
3. Racism III: Enter the Stereotypical Black.
By failing to portray the Negro as a matter of routine and in the context of
the total society, the news media have, we believe, contributed to the
black-white schism in this country. 1
0 2
We wish to plead our own cause.... Too long has the publick been deceived
by misrepresentation, in things which concern us dearly.... From the press
and the pulpit we have suffered much by being incorrectly represented.
0 3
The American media has in recent years played a dual, para-
doxical role in the presentation of African Americans to the general
society. While the daily account of the life of the typical black person
is still one of stereotype and extreme negativism, the image of the
fictional black person has fared relatively well. Media accounts of
the daily lives of African Americans are filled with negative im-
agery, images that clearly define the African American as the trans-
gressor Other.10 4 There has been, however, a change in the image of
blacks in fictional'accounts. Since the mid-1980s television has pro-
duced situation comedies such as The Cosby Show, 227, Frank's
Place, and A Different World which have shifted black characters
from low-income settings to more middle class and up-scale ones.
These programs present images of the fully accepted and assimi-
lated middle class black, whose sense of self is defined not by his
daily encounters with racism but by the same aspirations and values
101. See Sam V. Meddis, Tables Turn on U.S. Attorney, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 1993, at
A4; mry McGrory, The Quadrennial Makeover: City Primps for the Moment, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at F25; Adrienne T. Washingon, No Issue Matters More, WASH.
TIEs, Feb. 2, 1993, at B1. Each story refers to Washington as the "murder capital" of the
United States.
102. KERNER REPORT, supra note 54, at 383.
103. To Our Patrons, FREEDOM'S JOURNAL (New York), Mar. 16, 1827, at 1, reprinted
in CLINT C. WILSON H & FtLX GUTIARREZ, MINORITIES AND MEDIA: DIVERSITY AND THE
END OF MASS COMIUNICATION 197 (1985). Freedom's Journal was the first newspaper
published in the United States by African Americans. WILSON & GUTIERREZ, supra at
179. The quoted statement was published in the newspaper's first issue in 1827. Id. at
180-81. More than 165 years later, the same observation about the media's misrepresen-
tation of African Americans may still be made with a considerable degree of accuracy.
104. News stories featuring blacks and Hispanics are typically more negative than
stories featuring Whites, and focus mostly on crime and other negative topics. See ALETHA
C. HOUSTON ET AL., BIG WORLD, SMALL SCREEN: THE ROLE OF TELEVISION IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 25 (1992) (citing Bradley S. Greenberg, Minorities and the Mass Media, in
PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECT 165 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 1986)).
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that define middle class white families.105
At first blush the two images, the fictional account and the
"real" account, seem to be at odds with each other. The account of
the real person is typified by themes of difference and negation,
while the account of the fictional person is typified by themes of
sameness and assimilation. There is, however, some consistency and
coherence between the two narratives. The narrative of the daily
lives of real blacks is the narrative of sin, of black collective fall. This
is the familiar majority story of blacks as transgressors. The narra-
tive of fictional blacks, on the other hand, is the redemptive story,
the story of hope and the redemptive power of the majority and its
institutions. It is the story of the image which white America holds
of itself and of its institutions, where mobility and success are open
to any person who possesses the requisite ambition and talent. The
narrative of the fictional black frees the majority of the responsi-
bility for the condition of the real black.'06
But what of examples of the daily depiction of blacks in the
media? When the depiction is not of blacks as criminals, it is of
blacks as people who lack the most important ingredient of person-
hood, the capacity to think. Al Campanis summed up this attitude
when he declared that blacks lack "the necessities" to be responsible
citizens. African Americans are depicted in the media as a threat to
the physical and cultural health of the majority community.
A 1991 report in The New York Times17 demonstrates the point
well. Dubuque, a small city in Iowa with a population of about
60,000, has in recent years experienced racial tension, the emer-
gence of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the National
105. See Herman Gray, Television and the New Black Man: Black Male Images in
Prime-Time Situation Comedy, 8 MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 223, 223-24 (1986)
("[These images] emphasize black Americans who have achieved middle class success,
confirming in the process the belief that in the context of the current political, economic
and cultural arrangements, individuals, regardless of colour, can achieve the American
dream. However, these images also exist in the absence of significant change in the
overall position of black Americans as a social group.").
106. A 1992 report conducted by researchers at the University of Massachusetts, and
financed by Bill Cosby himself, found that The Cosby Show, by featuring an affluent black
family, desensitized whites to the nation's racial inequalities. Sut Jhally, one of the re-
port's authors, suggested that,
[l1f black people fail, then white people can look at the successful black people
on 'The Cosby Show' and say they only have themselves to blame.... Most
white people accepted that America has had a kind of racist past, but the pres-
ence of the Huxtables and their spinoffs really seems to send a message to white
people that black people can make it if they try.
Jeff Donn, Study Knocks 'Cosby' for Loop, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 27,
1992, at All.
107. Isabel Wilkerson, Seeking A Racial Mix, Dubuque Finds Tension, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1991, § 1, at 1.
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Association for the Advancement of White People, and a plague of
racial graffiti scrawled on school and church buildings, some of it
proclaiming "the new KKK"'O What is surprising about the
Dubuque situation is not that racism exists in the Midwest as it
does in the South and other parts of the country; no part of the coun-
try is immune from the culture of racism. Rather, what is surprising
is that racism exists even where there are virtually no African
Americans in the community. Racial minorities comprise only 2
percent of Dubuque's population, and the city in late 1991 had only
331 black residents "scattered across the city."'0 9 Yet the presence of
a handful of African Americans was apparently enough to trigger
racism and racial attacks. The image upon which racist members of
the community acted could hardly have been derived from actual
contact with African Americans, for very few African Americans live
in the community. Furthermore, no member of the African American
community in Dubuque is reported to have committed any of the
acts for which the mainstream media condemns the entire African
American community. What the situation in Dubuque demonstrates
is that white America quite often acts in response to the image of
African Americans constructed in large measure by the media.
When a puzzled counselor in a high school in Dubuque wondered,
"How can we have a race problem when we don't even have minori-
ties?," 1° the answer is that the source of the problem is not the pres-
ence of minorities, but rather the presence of a profoundly negative
national identity of African Americans sustained and reproduced by
the cultural institutions of this country, such as the media.'
As a means of exploring the image of African Americans pre-
sented by the media, I will now look at the description and coverage
of three specific groups of African Americans: young black males,
black athletes, and black politicians.
a. Young Black Males. The image of young black males con-
veyed by the mainstream media is one associated with drugs, crime,
and violence. To be a young black male is to be thought of as the
paradigmatic Other. It is an image that instills fear and terror
among whites. Stephen Carter was right when he observed,
"[b]lackness... can threaten simply by appearing unexpectedly, in a
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Kim Clayton, a counselor at Dubuque Senior High School).
111. One Dubuque high school student remarked that "[blacks are] always the mean
guy in the movies." Id.; see also Isabel Wilkerson, The Tallest Fence: Feelings on Race in a
White Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1992, § 1, at 18. Wilkerson compared two
mostly segregated Chicago neighborhoods, one black and one white. She reported that,
"[plarticularly for whites, it seems, what they learn about the other race comes from tele-
vision news or stereotypes passed down through the generations." Id.
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wealthy white suburb in the middle of the day, on a darkened side-
walk in the middle of the night, on the other side of the peephole in
the door when no one is expected.""' "Criminal" has become the
noun often used to describe young black men. The electronic media
often uses pictures of young black men to illustrate a point or to
facilitate a discussion about crime," 3 and it is the image of the young
black male as the paradigmatic criminal that made it possible for
Charles Stuart to pass his involvement in a hideous crime off on a
fictional black and be believed by both the media and the police."4 It
112. Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 428
(1988).
113. See, e.g., Don Aucoin, Street Stereotypes: Images of Gangs, Violence Add to
Burden of Young Blacks Trying to Break Free, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 1990, Metro
Section, at 1 (recounting the visibly fearful reaction of a white pedestrian upon
encountering a black youth in the street).
The media's routine use of irrelevant images of young black males to set the context
for discussions of crime was demonstrated to me one morning in April 1992 as I watched
Good Morning America on ABC television. As the show's host introduced a panel
discussion on parental legal responsibility for the criminal actions of children, the screen
broadcast the image of a handcuffed young black male. Although this handcuffed young
man -was neither related nor relevant to the discussion that followed, with his silent pres-
ence he established the context for the discussion about crime.
114. The notorious case of Charles Stuart illustrates the presumption of black crimi-
nality. In October 1989, in Boston, Charles Stuart shot and killed his wife, inflicted a mi-
nor gunshot wound upon himself, and reported to the police that he and his wife had been
the victims of a black assailant after having wandered into the "wrong" neighborhood. See
Mike Barnicle, Stuart Case Defies Ending, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1992, Metro Section,
at 21. His story was immediately and unquestionably accepted by the police and the me-
dia, and a huge manhunt for a black suspect was commenced. Id. Weeks later suspicion
finally fell upon Stuart himself and he killed himself by jumping to his death from a
bridge over Boston harbor, id., but the episode was telling. Stuart knew that his story
would be believed if he provided the details of a story of innocent whites victimized by a
black assailant in a black neighborhood, and it was, with little question by the police, the
media, and the public. The columnist William Raspberry observed that the stereotype of
the criminal black is so entrenched that the Stuart story was embraced even by some
blacks, who later regretted doing so. See William Raspberry, The Boston Case: Anger,
Yes-But Toward Whom?, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1990, at A15 (quoting Veronica Byrd, who
remarked, "The black community was forced to withstand abrupt and unnecessary
suspicion and police searches, but some of us felt it was rightly so. We had brought this
on ourselves. Now some of us feel the stinging sensation of having believed the hype.
Racial attitudes are becoming so pervasive and persuasive that even we are beginning to
believe too easily the accusations, doubts and headlines ourselves."); see also Michael
Rezendes and Scot Lehigh, Black Leaders Ask Review of Stuart Probe, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 8, 1990, Metro Section, at 1.
A similar scenario occurred in Milwaukee in 1992. Jesse Anderson stabbed his wife
to death and inflicted a minor stab wound on himself, then told the police a story of how
he and his wife were robbed and assaulted by two black men. Anderson's account was
largely accepted by the media although discounted by the police, and he was eventually
arrested and charged with homicide. See Isabel Wilkerson, Police Charge Man Who Said
Blacks Stabbed Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at A14; Rogers Worthington, Once A
Victim, Now Suspect: Husband Held as Cops Question Account of Wife Slaying, CHI.
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is partly this image of African Americans which made David Duke's
story about blacks compelling to many of the white Louisiana voters
who supported him."'
It is true that more crimes are committed in poor African
American communities than anywhere else, and that young black
males are responsible for most of those criminal acts. But the image
that the mainstream media paints, in which crime is a metaphor for
young black males and the white community its victim, is false; the
overwhelming majority of crimes are in fact committed intrara-
cially." 6 Whites are usually victims of white offenders and blacks
are usually victims of black offenders. The image painted by the
media, in which young black males commit most of the crimes" 7 and
the white community is threatened by black crime, is at odds with
the facts.
The nation's drug problem is another issue by which blacks,
especially young blacks, are continuously portrayed by the media as
transgressors. Although most of America's drug abusers are white,
the majority of the media reporting and commentary about the prob-
lem of drugs tends to focus on the black community."3 Drugs are
indeed a problem in the black community. Drug abuse has seriously
TRIB., Apr. 28, 1992, § 1, at 1.
I relate the Stuart and Anderson incidents for two reasons. First, they demonstrate
that the image of black criminality is so pervasive in this culture that some whites believe
that they can easily blame their crimes on blacks and be believed. Second, they illustrate
the media's eagerness to tell the story of the "white victim" as long as the accused is a
black man.
115. See Bill Lembrecht, Duke Announces Presidential Bid as Republican, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1991, at Al; see also supra note 37.
116. In 1991, for example, 85% of white murder victims were killed by white assail-
ants, and 93% of black victims were killed by black assailants. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1991: CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 17 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 UNIFORM: CRIME REPORTS].
117. White youths committed 71.4% of all juvenile crimes in the United States in
1991, id. at 232, yet "the major networks focused most of their attention on black street
gangs and vandals." Legrand H. Clegg II, Letter to the Editor, Hollywood and Black
Americans, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1990, at B6. Although 69% of all crimes are committed
by whites, see 1991 UNIFORI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 116, at 231, the typical media
report about crime focuses on a black person as the paradigmatic criminal.
118. Some sources have claimed that among all drug abusers in the United States,
up to 80% are white. See Clegg, supra note 117, at B6 ("Robert Dupont, former director of
the National Institute of Drug Abuse, has publicly declared that 80 percent of America's
drug abusers are white and only 14 percent are black, [and yet] virtually all news reports
on drugs center on the black community."); see also Beth Frerking, Children Get Racial
Bias From Parents, Friends, TV, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 24, 1992, at
A8 ("Racism persists through exaggerated media portraits. Joe Feagin, a sociology
professor at the University of Florida and author of several books on racism, said most
drug-related crimes on television involve black people, although 70 percent of drug use is
by white people.").
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undermined black communities and families, especially those living
in the inner cities. Many of the murders that take place in those
communities are drug-related. As such, recognition 'and concern
about the destructive role which drugs play in those communities
can only be a good thing, for such recognition may lead to efforts to
confront the problem. My point, however, is that when the news
reports about drugs focus on the black community, the image con-
veyed is one of black people as The Problem.
b. Black Sportsmen. Another area of media stereotype and
racist imagery is in media sports reporting. Phillip Hoosel" has
given a detailed account of how mainstream media commentators
describe black athletes in stereotypical terms similar, if less explicit,
to the ones used by Al Campanis and Jimmy (the Greek) Snyder.120
Hoose observed that "[tihe black athletes who today make up most of
the NBA and NFL labor forces, and who have begun to penetrate
country-club and even Nordic sports, have heard their success ex-
plained in terms of their hands, tendons, muscles, joints, nerves,
blood, thighs, African ancestry, and even eye color. But not their
minds." 2' Studies have shown that sports commentators tend to de-
scribe the success of black athletes on the field in terms of physical
attributes, such as their size and their running, jumping, and leap-
ing abilities, while the success of white athletes engaged in the same
sport tends to be described in terms of their thinking capacity.22
Many sports commentators are white former coaches whose
sense of connection with the black athletes may be the control they
once had over other black athletes.12 It also happens that almost all
119. HOOSE, supra note 4.
120. Id. An informal study of professional football and college basketball broadcasts
conducted in 1989 by the sportswriter Derrick Z. Jackson of the Boston Globe found that
black athletes were more often described in terms of physical attributes and innate ath-
letic abilities, while white athletes were more often described in terms of intelligence,
leadership, and motivation. Derrick Z. Jackson, Calling the Plays in Black and White:
Will Today's Superbowl be Black Bowl vs. White Bowl?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 1989, at
A25.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 12, 19.
123. It is interesting to note a comment made by Mark Shields, a regular on the
MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour. On May 8, 1992 program, the News Hour had on its regular
duo of Shields and David Gergen, and the discussion was about the recent riots in Los
Angeles and what could be done to address the desperate situation in South Central Los
Angeles. Shields noted that the two white politicians who show genuine concern about the
desperate state of the inner cities and are at the forefront of addressing the problem are
Jack Kemp and Bill Bradley. Both of these men were professional athletes before they be-
came politicians, and thus knew black people as teammates and equals. MacNeil.Lehrer
News Hour (PBS television broadcast, May 8, 1992). Perhaps Shields is right that there is
a qualitatively different perception of black athletes depending on whether the
sportscaster was an ex-player or an ex-coach. However, as one of my research assistants
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the executive officers and producers in the sports -departments of
network television are white males.24 Indeed, as Hoose put it,
"[tloday, almost all of the information you receive about a black
athlete through any medium is owned, financed, selected, edited and
delivered by white people."'1 The invisibility of blacks as communi-
cators seems to continually lead to another invisibility, the invisibil-
ity of the black athlete as a thinking human being.
c. Black Politicians. The mainstream media portrays minor-
ity politicians and political candidates, and especially African
American male politicians and candidates, in a manner replete with
stereotypical imagery. One of the most common questions the media
implicitly asks itself when it covers an African American political
candidate is whether that candidate is threatening or non-
threatening to whites. Jesse Jackson is characterized as being very
threatening,1 6 while Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder and New
observed, almost every coach is an ex-player, and hence Shields' observation might not be
as illuminating as it appears.
Minorities still hold only a tiny fraction of the high level coaching and administrative
positions in professional sports. For example, during the 1993 major league baseball sea-
son there were six minority field managers among the twenty-eight teams. Jerome
Holtzman, Lady Czar? Don't Hold Your Breath, Ci. TIB., Apr. 25, 1993, at 9. Officials of
Major League Baseball claim that 8% of the executives and department heads of major
league clubs are African American, Hispanic, or Asian, with only one or two among them
Asian. Paul Valentine, Jackson, Protesters Call for More Women, Minorities, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1993, at C7. That figure is disputed by Jesse Jackson, who claims that African
Americans and Hispanics hold only 4% of those positions. Id. See also Robert Hilson Jr. &
Melody Simmons, More Than 200 Protesters Make Their Pitch, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Apr.
6, 1993, at 7C. During the prior baseball season there were only seven black field
managers in the minor leagues, the critical training ground for major league managers
and coaches. Silent Racism Keeps Managers in Minors, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 19, 1992, at C3. During the 1992-93 National Football League season there
were two African American head coaches among the twenty-eight teams. Thomas George,
On Pro Football: Two Head Coaches Make History, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, § 8, at 14. A
recent survey found that "[e]thnic minorities comprise less than 5% of five key positions
[president, general manager, top financial officer, head of scouting, and manager/head
coach] among major professional sports teams." Mike Dood, Survey Finds Minorities Rare
in 'Power' Positions, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1993, at 60.
124. A 1992 television broadcast on racism in sports reported that there are no black
network television executives with administrative or managerial control in sports
broadcasting, no black newspaper managing editors, and only three black sports editors
at 1,550 daily newspapers in the United States. Outside the Lines: Portraits in Black &
White (ESPN television broadcast, Dec. 17, 1992) (transcript on file with author). As re-
porter Robin Roberts noted, "In print media it is the editors who have the power to hire
and fire." Id. at 7.
125. HOOSE, supra note 119, at 21.
126. For example, Walter Goodman, television critic for the New York Times, wrote
that while other politicians admire Jackson, "none want him too close during elections,
lest he put off white voters who feel threatened by what they see as his emphasis on
race." Walter Goodman, New Breed of Blacks on Politics and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1990, at C18 (television review).
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York Mayor David Dinkins' political successes are portrayed as
having depended on their "non-threatening" postures. Even Nelson
Mandela's successful tour of the United States is explained by his
allegedly "non-threatening style, somewhat like a Jesse Jackson
speech delivered by New York Mayor David Dinkins," as one com-
mentator put it.
127
The notion of a "threatening" black politician was puzzling to
me when I first came across it. What exactly is the concept meant to
convey? It may refer to the fear among whites of the threat of redis-
tribution of power and resources from whites to blacks that might be
effectuated by black political candidates who talk about social jus-
tice and equality. Perhaps when the media uses the adjective
"threatening" to describe black politicians, it is saying that whites
are threatened by black politicians who espouse egalitarian and
distributive policies, as whites perceive themselves to be the poten-
tial losers in such a redistributive scheme. It appears to me, how-
ever, that the concept of the "threatening" black politician is not
entirely used to describe the possible adverse effects that policies of
black politicians would have on the white electorate. If that were the
case, one would expect the media to use the same phrase to describe
white politicians who espouse similar, or even more egalitarian,
policies as those "threatening" black politicians. Yet one does not
hear that whites feel "threatened" by Senator Edward Kennedy, or
that Governor Mario Cuomo's relative popularity is tied to his
"non-threatening" posture. The adjectives "threatening" or "non-
threatening" are reserved for use as descriptions for black politi-
cians. These descriptions rarely have anything to do with the poli-
cies espoused. Indeed, if that were not the case, it would be very
difficult to make sense of the media's insistence on explaining the
success of Mandela's tour in this country in terms of his supposedly
"non-threatening" manner."2
What then does the media mean when it employs those adjec-
tives? I think the "threat" to which the media refers is a literal and
physical one, and one consistent with the media's description of the
typical black male. The typical black male is perceived by the main-
stream media as a potential threat to the physical security of
whites, 29 and the imagery the media uses to describe black politi-
127. Michael K. Frisby, Mandela's Ways Defy Politics as Usual, BOSTON GLOBE, June
30, 1990, at 7.
128. Id. If the threat of redistribution of power and resources could explaining the
notion of a "threatening" black, surely it would not make any sense to describe a foreign
leader like Nelson Mandela, who has neither the capacity nor the interest to pursue poli-
cies in this country, as being "threatening" or "non-threatening" to whites in this country.
129. See Aucoin, supra note 113; see also Gray, supra note 102, at 223 ("Now we're in
the eighties and we're back to the passive look, one that says, 'Oh, he's pleasing to look
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cians merely extends that perceived threat to the political realm.
Both when they are "praised" as non-threatening or condemned as
threatening, black politicians are used as metaphors to describe the
kinds of black males with whom the majority would not feel com-
fortable. 10
Consider another common description of black politicians. If a
black politician assumes prominence, he or she is likely to be regu-
larly referred to as "the most powerful black,"131 or his or her job title
is commonly modified with the word "black" even when the identifi-
at'. I know when rm on the screen, some lady in Minnesota or Montana is not going to
rush to turn off her screen because she's fearful that I may come in and do whatever.")
(quoting Michael Warren of Hill Street Blues, NBC television broadcast).
For an interesting correlation between the historical fear of the black man and the
fear of retribution, see Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narrative, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 403
(1989).
130. During his 1990 visit to the United States, Nelson Mandela was invited to speak
before a joint session of Congress. William Dannemeyer, a member of the House of
Representatives, called the invitation a "national disgrace." Donald Lambro, Congressmen
Boycott Mandela, WASH. TImES, June 27, 1990, at B7 ("Nelson Mandela is no Martin
Luther King... He is more like... Willie Horton.") (emphasis added). What is puzzling
about the Congressman's observation is not that he was outraged by the invitation, even
though the man invited to speak is one who has dedicated his entire life to changing an
evil system called apartheid, a man who had spent twenty seven years of his life in the
most brutal ofjais, the prison of apartheid. The puzzle is not even that the Congressman
condemns a man who talks about dialogue and reconciliation with his former jailers and
torturers, rather than retribution. One may understand the Congressman's complaint
given his conservative politics that a person who is not prepared to condemn people who
the Congressman thinks to be terrorists, people such as Yassir Arafat and Fidel Castro,
might from his point of view not have earned the privilege to address the Congress.
Rather, the puzzle is that from all the people with whom the Congressman could have
compared Mandela, he chose to compare him with Willie Horton. Perhaps one should not
be puzzled, for what the Congressman did was to use a rhetorical device that would tap
the prevailing image of a transgressing black man regardless of what the supposed
transgression is.
See also Ross, supra note 129, at 403.
131. Such prominent politicians as William Gray, Jesse Jackson, Tom Bradley,
Coleman Young, and Maxine Waters have been described in newspaper accounts as being
the most powerful, or as being among the most powerful, black politicians in the nation.
See, e.g., Michael Specter, Gray Named to Head United Negro College Fund, WASH. POST,
June 20, 1991, at A3 ("[Gray] the most powerful black member of Congress"); Vincent
McCraw, Jackson Casts His Shadow Over Democrats, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 1989, at BI
("[Jackson] the most powerful black politician in the nation"); Scott Armstrong, L.A's
Bradley Losing 'Teflon', CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28, 1989, at 1 ("[Bradley] one
of America's most powerful black politicians"); James Risen, Detroit's Problems Imperil
Mayor Young's Long Reign, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, Pt. 1 at 15 ("[Young] one of the
most powerful black politicians anywhere in America"); Lee Harris, Waters Confident
Despite Primary Foe's Attack on Jackson-Brown Ties, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1988, Pt. 9 at 4
("[Waters] one of the most powerful black politicians in the country"). What is interesting
about the description "the most powerful black" is that it conveys the message that blacks
can only aspire to be "the most powerful" of their own kind.
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cation of the race of the individual is of no relevance to the story.
13 2 If
the identification of the politician's race was not required by the
context of the story, why then does the media qualify the position
and power of African American politicians with the word '%lack?"
Imagine how absurd it would look and sound if the race of a white
politician were used as a qualifier to his or her position and power
when the context of the story did not call for it."3
It seems quite clear that the media's practice of using race as a
qualifier of power and position when the reference is to African
American politicians and public figures affirms the image the major-
ity holds of African Americans. They can rise to the top, but only to a
separate top."4 They can be leaders, but only of their own people.
132. Consider, for instance, a 1985 newspaper reference to William Gray, formerly a
member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, and
Democratic House Whip, and currently president of the United Negro College Fund. Dan
Balz, House Studies Deficit Options, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1985, at A7 ("Gray, the first
black chairman of the influential budget panel, said a substantial deficit-reduction pack-
age.., could be achieved with first-year cuts ranging from 'the high $30s [billions] to the
$60s,' depending on the mix of policies.") (emphasis added). Gray's race is irrelevant to
the substance of the story.
133. If, for example, successive newspaper references to Representative Thomas
Foley's leadership position in the House of Representatives were in the form "the white
Speaker of the House of Representatives," readers would presumably think that the iden-
tification of Foley's race is relevant to the story, and would attempt to figure out its rele-
vance. If the reader were unfamiliar with the workings of Congress, they might be
tempted to conclude that the House of Representatives has a speaker for every racial
group.
134. A recent article in The New York Times about Congresswoman Maxine Waters,
who represents South Central Los Angeles, makes the point well. The article ended its
feature article on the Congresswoman with the following observation: "Some of her sup-
porters believe she will go far politically, and that she deserves success more than any
other black leader on the political scene." Maria Newman, Lawmaker From Riot Zone
Insists On a New Role for Black Politicians, N. Y. TImES, May 19, 1992, at A18 (emphasis
added).
It is also interesting to observe that the mainstream media usually invites African
American politicians to comment on an issue, if it invites them at all, only when the issue
has some relation to African Americans. Regardless of the qualifications and images of
African Americans, there seems to be a limited range of issues upon which they are
regarded as qualified to comment.
Consider also the following. Individual African Americans, politicians and
non-politicians alike, are often referred to as "articulate." For example, the Boston Globe
in a 1990 story referred to Shelby Steele as "part of a small but articulate group of black
intellectuals who oppose race preference policies.' Ethan Bronner, High Court's Split on
Affirmative Action Echoes Nation's Division, BOST. GLOBE, June 29, 1990, at 1, 9. The
word "articulate" is rarely used in relation to whites. The adjective is obviously a positive
one and is used to compliment those blacks whom the media believe have stated their po-
sitions clearly. What is damaging, however, is what is implied by the use of the adjective,
that on the whole "articulateness" is apparently not a characteristic of blacks. Thus, the
media finds it necessary to use the adjective even when referring to a group of black intel-
lectuals. Just think for a moment how strange it would sound if an article stated that a
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Some may see this rhetorical segregation as harmless and inconse-
quential, but I see it differently. In my view, this is instead a symp-
tom of a deep-seated, albeit unconscious, resistance among the
mainstream media and the general public to the notion that the
African American Other can be a leader to all segments of the soci-
ety. Indeed, this resistance becomes clear when one reads reports
and discussions about nationally prominent African American fig-
ures. For example, although Jesse Jackson viewed himself as speak-
ing for the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and although
his Rainbow Coalition is comprised of a coalition of various groups,
including labor and farmers, the media continues to portray him as
the spokesman for black Americans.
35
Not only are African American public figures regarded by the
mainstream as speaking solely to and for African Americans, but the
African American community which they are perceived to lead is
regarded as monolithic and hence unable to accommodate more than
one leader at a time. This assumption becomes apparent when one
sees the media's attempt to regard every black politician who as-
pires to national office as a rival and potential replacement of Jesse
Jackson. When Douglas Wilder, the Governor of Virginia and a con-
servative Democrat, showed some interest in running for national
office, he was portrayed by the media as one likely to displace Jesse
Jackson, a liberal Democrat, from the national arena.136 When Ron
Brown, the Chairman of the Democratic Party, presided over the
successful Democratic National Convention in 1992, some media
group of articulate white scholars opposed affirmative action.
135. After Jesse Jackson addressed the 1992 Democratic Convention, there was a
discussion on a PBS/NBC program about the various speakers and speeches. Report on
the Democratic Convention, (NBC/PBS television broadcast, July 14, 1992). Jim Lehrer,
one of the hosts of the program, talked only about Jackson as speaking for blacks and as
being the leader of blacks, despite the wide-ranging nature of the issues Jackson covered
in his address and his attempt to position himself as a leader of the left wing of the party,
black and white. It took a white union leader on the panel to remind Lehrer that Jackson
spoke for a much wider audience than blacks and that the media's attempt to limit his
reach to blacks was puzzling and bizarre.
136. See, e.g., Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans View a Democratic Star 'With
Trepidation,' WASH. TIMES, June 25, 1990, at Al ("Former Reagan administration official
Donald J. Devine links the Wilder style to 'his real importance, which is his potential to
save the Democrats from their Jackson problem.'"). When Wilder sought the Democratic
nomination for President, B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., of The New York Times, observed:
"[T ]aking a position more centrist than is usually put forth by... Mr. Wilder's main black
rival in the party, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, Mr. Wilder promised to spend less and to con-
centrate much of what he did spend on the needy." B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Wilder
Announces Bid for President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991, at 1 (emphasis added). See also
B. Drummond Ayers, In the End, Wilder Realizes the Numbers All Fell Short, N.Y. TImES,
Jan. 11, 1992, § 1 at 7 (characterizing Jesse Jackson as "a powerful and influential Wilder
rival" even though the two men were not seeking the same positions).
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commentators spoke of Brown "eclipsing" Jesse Jackson, as if the
two were performing the same job or running for the same office.
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The diversity of leadership and ideas that are assumed to be present
in every other group is somehow presumed to be missing among
African Americans.
13 8
137. Tom Brokaw of NBC News remarked during the 1992 Democratic National
Convention that Jesse Jackson was being eclipsed within the Democratic Party by Ron
Brown, the party's chairman and an African American. Report on the Democratic
National Convention (NBC/PBS television broadcast, July 14, 1992). Brokavws remark
raises the question of why he found it useful or relevant to measure the success of the
party chairman in terms of its impact on another African American politician, given that
the two men were not rivals for the same office or position. The two played different roles
in the same way that Mario Cuomo and Ron Brown, or Paul Tsongas and Ron Brown,
played different roles. Imagine a successful Italian American chairman of the Democratic
Party having his success described in terms of how he is eclipsing the power and prestige
of another prominent Italian American, say Mario Cuomo. This is likely to sound odd, and
so it should. It would sound strange mainly because neither believe that Italian American
politicians speak only for Italian Americans, nor do we believe that Italian Americans
have only one leader.
138. The notion that African American leaders must be seen in terms of their poten-
tial to displace each other is premised on the rather strange, though often unarticulated,
assumption in this culture that African Americans are monolithic in views and attitudes
and that they will be loyal to whomever has been designated as their leader by the media
or by one of many African American organizations. This culture, which professes to take
the individual seriously- has never really come to understand African Americans as
individuals. It is only when one realizes this that one can begin to understand why
African American public figures are often asked, even demanded, to condemn or disavow
every racist or anti-semitic comment of any visible African American. Because African
Americans are seen only as members of a group, rather than as individuals, and are
regarded as monolithic in views and attitude, any comment by a black individual is re-
garded as representative of the view and attitude of all blacks. It is this de-individuation
of blacks that makes it possible for the mainstream media and white officials to make
black "leaders" accountable for the conduct of other blacks, while white officials are not
required to be responsible for the racist acts of other individuals.
Jesse Jackson, for example, has been pressed to strongly condemn Louis Farrakhan,
the leader of the Nation of Islam notorious for anti-semitic and anti-white rhetoric, even
though Jackson, a Christian minister, has never been allied politically with Farrakhan
nor ever endorsed his views. See Paul M. Montgomery, The 1992 Campaign: On the
Sidelines, N.Y. TIvES, July 8, 1992, at Al; E. J. Dionne Jr., Ex-Aide Describes Jackson
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at D28; see also Brent Staples, On Denouncing
Racism: Why are Some Blacks Accountable for All?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, § 1, at 22
("It has become common to impugn the honor of people who are accused of failing to de-
nounce the objectionable conduct of others.... Why are African-Americans held
accountable en masse? Probably because the culture views African-Americans in
simplistic terms - as conspiratorial, monolithic in attitude and loyal to whomever the me-
dia regard as the Head Negro of the Moment. There is plenty of evidence of how wrong
thaf view is. The black demonstrators in Crown Heights who chanted menacingly and
threw bottles at Mayor David Dinkins are just one example of how wide the spectrum of
black opinion has become. The range of black views on Clarence Thomas's confirmation to
the Supreme Court, from ultraconservative to liberal, is another.").
The complaint about blacks being regarded in monolithic terms is not limited to the
political realm. Recently a black artist from Britain made a similar complaint:
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Put simply, the media's description of African American politi-
cians, whether black politicians are referred to as "threatening," or
when their power and prestige is qualified by reference to race, or
when the community they are regarded as leading is considered un-
able to accommodate more than one leader at a time, sends a coher-
ent message. That message is that African Americans are the differ-
ent Other.
d. The Media Coverage of African Americans: A
Summary. One of the most important pictures that emerges from
the media's description of black youths, black athletes, and black
politicians is how very similar are the various images of African
Americans regardless of the group to which they belong. The African
American Other, whether he is described as the young black crimi-
nal, or the threatening black politician, or the unthinking black
sportsman, is seen as the negation of the normal and moral order.
The consequences of perceiving African Americans this way is that it
enables the majority to engage in activities and practices that ex-
clude African Americans from various spheres of social and political
existence, and hence continue to devalue their lives, without any
sense of cognitive dissonance. To put it differently, European
Americans are able to continue to hold a virtuous image of them-
selves and of their institutions while both they and those institu-
tions engage in the daily devaluation of the lives of African
Americans. They are able to do this precisely because the image of
the African American that is painted every day, which frames the
context within which European Americans act, is one that regards
African Americans as the negation of normalcy and the moral order.
The media, particularly the electronic media, is the major con-
tributor to that portrait and context,"9 as African Americans are
When [Spike Lee is] taken up as the embodiment of black filmmakers, what
happens is that one is enough. And so too in the art world. One is enough.
Somehow that doesn't happen with other groups of people.
I am not saying that I'm not trying to address common experiences [of black
people]. But having done that does not put me in the position of being a repre-
sentative. That's always been a real problem: "one black represents all blacks."
Manthia Diawara, The Art of Identity, 55 TRANSITION 192, 193-94 (1992) (quoting black
British artist Sonia Boyce in a discussion of her work with critic Manthia Diawara).
139. Research indicates that television in the United States typically frames issues of
crime and poverty in ways that profoundly affect viewers' attribution of responsibility for
these problems to individuals or to society. IYENGAR, supra note 30, at 11 ("The manner in
which a problem of choice is 'framed' is a contextual cue that may profoundly influence
decision outcomes."). Iyengar notes further that,
In the case of poverty, for example, news reports about a black person tended to
elicit more individualistic attributions of responsibility than reports of a white
poor person. Similarly, compared with news coverage of criminal acts carried
out by blacks, news stories depicting white perpetrators elicited more frequent
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generally made the subject of media coverage only as part of a prob-
lem, part of the challenge to normalcy. 140 This challenge to normalcy
can be seen either as an affirmative threat to normal andmoral life,
in the form of criminal behavior, or as the absence of the means
necessary for a full and normal being, in the form of intellectual
inadequacies."
e. Responses to the Media's Portrayal of African
Americans. What are the ways in which minorities, especially
African Americans, respond to the unfavorable portrayal of them-
selves? How do they respond to the attempt of the majority to main-
tain a virtuous image of itself by defining them as the negation of
the normal and moral order? There are three kinds of responses:
individual, group, and institutional (public and private).
On the individual level, members of minority groups can cope
with the media's image of their group in a number of ways. Some
might simply accept the picture as being by and large true, but
might nevertheless see themselves as exceptions to the general pic-
ture. This group of individuals, the "exceptionalists," as I shall call
them, save themselves from dissonance and psychological destruc-
tion by reconciling the favorable image they have of themselves with
the unfavorable public image of the group to which they belong by
regarding themselves as exceptions. Others might accept the public
picture as true in the same way that the exceptionalists do, but may
not see themselves as exceptions to the general rule;4 2 I shall refer
societal attributions of responsibility for the crime.
Id. at3.
140. The treatment of multiculturalism and cultural studies by the media in the last
few years is a good example of how anything that is connected with the Other is regarded
as the negation of normalcy. Newspapers and magazines of various political leanings
have been writing in such a way as to show that "multiculturalism and cultural studies
[are] a two-pronged drive to instill political correctness." Chicago Cultural Studies Group,
Critical Multiculturalism, 18 CRITICAL INQTIRY 530, 531 (1992); see, e.g., Diane Ravitch,
Multiculturalism, 59 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 337 (1990); John Searle, The Storm Over the
University, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 6, 1990, at 19.
141. Salman Rushdie, the well-known Indian-born British author, expressed the
situation this way:
The worst, most insidious st~reotype... is the characterization of black people
as a Problem. You talk about the Race Problem, the Immigration Problem, all
sorts of problems. If you are liberal, you say that black people have problems. If
you are not, you say they are the problem. But the members of the new colony
[black people in Britain] have only one real problem. The problem is white peo-
ple. Racism of course is not our problem. It is yours.
PETER JACKSON, MAPS OF MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 142
(1989) (ellipses in original) (quoting Kum Kum & Reena Bhavnani, Racism and
Resistance in Britain, in A SOCIALIST ANATOMY OF BRITAIN 146, 146 (David Coates et al.
eds., 1985) (quoting Salman Rushdie)).
142. A 1990 National Opinion Research Center survey found that 29.6% of blacks,
and 35.1% of Hispanics, surveyed considered themselves less intelligent than whites. See
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to this group of individuals as "adherents." Adherents structure
their daily lives according to that general portrait and avoid
dissonance by purchasing servility. Finally, individual members of
minority groups might respond, as most members of minority groups
are likely to do, by simply denying the accuracy of the picture; I
shall refer to this group as the "resisters." Resisters avoid dis-
sonance and psychological destruction by viewing the negative pic-
ture in political and historical terms, as part of the dominant cul-
ture's continual attempt to exclude them from participating in the
political and social life of the polity by defining them as the negation
of the normal and moral order.
Whatever form the individual responses take, they cannot be
transformative. They are simply ways of coping with a hostile envi-
ronment. This Article does not concern itself with these individual
responses. I mention them only to indicate that people are forced to
deal with the psychological threats of racism in their everyday exis-
tence.
There have been a few minority group responses to the unfa-
vorable media images of minorities. African Americans have, for
example, taken measures that run the gamut from boycotts of of-
fending media institutions43 and the organization of monitoring and
advocacy associations' to young black artists developing powerful
Survey: White Racism Alive and Well, supra note 40, at A4. These statistics demonstrate
the effects of negative portrayals of minorities on the self-image of those minorities. The
American Psychological Association has reported that "[u]nderrepresentation and
negative portrayals may influence the self-concepts and images of their own group for
members of the affected categories. ... " Report of the American Psychological
Association 22 (1986) (on file with author). This inference is based on "[a] small but
growing body of literature [which] has documented the potential role of television in re-
versing negative self-perception .... Id. at 26.
143. In 1990, the New York Post was boycotted by African American groups who
accused the newspaper of stereotypical and racist reporting. Michael Powell, The Pulpit
Versus the Post; Dozens of Ministers in Black Communities Have Endorsed a Boycott of
the Post, and Dozens More Have Pledged to Join In, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 1990, § II, at 8.
The Washington Post, Baltimore Evening Sun, and Philadelphia Daily News have also
been boycotted for similar reasons. Id. The media's negative portrayal of African
Americans goes hand in hand with the dearth of African Americans as reporters and edi-
tors. The Post, for example, had only one African American reporter on its staff during
the period of the boycott. Id. The complaint of African Americans has been that to a large
extent this stereotypical image that is constructed by the mainstream media is made pos-
sible because of the fact that they have been excluded from this process of identity con-
struction.
144. The National Black Media Coalition, the National Association of Black
Journalists, the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, and the Black
Women in Publishing are a few of the organizations that address issues of concern to
African Americans in the communication industry. The Committee to Eliminate Media
Offensive to African People (CEMOTAP), established in 1987, directly monitors media re-
porting about African Americans.
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alternative narratives.45 While these responses are useful and have
transformative potential, they cannot be sufficient in themselves to
alter the institutionally entrenched image. Institutional transforma-
tion requires institutional intervention. The next part of this Article
will deal with the FCC's attempt to respond as an institution to
transform the media's -negative portrayal of minorities.
Public institutional intervention in the communications indus-
try has been limited to the electronic media. Because of what is re-
garded as the dictates of the First Amendment, public intervention
in the workings of the print media is largely considered impermissi-
ble, so the institutional response with which I shall concern myself
in the next part will be limited to the public intervention in the
electronic media. 46
145. A number of black filmmakers, such as Spike Lee, John Singleton, Mario Van
Peebles, Matty Rich, Charles Lane, and Bill Duke, have in recent years begun to produce
films which tell stories about African Americans that have not been told by the dominant
narrative coming out of Hollywood. See Karen G. Bates, They've Gotta Have Us:
Hollywood Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, § 6 (magazine), at 15. "I just think about
telling a good story about my people, because in the last 75 years of American cinema, we
have been dogged out." Id. at 44 (quoting John Singleton).
146. Although the next section of this Article discusses only the electronic media and
the regulatory schemes that define it, I must point out here, as I did earlier, that the in-
clusion of minorities in the print media is as urgent as their inclusion in the electronic
media, if not more so. Even though I shall not develop the point here, the argument could
be made that the conditions that make public intervention necessary in the electronic
media also define the print media, and that it is not inconsistent with the First
Amendment for governmental intervention to make a content-neutral effort to diversify
the print media.
If it is true that in the context of the electronic media the rights of viewers and
listeners are more important than the rights of broadcasters, see Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount"), then it may be argued analogously that a
similar hierarchy of rights exists between print readers and publishers. This is
particularly true given that the key difference once considered to distinguish the
electronic media from the print media-the scarcity of physical resources-no longer ex-
ists in the current era of abundant cable television capacity and other broadcast
technologies.
Some, including members of the FCC itself, have alternatively argued that since
physical scarcity no longer defines the electronic media, the broadcast model of media
regulation ought to be abandoned and the print model of First Amendment protection
should be applied to the electronic media. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987). As I shall argue in the next section,
however, if the market systematically excludes certain information and certain groups
from the discursive domain in both the print and electronic media, and if the current
argument for public intervention in the electronic media is premised largely on the need
to include voices and information that the market does or is likely to exclude, then the
argument for the adoption of the print model simply misses the point.
For a novel and interesting, but ultimately unpersuasive, argument in favor of the
maintenance of a dual regulatory system for the media, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF
A FREE PRESS 90-132 (1991); Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access:
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IV. THE FCC AND MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA: INSTITUTIONAL ADMISSION OF MINORITY NARRATIVES
A. Existing FCC Rules Regarding Minorities
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)47 is the pri-
mary governmental agency presiding over the distribution and utili-
zation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Operating on the assump-
tion that the electromagnetic spectrum is a limited resource, and
that its operation could thus not be left to the operation of the mar-
ket, Congress empowered the FCC to allocate the spectrum, to insti-
tute general standards of operations, and to grant licenses to pro-
spective users of the spectrum.148
Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
Bollinger's favor of a partial regulatory scheme is informed by what he regards as the
paradox of access regulation. On the one hand, access legislation could ensure the
admission of voices and views that are excluded by the market. On the other hand, access
regulation could have a chilling effect on the media. Bollinger sees partial regulation as
the answer to the paradox. He argues:
In the light of the double-edged character of access regulations, and the special
circumstances of the mass media, it may make sense to affirm congressional
authority to implement a regulatory scheme, but only partially within the me-
dia. With this approach, with a major branch of the press remaining free of
regulation, the costs and risks of regulation may be held at an acceptable level.
Expressed another way, only under such a system can we afford to allow the de-
gree of governmental regulation that is necessary to realize the objectives of
public access.
Id. at 113-14.
As interesting as Bollinger's argument for justifying the status quo may be, I remain
unconvinced. First, Bollinger obviously realizes, but does not fully consider, the fact that
the communications technologies that make obsolete the rationale for the dual system are
also leading to the convergence of the various media to an extent that in the near future
it might not be easy to distinguish one media from another. Second, as he acknowledges,
the increasing cross ownership of electronic and print media outlets makes more likely
the prospect that any chilling effect caused by regulation of the electronic media will be
felt in the cross-owned print media as well. Finally, Bollinger's partial regulation will not
be reassuring to minorities whose complaints are that the media paints a negative image
of them dailyand that the market systematically excludes them from the process of com-
munication. Nor will it be reassuring to them to be told that it will only be one segment of
the media that will now be able to define them as the problem Other without any fear of
regulation.
147.47 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The FCC was established in 1927 as the five-member
Federal Radio Commission, and was given its present name in 1934. Id.
148. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988). The Supreme Court
first recognized the scarcity theory in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943)
("[The] facilities [of radio] are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use
them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody.").
The debate is one of whether or not scarcity exists. See POWE, supra note 146, at
200-09; Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in Modern Garb: Retaining System
Legitimacy-A Review Essay of Lucas Powe's American Broadcasting and the First
Amendment, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 198-200 (1987) (book review). Challenges to the
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The power of the Commission to regulate has been held to be
technical as well as non-technical, guided by requirements of the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity."4 9 As the Supreme Court
noted in NBC v. United States,5 ' the Act does not reduce the
Commission to that of a "traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to
prevent stations from interfering with each other.... It puts upon
[it] the burden of determining the composition of that traffic." 5' The
FCC is required to be guided by the "public interest" in determining
the composition as well as the behavior of the users of the spec-
trum.
15 2
Guided by what it sees to be the "public interest," the FCC over
the years has developed a number of regulatory schemes to diversify
the voices and perspectives that utilize the electronic media. In the
1940s, for example, it developed the "fairness doctrine," whose con-
stitutionality was upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.13
In the 1970s the FCC developed a regulatory scheme which limited
license holders to ownership of one broadcast station in any given
market, without regard for the kinds of broadcast services in-
volved.'54 In addition, since 1975 the FCC has maintained a policy
scarcity argument are informed by three concerns and doubts. First, there is skepticism
about the claim of scarcity in the midst of an era of cable and technological abundance.
Second, some doubt the utility of administrative supervision or regulation in general, and
view the FCC's regulatory scheme as skeptically as they do other state regulatory re-
gimes. Here the challenge is part of a general suspicion about state interventions and a
preference for a market-dictated allocation and exchange process. See Glen 0. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REV. 169, 171, 236 (1978). The preference for the market is partly informed by a belief
that it will allocate the spectrum more efficiently, and partly by an ideological
commitment to a private property-right system. See HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE
RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 52-56 (1971); R.H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 12-17 (1959). The third concern
is over the possible negative effect of regulation on free speech.
149. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (West Supp. 1992).
150. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
151. Id. at 215-16.
152. Id. at 216; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969)
("[the] mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a
broad one, a power 'not niggardly but expansive'") (quoting NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. at 219)).
153. Id. at 375. The Fairness Doctrine imposed two obligations on broadcasters. The
first obligation required that licensees provide coverage of issues of public importance in
the community they serve. The second obligation required that once a licensee has
covered an issue of public importance, it must provide a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting points of view on the issue. In 1989, the Fairness Doctrine be-
came one more victim of the deregulation fervor unleashed by the Reagan
Administration. In In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), the FCC
eliminated the doctrine, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the elimination. Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. In re Amendments of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission
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that bars cross-ownership of media outlets in a given market,5 5 and
it has also imposed a limit on the number of electronic media outlets
a party may own nationally.5 ' All of these policies. were guided by
the idea that maximum diversity in ownership was in the public
interest, and that diversity of ownership will likely lead to the diver-
sification of program viewpoints and ideas.157
As I noted earlier, the FCC's regulatory schemes are premised
on the assumption that diversity of ownership is likely to lead to a
diversity of views and programs, and that such diversity is in the
public interest. The "public" envisioned as the beneficiary of these
schemes, however, is an undifferentiated public, and the diversity
desired is consequently class-, gender- and race-neutral. It is no
longer controversial to claim that there is not an undifferentiated
public, and in fact what is referred to as the "public" is a collection of
social groups whose corporate identity is defined more by their con-
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 311 (1970).
155. The cross-ownership policy prohibited a licensee from owning a television
station and a print media outlet in one market. Although the Coinmission has lately had
second thoughts about both the policy and the rationale that informed its emergence,
Congress recently codified it into law hoping that the policy will advance the First
Amendment goal of achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources." Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
156. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 18,
42-43 (1984); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1992). Until 1991, a licensee could not simultane-
ously own, directly or indirectly, more than twelve AM radio stations, twelve FM radio
stations, and twelve television stations, and a licensee's audience reach could not exceed
25% of the national audience. 100 F.C.C.2d 17.
In 1991, the Commission adopted higher radio ownership caps, allowing licensees to
hold simultaneous interests in up to 30 AM stations and 30 FM stations. In re Revision of
Radio Rules and Policies, 6 F.C.C.R. 3275 (1991); Joe Flint, Radio's Magic Numbers:
30-30, BROADCASTING, Mar. 16, 1992, at 4. There has been Congressional resistance to
these higher caps, and there is a likelihood that the FCC will revert to its earlier policy of
allowing ownership of no more than twelve AM radio stations, twelve FM radio stations,
and twelve television stations, with an audience reach of no more than 25% of the
national audience. For rules regarding ownership of cable and broadcast television
networks, see generally In re Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.501 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Elimination of the Prohibition on
Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Television Networks, 91
F.C.C.2d 76 (1982).
157. The Commission declared in 1970:
We are of the view that 60 different licensees are more desirable than 50, and
even that 51 are more desirable than 50 [because] ... [ijf a city has 60 frequen-
cies available but they are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the number of
sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st licensee that would be-
come the communication channel for a solution to a severe local social crisis.
This view was endorsed by the Supreme Court eight years later. See FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 784 (1978).
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flicting and contradictory views and interests than it is by the iden-
tity of these interests. As I have argued throughout, in relation' to
African Americans, it is the fact that they are regarded as the nega-
tion of the normal and moral order, rather than as part of the corpo-
rate body, that defines their presence. A mere expansion of individ-
ual ownership interests among those groups who have been tradi-
tionally well represented and who see other groups, such as minori-
ties, as having problems or as being The Problem, will not result in
diversified views and programs.
Before the current fervor of deregulation, the FCC apparently
recognized this fact. In 1978 the Minority Ownership Conference
Task Force of the FCC, established partly as the result of pressure
and persuasion by minority groups, issued a report suggesting that
there is a need for coherent and consistent policies to enhance mi-
nority ownership of broadcast stations."8 In that same year the FCC
issued a policy statement by which it intended to enhance minority
access to the electronic media.' In that policy statement the
Commission adopted two initiatives: distress sales and tax certifi-
cates.1 6 These ownership policies joined existing Commission em-
ployment policies to form the FCC's program to enhance minority
participation in the communications industry. The two following
subsections analyze the FCC's program in greater detail.
1. Ownership Policies. Under the FCC's distress sale policy, a
party whose license application is designated for a hearing on basic
qualification issues, such as misrepresentation, or whose license is
designated for a revocation hearing, may sell its station at a pre-
mium over the value of the unlicensed equipment if the station's
buyer has a significant minority ownership interest or if the interest
is controlled by minorities.' 6 ' Thus, a licensee whose license renewal
158. FCC, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING (1978).
159. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement]. FCC rules define the term
"minority" to include "American Indians or Alaskan Natives, Asians and Pacific Islanders,
Blacks and Hispanics." In re Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority
Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Policy State-
ment].
160. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 159, at 983 & n.21.
161. Id. at 983. Minority ownership of a station is considered "significant" if the
interest exceeds 50%. See generally In re Grayson Enterprises, Inc., 77 F.C.C.2d 156, 164-
65 (1980); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.4140 (1992).
If a licensee decides to elect a distress sale over a hearing, the station will be put on
a "distress sale elect" list maintained by the FCC and made available to the public. The
Commission also maintains a list of minorities interested in purchasing stations. Minority
Buyers Listing Public Notice, 69 F.C.C.2d 1553 (1978); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.4140 (1992).
In a distress sale the parties negotiate the terms of the sale, but as in every other sale the
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might be in jeopardy is allowed to transfer or assign the station to a
minority interest before the revocation hearing begins, gaining a
better price than the licensee would have received had the license
been revoked. 162 The price a licensee may charge in such transfers
cannot exceed seventy-five percent of the fair market value of the
viable business. The distress sale policy is premised on the assump-
tion that a licensee who is designated for a hearing will likely elect
to avoid the costly aid time-consuming hearing process, which may
lead to revocation of the license, and keep his losses to a minimum
by selling to a minority enterprise. This transfer, the FCC believed,
would stimulate the sale of broadcast properties to minorities,
thereby diversifying the views and voices heard over the electronic
media.
Under the tax certificate policy the FCC may grant tax certifi-
cates, 63 permitting the seller of a broadcast station to defer payment
of capital gains taxes"6 if the station is sold to a minority owned or
controlled firm. 65 Tax certificates may also be issued to shareholders
FCC must still give its approval. 1982 Policy Statement, supra note 159, at 858-59.
162. Typically, once a license is designated for a hearing, a licensee is prohibited
from selling the station until the issue is resolved in the licensee's favor. See Bartell
Broadcasting of Florida, Inc., 45 R.R.2d 1329, 1331 (1979). Thus, the distress sale policy is
an exception to the general rule.
To calculate fair market value, buyer and seller each submit appraisals of the sta-
tion's fair market value. The values are averaged, and the average is deemed fair market
value. If the difference between the appraisals exceeds 5% of the average of the
appraisals, the two parties must then submit a third appraisal. The three values are av-
eraged, and that average is deemed fair market value. Grayson, 77 F.C.C.2d at 163-64.
163. The FCC relies on § 1071(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to award such certifi-
cates. 26 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1982). Enacted in 1974, § 1071 was originally intended to
provide the FCC with the means to generally diversify ownership. See Richard C. Blake &
Matthew M. McKenna, Section 1071: Deferral of Tax on FCC Sanctioned Dispositions of
Communications Properties, 36 TAx L. REV. 101, 105-06 (1980). In 1979 the FCC extended
its use as a means of promoting minority ownership of broadcast stations. Congress ap-
proved this use of § 1071 by resolution in 1987. H.R.J. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
The grant of a tax certificate enhances the bargaining power of the minority pur-
chaser by allowing the seller to defer the payment of taxes on the sale. Obtaining the tax
certificate will allow the seller to defer paying tax so long as it reinvests the proceeds in
other cable or broadcast stations. The tax is deferred until the replacement property is
sold. Often, the seller's capital gains tax saving will exceed the difference between the
purchase price offered by a non-minority and by the minority purchaser.
164. The tax deferral is permitted as long as the seller reinvests the money in an-
other communications property within two years following the tax year in which the sale
closes. 26 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1982). Payment of the tax is then deferred until such time as
the property in which the seller reinvested the proceeds of the original sale is sold.
165. A station is considered minority owned or controlled if the minority interest in
the station exceeds 50%. See supra note 161. "Minority control" does not require control
by a single minority interest; it is sufficient that the aggregate of the minority
shareholders constitute a majority. Bruce Wilde, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities: A Critical Reexamination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
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in a minority controlled broadcasting entity when -the shareholders
sell their shares, provided that their interests were instrumental in
financing the acquisition of the facility'16 and that the disposition of
their shares will not reduce minority ownership below 51 percent.'
Minority tax certificates therefore provide two kinds of tax benefits:
benefits to the sellers of a property and benefits to investors in mi-
nority start-up ventures.
The FCC has also attempted to use its "multiple ownership
rule" to encourage minority ownership. The "multiple ownership
rule" restricts the number of radio and TV stations an entity or
individual may own nationally.16 Owners, however, are permitted to
increase by two the number of stations they own if two or more of
the stations in which they hold cognizable interests are minority
controlled, and by one if there is a cognizable interest in at least one
minority controlled station. 9 In addition, the audience reach al-
lowed to such interests is increased by 5 percent, provided that at
least five percent of the aggregate reach of its station is contributed
by minority controlled stations.7
The FCC also utilizes its comparative hearing policy to increase
979, 989 (1990). Tax certificates may also be granted to a seller even though the buyer
has less than 50% minority ownership if the buyer is a limited partnership and the gen-
eral partner is minority individual. Minority Ownership of Broadcast Stations; Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Minority Ownership
Hearings]. An interest of greater than 20% by the minority general partner is sufficient
for a tax certificate to be granted in the limited partnership situation. See Commission
Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 48 Fed. Reg.
5943, 5945 (1983) [hereinafter Advancement of Minority Ownership].
The FCC also grants tax certificates for the sale of cable TV facilities to minority
buyers. It might also be important to note here that selling to minorities is not the only
condition for which a seller is entitled to a tax certificate. Recently, the FCC decided to
use the tax certificate policy to encourage AM radio station owners "to sell their stations
in instances in which there is a sufficient reduction in interference on the AM band."
Communications and Minority Enterprise in the 1990s, at 44 (Sept. 26-27, 1990) (Report
of Conference sponsored by the FCC, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), and Howard University Small Business Development Center, on
file with author).
166. Advancement of Minority Ownership, supra note 165, at 5946.
167. Tax certificates will not be issued to any seller of an interest in a station, minor-
ity or not, if disposal of their shares will reduce minority ownership and control of the sta-
tion below 51%. See Letter of the FCC to R. Clark Wadlow, Esq., 4 F.C.C.R. 5262 (1989).
On the other hand, if the disposition of such an interest does not reduce minority
ownership and control below 51%, the certificates may be granted regardless of whether
the seller is a minority or not. Id.
168. In re Amendments of 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636, supra note 153.
169. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 155, at 94-95. In 1992, the FCC
abolished the minority exception in relation to AM and FM stations. In re Revision of
Radio Rules and Policies, 7 FCC Rec. 2755, 2761 (1992).
170. 7 FCC Rec. at 2761.
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minority ownership and participation in the electronic media. When
presented with two or more mutually exclusive applications17 ' for a
broadcast station license, the FCC conducts a comparative hearing
to determine which applicant will best serve the public. 72 The FCC
considers two principal objectives in the comparative process: 173 (1)
maximum diffusion of the electronic media, and (2) best practicable
service to the public. The Commission has considered the first objec-
tive of "primary significance," and the second of "substantial impor-
tance."174 Under the first objective, applicants who do not own any
interest in existing media concerns are given a preference over those
who do own such interests. Under the second objective a number of
factors are considered, the most important of which is the integra-
tion of ownership and management, which is the extent to which
owners are involved in the day-to-day management of the station. To
measure the level of integration of ownership and management for
comparative purposes, the FCC employs a two-step process. First, it
weighs "quantitative factors," determining the extent to which the
owners themselves intend to work in management positions such as
general manager, station manager, program director, or sales man-
ager. If an applicant has a clear quantitative advantage, that appli-
cant wins. 75 In the event that no applicant has a quantitative ad-
vantage, the Commission weighs a number of "qualitative" factors to
measure to what extent the integration of ownership and manage-
ment may be enhanced by these qualitative factors. One of those
"enhancement" factors is "the degree to which minority... owners
will be integrated in station management." 76
171. Mutually exclusive applications are two or more applications filed in a timely
manner for the same frequency or frequencies whose simultaneous use would cause elec-
tronic interference with each other. A leading case on the subject of mutually exclusive
applications is Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 328 (1945).
172. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a), (e) (1988).
173. See 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393
(1965) [hereinafter 1965 Policy Statement].
174. Id. at 394-95.
175. See, e.g., In re Applications of WHW Enterprises, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 799, 817-19
(Rev. Bd. 1982), rev. denied, 92 F.C.C.2d 1501 (1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nor. WHW Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cited in Winter Park Communications, Inc., v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
afftd and remanded sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(where one license applicant has clear quantitative advantage, that applicant is awarded
the license, assuming that the applicant is otherwise qualified and does not own other
media interests).
176. The other enhancing factors are (1) local residence,'(2) participation in civic
activities, and (3) past broadcast experience of the integrated principals. See 1965 Policy
Statement, supra note 173. For a general discussion of minority application enhancement
factors, see In re WPIX, Inc. 68 F.C.C.2d 381,411-12 (1978).
Although local residence and minority ownership are said to be the most important
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Since 1974 the FCC has considered minority ownership of, and
participation in, broadcasting as a factor to be considered in the
comparative hearing context. In T.V. 9, Inc. v. FCC,'" the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declared that in a com-
parative hearing the FCC erred in having failed to give credit to a
license applicant which had two minority stockholders who were to
be corporate directors. For the first time, minority ownership and
participation were recognized as factors to be considered in a com-
parative hearing. The TAV. 9 court reasoned as follows:
It is consistent with the primary object of maximum diversification of
ownership of mass communications media for the Commission in a com-
parative license proceeding to afford favorable consideration to an appli-
cant who, not as mere token, but in good faith as broadening community
representation, gives a local minority group media entrepreneurship....
We hold only that when minority ownership is likely to increase diversity
of content, especially of opinion and viewpoint, merit should be awarded. 78
The FCC subsequently adopted the court's initiative as its own pol-
icy.17
9
In a comparative hearing, therefore, minority ownership plays
a role only as one of a number of enhancers, at the end of the proc-
ess, and only in relation to the less important of the two main objec-
tives the FCC considers in the process. In most circumstances, the
decision to award the license will have been made before minority
status is considered.
2. Equal Employment Opportunity. Minority ownership has not
been the only means by which the FCC has attempted to enhance
minority participation in the electronic media. The first FCC regula-
qualitative factors, the FCC has ruled that in some circumstances past broadcast
experience will be given the same weight as these factors. See In re Implementation of BC
Docket No. 80-90 to Increase the Availability of FM Broadcast Assignments, 101 F.C.C.2d
638, 645 (1985), recon. granted in part, 59 R.R.2d 1221, affd sub nom. National Black
Media Coalition v. FCC, 822 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1987).
177. T.V. 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986
(1974).
178. Id. at 937-38 (footnote omitted).
179. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 159, at 982. The FCC may also award
licenses by lottery when there are a number of equally qualified applicants, but when it
does so it is required by statute to give "significant preference" to applicants or groups of
applicants who. would increase diversification of ownership of the media. 47 U.S.C. §
309(i)(3)(A) (1988). The FCC is also required to grant additional significant preference to
any applicant controlled by a minority group. Id. The Commission has complied with the
statute by amending its selection rules to give such preferences. See In re Amendment of
the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Certain Competing
Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 93
F.C.C. 2d 952 (1983) (second report and order).
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tions directed specifically at minority communicators were the
FCC's equal employment opportunity regulations, issued in 1968, a
decade before it adopted its policy statement on minorities in the
broadcasting industry. Those regulations were adopted to promote
nondiscriminatory employment practices among broadcast licen-
sees. 180 Declaring that it was impossible for the FCC to "make the
public interest finding as to a broadcast applicant who is deliber-
ately pursuing or preparing to pursue a policy of discrimination,"18'
the FCC announced that it would take action when a "substantial
issue of discrimination" was raised. Such action consists of a referral
of the issue to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
investigation, or an investigation conducted by the FCC itself. If
after investigation substantial discrimination is found to exist, the
FCC formally designates the application for a full evidentiary hear-
ing, which could result in sanctions.8 2 Under the policy, however,
statistical disparities are not considered sufficiently indicative of
discrimination and thus cannot on their own lead to investigation."
In 1969 and subsequent years, however, the FCC adopted rules
and regulations that allowed it to inquire more extensively into the
employment activities of licensees,'8 and in 1976 it began to require
broadcast licensees to do more than simply refrain from discrimina-
tion against minorities. It required them to establish and maintain
affirmative action programs. 185
Currently, all licensees who employ five or more persons are
180. In re Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licenses to Show
Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968). It is not
accidental that the FCC adopted the policies in 1968, the year of the Kerner Commission
report. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 766.
182.47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988). The FCC often designates renewal applications for
hearing upon the initiative of third parties who object to license renewal. Two
organizations, the National Black Media Coalition, Inc. and the Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ, have been active as third-party intervenors on behalf of
minority interests in license renewal proceedings. William Kennard et al., Minority
Business Development and Equal Employment Opportunity in the Telecommunications
Industry, in ONE NATION, INDvsIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S, at
324, 328 (Reginald C. Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989).
183. In re Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show
Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 771 (1968).
184. See In re Equal Employment Opportunity Inquiry, 36 F.C.C.2d 515 (1972); In re
Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in
their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970); In re Petition for Rulemaking to
Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices,
18 F.C.C.2d 240, 243 (1969).
185. In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast
Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976). See FCC Equal Employment Opportunities Rules, 47
C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1991).
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required to file an annual employment report and an equal employ-
ment opportunity report at the time of license renewal. 1 6 In the An-
nual Employment Report, licensees are required to show the ethnic
and racial composition of their work force in nine job categories.
18 7
The Equal Employment Opportunity Program Report requires licen-
sees to provide information regarding their EEO policies and prac-
tices, such as the dissemination of EEO policies, recruiting efforts,
hiring, and promotions.18 These two reports are considered by the
FCC to be adequate means by which to monitor the behavior of a
licensee, both in terms of its employment profile and its EEO ef-
forts. 189
When a licensee comes up for a renewal, the Commission in-
itially evaluates the licensee's EEO efforts by examining its Annual
Employment Report, EEO Program Report, and any complaints filed
against it. In examining the composition of the station's work force
the Commission compares the licensee's minority workforce with the
area's available labor force,' 90 although the Commission has held
186. All stations are required to file an annual report, although stations with less
than five employees do not have to provide a profile of their workforce and are not
required to institute affirmative action programs. See In re Amendments to Part 73 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Opportunity in the Broadcast, Radio and
Television Services, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, 3992 (1987).
187. FCC, 1989 BROADCAST AND EtiPLOYMENT TREND REPORT, 1990 FCC LEXIS 3050
(June 4, 1990). The licensee is also required to maintain separate data for full-time and
part-time employees. Part-time employees constitute a significant portion of the total
work force at most broadcast stations. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Part 73 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio
and Television Services, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, 3970 (1987). If employment data on full-time
and part-time employees were consolidated, licensees could boost their minority
employment profile by employing more minorities in part-time positions. Id. at 3988-89.
188. Licensees are not required to complete the EEO Program Report if minority
group representation in the available local work force is less than five percent. Id. at
3992.
189. First-time license applicants must complete an equal employment opportunity
model program report, which requires them to set forth their proposed EEO policies and
practices. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1991).
190. In re Applications of Certain Broadcast Stations Serving Communities in the
State of Florida, 3 F.C.C.R. 1930 (1988), affd sub nom. Tallahassee Branch of the NAACP
v. FCC, 870 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Commission uses "processing guidelines" to
determine whether there should be an initial inquiry. Under the processing guidelines a
licensee with five to ten full-time employees may be subject to review if its total minority
employment rate is less than 50% of the percentage of minorities in the available local la-
bor market, and less than 25% among the station's top four job categories: officials,
managers, professionals, technicians, and sales personnel. A licensee with eleven or more
full-time employees must show a total minority employment rate of at least 50% of the
percentage of minorities in the available local labor market for all categories of
employment to avoid initial review. See, e.g., In re Equal Employment Opportunity
Processing Guideline Modifications for Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 79 F.C.C.2d 922,
923 (1980); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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that the use of the local work force as a comparative guideline does
not mean that a licensee who meets that guideline "has reached a
'safe harbor'." Nor will a failure to meet the guideline be determina-
tive of whether the station has done an unsatisfactory job in hiring
minority employees. 191 The Commission's evaluation of the licensee
will largely turn not so much on percentages and figures, but rather
on the broadcaster's "efforts." 92 If the Commission's initial review
"indicates that a station's efforts may have been less than satisfac-
tory, it will be subjected to a second-step investigation of those areas
of responsibility where its efforts appear deficient."19 3 If the second
step of investigation shows that "factual questions persist and are
substantial and material,"194 then the application is designated for a
hearing. If it is found that the licensee has not complied with the
EEO rules and policies, the Commission may impose sanctions rang-
ing from the issuance of warnings, to the requirement of submis-
sions of periodic progress reports, to renewal of the license for less
than a full term.195 Unless the Commission's action is "arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable,"'96 the courts will not reverse the
Commission's determination.
The Commission's power to sanction licensees is not based on a
general mandate to promote nondiscrimination in the broadcast
industry, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) is empowered to do in a Title VII suit.9 ' The Supreme Court
191. Florida Broadcasters, 3 F.C.C.R. at 1933.
192. Id.; see also In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules to
Implement the Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 102 F.C.C.2d 562, 591-92, 594 (1985) ("[Ilt is important to emphasize
that if the record indicates that the [industry] is making reasonable and good-faith efforts
to recruit and employ minorities and women and place them in responsible positions, cer-
tification will be granted even though there may be [disparity] between the number of
minorities and women employed and their respective proportions in the relevant labor
market.").
193. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal
Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services, 2 F.C.C.R.
3967, 3974 (1987).
194. Florida Broadcasters, 3 F.C.C.R at 1934 n.7. The requirement that there be a
"substantial and material question of fact" before a hearing is warranted was judicially
sanctioned in Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621,
629 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
195. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988). The Commission's authority to impose those sanctions
is derived from the Communications Act, which provides that the Commission may grant
a license only if it "finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served
by the granting thereof." Id.
196. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition, 595 F.2d at 631 (quoting Columbus Broadcasting
Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
197. In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast
Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 229 (1976) ("We do not contend that this agency has a
sweeping mandate to further this 'national policy' against discrimination.").
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has held that the meaning of the phrase "public interest" in the
Communications Act, on which the FCC's regulatory scheme is
based and by which it is empowered, is limited by the purpose of the
Act. The Court has held that the objective of the Act in relation to
minorities is to ensure that "its licensees programming fairly reflects
the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups,"9 ' not to promote
non-discrimination in a general way. A licensee's intentional dis-
criminatory practice is therefore relevant only to the extent that it
affects the licensee's capacity to discharge its obligation to reflect the
tastes and views of minorities. The anti-discrimination principle
here is not a goal but a means.
It is not difficult to argue, however, that even in the limited
sense in which the Supreme Court has understood the phrase
"public interest," explicitly discriminatory employment practices are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Communications Act. A licen-
see who engages in discriminatory employment practices against
members of a group is unlikely to be sympathetic to the interests,
tastes and viewpoints of that group and to cater to its programming
needs. It may be persuasively argued that intentional discrimina-
tory employment practices by a licensee indicates that the licensee is
unfit to occupy a position of public trusteeship.119
The crucial issue, however, is what to make of statistical dis-
parity? Is discrimination evidenced only by blatantly intentional
discrimination? How should the FCC deal with the question of struc-
tural exclusion? What probative value should statistical disparities
be given in evaluating the record of a licensee's employment prac-
tice? It is in this area that the FCC's policy has been tentative and
consequently ineffective.
B. How Effective Have The FCC Policies Been?
Although the FCC's minority opportunity policies have now
been in place for a number of years, their impact on the diversifica-
tion of the communication industry has been mixed and very mod-
est. I suggest that three factors might be responsible for the less
than satisfactory results. First, in the last twelve years the FCC has
been less than enthusiastic in enforcing its own policies, especially
its ownership policies. Commissioners appointed by the Reagan and
Bush Administrations regarded those inclusive policies as impedi-
ments to the normal functioning of the market, impediments to the
normal diversifying power of the market. Indeed, had the
198. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976) (Stewart, J., dictum).
199. See Bilingual Bicultural Coalition, 595 F.2d at 628 ("[Ihe public interest is not
served by licensees who engage in intentional discrimination."); see also supra note 181
and accompanying text.
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Reagan/Bush Commission had its way, most, if not all, minority
ownership policies would have been abandoned.
2 0
Second, the image of African Americans that informs and con-
stitutes the discourse about African Americans in this polity gener-
ally, and within the media specifically, may have affected the per-
ception of members of the Commission as to what constitutes unjust
exclusion and what constitutes legitimate and worthwhile diversity.
Given that between 1980 and 1992 members of the Commission
were appointed by presidents who, to varying degrees, contributed
to the discourse that casts African Americans as the negation of the
normal and moral order, it would not be surprising to learn that
members of the Commission believed that what has been excluded
by the market is legitimately excluded. Third, there are structural
and institutional limitations to the Commission's policies. My point
is not so much to fault the Commission for those policies, but merely
to indicate that, given their institutional limitations, it is not sur-
prising that the reach and success of these policies have been
modest.
Let us now look at the effectiveness of the Commission's poli-
cies in some detail, so as to indicate how both the attitude of the
Commission as well as the structural limitations on the policies
themselves have contributed to the modest nature of the resulting
diversity.
1. Ownership Policies. Minority ownership of electronic media
outlets in the United States is very low,20' and in some cases it has
declined in recent years. Take the distress sales policy, for example.
Between the time the FCC adopted its "distress sale" policy in 1978
and the end of 1991, only 38 distress sales have been approved.
Since the beginning of the Reagan/Bush era, the number of distress
sales has dramatically declined. There have been only thirteen dis-
tress sales since 1980. In the last five years there has been only one
such sale.02 In the last three years, there has not been a single sale
200. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. This article was researched and
written prior to the November 1992 presidential elections, and therefore its analysis of
the work of the Federal Communications Commission is limited to the FCC during the
Reagan/Bush era. It is likely that as President Clinton makes appointments to the
Commission, its ideology and policies will shift. This article cannot foresee the direction of
these shifts and therefore does not attempt to predict how the policies discussed herein
will change.
201. See text accompanying supra note 59-60.
202. FCC Consumer Assistance and Small Business Division, Office of Public Affairs,
Minority Ownership Lists (updated March 2, 1992), reprinted in Commissioner Barrett
Issues Statement on National and Local Radio Ownership Rules (MM Docket 91-140),
1992 FCC LEXIS 2081 app. 2 (April 15, 1992) [hereinafter Minority Ownership Lists].
Most of the distress sales took place in 1980, when twenty-two stations were approved.
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under the distress sale policy. Since 1980, successive chairmen of
the Commission have pursued deregulation and non-intervention as
central concerns of their mandate. Consequently, few stations have
been designated for hearing, and therefore, opportunities for distress
sales have declined. Even on those rare occasions when licensees
have been found to have violated FCC rules, the Commission has,
contrary to its minority ownership policies, allowed those licensees
to transfer their licenses to non-minorities for the full value of the
property.23 The FCC apparently believes that the market is best
able to achieve the desired level of diversity and that the best way to
undermine policies inconsistent with the workings of the market is
to ignore them, if one is not politically able to revoke them.
Even if the FCC were fully committed to its distress sale policy,
the deregulatory environment in which transactions among private
parties go largely unscrutinized is likely to lead to some
well-entrenched media owners realizing quick profit by quick and
successive transfers and sales, rather than to racial diversity. This
could happen in one of two ways. First, the seller may arrange the
sale to a party which will ultimately reinforce and reinstate the
seller's interests. Second, the buyer might buy the station without
the intention of keeping it, intending rather to make a quick profit
203. See, e.g., Spanish Int'l Comm. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 3336 (1987). The Commission
designated for evidentiary hearing the renewal applications of Spanish International
Communications Corporation (SICC), after a preliminary investigation raised "serious
questions" regarding whether the licensee was controlled by aliens or their representa-
tives in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 310(b). The Administrative Law Judge concluded that
.alien influence and direction... greatly exceeded that permitted by Section 310(b)." The
normal practice in such a situation is to deny the licensee permission to transfer the li-
cense until completion of the renewal proceeding. See Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC,
652 F.2d 1026, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("radio station licensees whose licenses have been
designated for revocation hearing, or whose renewal applications have been designated
for hearing on basic qualifications issues [such as non-compliance with the requirements
of § 310(b)] are forbidden to transfer control of these licenses"). Prior to the completion of
the renewal proceeding, however, the Review Board approved a settlement agreement by
which SICC was allowed to transfer its stations to a non-minority entity for their full val-
ues. The Commission affirmed the decision of the Review Board, claiming that such
transfer would promptly remedy "any alien ownership problems with respect to the
SICC... simplify the proceeding and result in substantial administrative savings," and
also reduce the potential for deterioration of service to the public "during an extended pe-
riod of uncertainty." 2 F.C.C.R. at 3340. But what is not clear from the above reasoning is
why the FCC could not have required SICC to transfer its license only to a minority ap-
plicant, if the Commission thought the transfer of the license before the completion of the
renewal proceeding was in the public interest.
In another notable case the FCC allowed a licensee deemed unfit to hold a license
because of its filing of false financial reports and fraudulent advertising to transfer its li-
censes to a non-minority applicant for the full value of the property. In re Applications of
RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 3 F.C.C.R. 5057 (1988).
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from successive transactions.2 0 4
In addition, the distress sale policy is inherently reactive rather
than proactive. Its success depends wholly on the actions of third
party licensees whose practices have run afoul of FCC requirements.
It seems unsatisfactory that the important objective of giving mi-
norities access to the communication industry is made to depend on
the wrongdoings of third parties. To be sure, the distress sale policy
is meant to act as a supplement to other policies, so in that regard it
may be overly harsh to criticize it as being insufficiently active. But
it is important to remind ourselves that there are structural and
institutional limitations to such policies, so that we might inquire
into alternative methods of diversity.
In sum, the distress sale policy does not seem to significantly
foster diversity in the communication industry. The climate of de-
regulation that has thoroughly defined the working environment of
the FCC in the last few years, as well as the wholly fortuitous na-
ture of the policy, suggests that perhaps little ought to be expected
from it.
Statistics for the tax certificate policy through December 1991
indicate that the FCC has issued 271 tax certificates.0 5
Interestingly, while in the last five years there were virtually no
distress sales, the number of tax certificates issued has increased by
59 percent.0 6 At face value, the figures suggest that the tax certifi-
cate policy is working, at least relative to the distress sale policy,
since nearly five times as many stations have passed to minority
control through the tax certificate policy than through the distress
sale policy. An FCC official in 1984 refered to the policy as "a door
opener that has obviously increased minority ownership," and de-
clared it to be "successful."20 7
The effectiveness of the tax certificate policy has been chal-
lenged by some critics. One of the criticisms has been similar to the
one against the distress sale policy, that non-minority groups have
abused the process by using minority individuals as a front for an
entity which is effectively non-minority owned. This may be true,
but the solution to the problem is not to abandon the policy, as some
critics have concluded. What is needed instead to reduce this abuse
is for the FCC to strengthen its supervisory role over these types of
204. See, e.g., FCC Revokes Licenses of Georgia AM-FM, BROADCASTING, Nov. 7,
1988, at 53.
205. Minority Ownership Lists, supra note 199.
206. Id. From 1987 to 1992 the FCC issued 161 tax certificates, approximately 59%
of all certificates issued since the program began. During that same period there was one
distress sale, or approximately 2 % of all sales since that program began in 1978. Id.
207. Patrick J. Sheridan, Minority Tax Certificates: Doing the Job, BROADCASTING,
Apr. 8, 1991, at 68, 69.
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transactions. For example, the FCC ought to be suspicious of "buy
out" agreements which entitle a non-minority partner to buy out a
minority general partner shortly after the acquisition of the entity.0 8
Unless the Commission is vigilant in regulating transfers of licenses
when the transferor seeks to take advantage of tax deferral, it is
likely that the transferor will use the system to enrich himself, and
the transfer will not lead to genuine racial diversity. The role the
Commission has played in the last twelve years, however, does not
encourage one to believe that the Commission is truly committed to
diversity beyond that which the market has ushered in.
Regarding the minority exception to the multiple ownership
rule, there is no evidence to demonstrate that raising the limits on
station ownership by one or two has encouraged white owners to
invest in minority-owned enterprises. It is unlikely that white en-
trepreneurs will be enticed to invest in a minority controlled enter-
prise just so they can increase their national ownership by one or
two stations. When one already owns 12 stations, for example, the
potential to own one more station may not be a sufficient incentive
to invest in a venture where one would not have invested in the first
place. In any case, the Commission has indicated that it will abolish
the minority exception to the multiple ownership rule beginning on
August 1, 1992.09
Finally, consider the comparative hearing process. Admittedly,
there are times when the comparative process will tip the balance in
favor of a minority applicant, as in Winter Park Communications,
Inc. v. FCC. 21 Such occasions, however, are rare. At both the quanti-
tative and qualitative levels, numerous factors are considered
2 1'
208. An example of such a questionable transaction occurred in 1987 when Gillett
Broadcasting purchased WTVT-TV in Tampa, Florida. Id. at 69. Although the principals
of Gillett Broadcasting were non-minorities, they formed a limited partnership with a
minority limited investor who was made the general partner and majority voting
shareholder. Id. By this arrangement the partnership was able to obtain a tax certificate
and complete the transaction at a price significantly lower than market value. Id. The
arrangement was criticized because the partnership arrangement included a clause that
allowed Gillett Broadcasting to buy out its minority partner after two years, raising
questions of whether the partnership arrangement was in fact a sham designed to induce
the issuance of a tax certificate. Id. The Commission approved the sale despite the
presence of the buy out clause. Id.
This possible abuse could have been minimized if the FCC had refused to permit the
transfer unless the buyout clause was omitted.
209. Although the minority exception to the multiple ownership rule has been
largely ineffective, the FCC's new policy will likely undermine its general policy of en-
couraging diversity by creating conditions by which smaller broadcasting companies will
be driven out of the market by their larger and more financially powerful competitors.
Under this new policy, minority owned stations are likely to be particularly vulnerable.
210. 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
211. Factors considered at comparative hearings include diversification, integration
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which will likely determine the issue before the factor of minority
status is ever considered." Many cases are decided at the quantita-
tive level, which means that race and ethnicity play no role at all,
and even when cases do reach the second round, where qualitative
factors are considered, minority broadcasters will infrequently be
granted the license. Given .that membership in a minority group is
only one of several factors to be considered, it is only in those cir-
cumstances where the applicants are comparable on all other quali-
tative factors that a minority applicant will win on account of minor-
ity status. Such circumstances are rare.
There is a further reason why comparative hearings may not be
an effective means of diversifying the electronic media. Given the
suspicion, and in fact the hostility, of the majority of commissioners
toward affirmative action, comparisons which tip the balance in
favor of minority applicants are rarer than they have been in the
past. The FCC's disfavor of the comparative hearing process, where
membership in a minority group is one of many factors to be consid-
ered, has been an open secret.213 A reluctant adherent to the faith is
unlikely to have a true communion.
Furthermore, the time and expense of the comparative process
for awarding a new broadcasting license is bound to make it unat-
tractive, and even unavailable, to many minorities. One of the most
significant obstacles to minority entry into the communication mar-
ket is the lack of support from financial institutions, which tend to
be skeptical about minority entrepreneurship. 214 Therefore a process
of ownership and management, local residence, civic participation, broadcast experience,
and environmental impact. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 38,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
212. "Although the FCC has not scientifically surveyed all of its many comparative
broadcast licensing proceedings, even of the cases cited by Metro, sixty percent were de-
cided on grounds other than the minority enhancement credit." Id. at 39 (footnotes omit-
ted).
213. In 1986 the Commission initiated a proceeding to re-examine the constitutional-
ity and desirability of comparative hearings that consider race and gender as factors in
the comparative process. The proceedings were not an innocent fact-finding mission, but
were, as the Congress clearly saw them to be, elaborate rituals by the FCC intended to
give legitimacy to what it had already decided. By the time the FCC commenced the pro-
ceeding it had already decided that the policy was both unconstitutional and unwise. It
took Congressional intervention to force the FCC to discontinue the proceeding. See Pub.
L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987). A rider was placed on an appropriations bill
which prohibited the FCC from using appropriated funds "to repeal, to retroactively apply
changes in, or to continue a reexamination of" Commission policies intended to expand
female and minority ownership in the electronic media. This prohibition has been
renewed in subsequent fiscal years. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17
(1988) (same language).
214. Mark Fowler, former Chairman of the FCC, was aware of the problems that
minorities face in the area of venture capital. He observed, "The greater gains which
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such as comparative hearings may be seen as financially prohibitive
given that minorities have lesser access to financial resources than
members of other groups.
What can be said of the effectiveness of the FCC's minority
ownership policies? First, there are indications that the Commission
has failed to vigorously enforce its minority ownership policies and
has even been slightly hostile to these policies. This is especially
true in relation to distress sales. Second, some of the Commission's
minority ownership policies are structurally limited in their capacity
to achieve significant diversification of ownership and viewpoint.
The policies are inherently reactive rather than proactive, and do
not address the crucial question of finances. In a financial market
chronically skeptical of the entrepreneurial ability of minorities, it
remains difficult for minorities to raise the necessary capital. There
is therefore a need for an institutional structure which will lessen
the hardship minorities face when they attempt to raise capital.
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. The FCC's EEO
policy has made a positive impact on the employment of minori-
ties. 5 In the top four categories, however, the figures for all minori-
ties, and especially African Americans, are still very low. An exami-
nation of the figures for the period between 1986 and 1990 show that
the percentage of African Americans in the top four categories has
remained virtually stagnant. 6
The top four job categories are significant because employees in
these categories make the important decisions that have an impact
on the communication process. If the ultimate objective of the FCC's
policies is the transformation of the negative image of African
could be made in minority ownership of telecommunications facilities are restrained by
the reluctance of our country's financial institutions to back minority entrepreneurs."
Mark S. Fowler, The Federal Communications Commission 1981-1987: What the
Chairman Said, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 409, 488-89 (1988) (quoting Chairman
Fowler's address to the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, Inc., Sept. 24,
1981).
215. 1990 Broadcast and Cable Employment Trend Report, 1991 FCC LEXIS 3310
(June 11, 1991).
216. The 1990 Broadcast and Cable Employment Trend Report shows that in the cru-
cial top four categories, the percentage of African Americans in each job category stood as
follows:
Job Catego1
Officials and Managers 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.3
Professionals 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.2
Technicians 11.2 11.2 11.0 10.7 10.6
Sales Workers 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.0 5.3
Id. at *4-5.
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Americans and the reconstitution of the image which the majority
holds of itself which allows it to define African Americans as the
negation of the normal and moral order, then strong minority pres-
ences in these categories will have a make an important difference.
The concern about the dearth of minority employees in the commu-
nication industry is not simply a concern about employment dis-
crimination, which may be remedied by the employment of more
minorities at the lowest sectors of the industry, such as service
workers and laborers. The objective is to check the proclivities of the
majority to ensure self-certainty by defining African Americans as
the problem Other through the communication process. Given the
nature of the mission, only the employment of a substantial number
of African Americans in the four critical categories will begin to
address the issue.
The lack of improvement in the four categories may be attrib-
utable to the vagueness of the Commission's EEO rules, as well as to
the lack of commitment by the Reagan/Bush Commission to the
notion of affirmative action. In what sense are the rules vague? The
Commission has stated that statistics are not as important as the
"reasonable and good-faith efforts" of the licensee, and that it will
derive its judgment from an examination of various indicia, includ-
ing the composition of the available labor force in the station's area.
The assessment of "feasibility" will be based on specific economic
assumptions, 17 and a "narrative mapping" that is insensitive to and
oblivious of "structural" or "unconscious" racism.218 This flexible
guideline could be used as justification for FCC non-intervention.
Given its abundant faith in the workings of the market, the
Commission is likely to err on the side of assuming "good faith ef-
fort" on the part of the licensee. The danger is that the flexibility
inherent in the "good-faith effort" test will be used not to curtail the
domain within which the excluder can freely move, but rather to
give him an emergency exit even though all "objective" indicators
217. Mark Fowler once proposed an alternative, market driven method. "Instead of
defining public demand and specifying categories of programming to serve this demand,
the Commission should rely on the broadcasters' ability to determine the wants of their
audiences through the normal mechanisms of the marketplace." Mark S. Fowler & Daniel
L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209-10
(1982). "[Blroadcasters best serve the public by responding to market forces rather than
governmental directives." Id. at 256.
218. The Commission's actions suggest that it often operates on the assumption that
discrimination will always be evidenced directly. Where no such direct evidence exists,
the Commission finds the licensee's employment practices to be discrimination free.
Bilingual Bicultural Coalition, 595 F.2d 621, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson, J.,
dissenting in part). While the Commission is usually suspicious of statistics from the peti-
tioners, it is often willing to accept statistical offerings of its licensees to protest the
charge of the petitioner. Id.
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seem to show that he is trapped.
There are two reasons for believing so. First, if recent decisions
of the Commission are any indication, it is likely that the Commission
will not impose harsh sanctions on those who have not complied
with its EEO policy.219 Second, and perhaps more importantly, a
determination of "good-faith effort" cannot be made independent of
the assumptions under which the regulator functions. Whether the
FCC regards the behavior of a licensee to be "good-faith effort" will
likely depend not only on what behavior the Commission thinks is
desirable, but also on what it believes is feasible. While it is admira-
ble that the Commission recognizes that the minimum statistical
requirement can be taken to be the maximum, where statistical
guidelines could be used as "safe harbor," the use of a much more
flexible guideline might be a better check on the behavior of broad-
casters. It is not sufficient to say that one knows a "good-faith effort"
when one sees it, for there is no one single way to see, and it matters
greatly who is actually doing the seeing. Given that the long line of
discourse in this country has constructed a profile of the undeserv-
ing African American, and of black collective fall, the Commission's
intuition as to whether minorities, especially African Americans,
have been illegitimately excluded is likely to be informed by that
background discourse. Put simply, the vagueness of its rules will
allow the Commission to continue to rationalize the exclusion of
minorities as a routine outcome of legitimate professional decisions.
In that case, the negative image which minority employment in the
top four categories is meant to alter will have been used to give bu-
reaucratic sanction to the process of exclusion in employment.
If the FCC truly desires to improve the employment opportuni-
ties of minorities in the top four categories, it must become more
active in inquiring into the records of licensees, and licensees must
be made to realize that violations of the FCC's EEO rules will lead
to serious sanctions. The FCC in its current practice relies on com-
plaints and petitions from third parties, rather than initiating in-
quiries itself;2.20 whether a licensee is sanctioned for a violation of
FCC policy is dependent on whether a private third party has had
219. Reporting requirements are a favored sanction of the Commission. See Kennard
et al., supra note 182, at 324, 329 ("The Commission more commonly responds to
inadequate EEO efforts with lesser penalties, such as sending a letter of admonishment,
imposing additional reporting requirements, requiring the licensees to submit hiring
goals and timetables, or renewing the license for less than the full term.... Between
1972 and 1987, the Commission designated only 11 licensees (representing 23 broadcast
stations) for hearings on grounds of EEO deficiencies; only 3 of those licenses were denied
on EEO grounds."); see also Florida Broadcasters, 3 F.C.C.R. 1930, 1934 (1988) (imposing
merely a heightened reporting requirement as a sanction for violation of EEO rules).
220. Kennard et al., supra note 182, at 328.
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the time, the energy, and the resources to file petitions against that
licensee.
Even in the event that a license has been designated for a hear-
ing and a violation has been established, the sanctions imposed on
the licensee are rarely ones that provide sufficient incentive for
other licensees to comply with the Commission's EEO rules. For the
sanctioning process to carry any credibility, licensees must believe
that revocation of their licenses may possibly result from noncom-
pliance with the policy. Current FCC practice sends a different mes-
sage, that the ultimate sanction of license revocation is unlikely to
be used against a licensee for violation of EEO rules.
Not only has the FCC been reluctant to vigorously enforce its
policy in areas where the EEO requirement is clearly applicable, it
has also exempted some important employers from the application of
the policy. The most prominent of those exempted are the television
networks.221 As William Kennard, Jennifer Smith and Byron
Marchant have noted, given that the networks employ a substantial
number of people, 22  and given their "substantially worse EEO re-
cords than [those of] broadcast licensees,"2 1 the refusal of the
Commission to apply its EEO policies to the networks will continue
to undermine the effectiveness of the policy.
Put simply, the Commission's unenthusiastic enforcement
practices and its reluctance to extend its policies to significant seg-
ment of the communications industry have seriously undercut the
effectiveness of its EEO policies. The Commission's reluctance to
vigorously enforce its policies and extend those policies to communi-
cation entities with significant employment, such as the networks, is
informed by the Commission's unsupported assumption that the
market is able and likely to usher in necessary and meaningful di-
versity.
3. FCC's Minority Policies: Concluding Remarks. Although it
cannot be denied that the FCC's minority policies have resulted in
some diversification of the broadcasting industry, the result, at least
in relation to African Americans, has been mostly insignificant.
There are a number of reasons for this. The first, and perhaps most
significant, reason is the lack of commitment the Commission has
shown towards these policies in the last- twelve years. Expressing
faith in the capacity of the market to diversify the broadcasting
industry, the Commission has tended to be less than vigorous in
221. Id.
222. The three major television networks employed approximately 12,000 people at




enforcing its own rules. Indeed, had it not been for. its belief that
Congress would be displeased if it abolished its minority policies, it
is more than likely that the Commission would long ago have aban-
"doned most, if not all, of its minority ownership policies. It was, after
all, the direct intervention of the Congress that saved the minority
enhancement aspect of comparative hearings.2 In many ways the
FCC seems to regard its minority policies as politically necessary
evils.
Second, the FCC's minority ownership policies have some
structural defects. They are reactive rather than proactive, in that
the entry of minorities into the broadcast industry is dependent on
how poorly non-minorities act serve the public interest. In the past,
the unavailability of new broadcast frequencies has necessarily tied
the effectiveness of the FCC's ownership policies to the behavior of
current frequency holders. But as technological capabilities enable
the expansion of the broadcast spectrum,2r there will be opportuni-
ties to award new frequencies. Under these circumstances, an FCC
which is committed to diversifying the electronic media will need to
develop schemes to award some of those frequencies to minorities
within the limitations of Metro Broadcasting. To attain true diver-
sity, an afirmative policy that is not simply tied to the misbehavior
of non-minorities is needed. Such a method of allocation is desirable
not only because an important policy of diversity is not made contin-
gent on the number of non-minority policy violators, but also be-
cause it will address to some extent the problem of finance that
many minorities face when they seek to acquire broadcasting facili-
ties by allowing them to avoid expensive transfer costs. If the FCC is
to effectively diversify the broadcasting industry, it must focus more
than it has in the past on effectively and fairly allocating new spec-
tra to minorities.226
224. Id.
225. With the advancement of new radio technologies the AM band has been effec-
tively expanded to accomodate more channels, 56 Fed. Reg. 64842, 64842-74 (1991), and
the FCC has lifted its ban on accepting applications for new-AM stations. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.37 (1991); see also Fierce Background Debates; FCC Sets New Band and Protection for
AM Service, 11 Comm. Daily (Warren Publishing) No. 188, at 2 (Sept. 27, 1991)
[hereinafter Fierce Debates].
The Commission has refused to reserve any of the new frequencies for minorities,
however, and there have been reports that the Commission will allow "only existing
broadcasters.. . to set up shop in new expanded territory." Fierce Debates, supra. This
would be a rather curious method of diversifying the radio industry.
226. This fair and effective allocation of the electronic broadcast spectra is what the
minority exception to the multiple ownership rule and minority enhancement scheme in
the comparative hearing process were expected to accomplish. These policies have not,
however, been particularly effective in doing so. See supra notes 209-14 and accompany-
ing text.
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The Commission must also directly address the perennial prob-
lem of financing. Current FCC policies fail to address the financial
problems that minorities face. Financial markets are chronically
skeptical of the entrepreneurial abilities of minorities and are reluc-
tant to provide them necessary start-up and acquisition capital.
Many minorities lack the experience that most financial lenders
demand of loan applicants, and many have not mastered the pro-
cedural requirements and techniques for successful application for
capital. While the FCC does not have a great deal of power in terms
of start-up financing, it could play a modest role by organizing and
funding workshops on how to secure loans and capital. This would
send a signal to the financial market, as well as to the minority
community, that diversifying the broadcast industry is a priority
goal of the Commission. Additionally, minorities encounter difficul-
ties in attracting advertising dollars sufficient to continue their
operations. There is evidence that in both cases minorities are faced
with blatantly discriminatory practices. 7
At least in relation to discriminatory advertising practices, it is
arguable that the Commission already has jurisdiction to develop
rules and regulations to obviate the destructive impact of such ad-
vertising on minority owned and formatted media. The general
power granted to the Commission under § 303(r) to "make such rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions.., as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act [and as]
public convenience, interest, or necessity requires" would allow the
Commission to ban advertisers from discriminating against minor-
ity-owned facilities. Since diversity is determined to be an important
goal of both the Act and of the FCC, any user of the electromagnetic
spectrum whose conduct and manner of use directly undermine that
important goal may be sanctioned.2" This is not a general assertion
227. See Kennard et al., supra note 182, at 336-38. The authors cite a 1986 letter to
the FCC from the National Black Media Coalition (NBMC) in which the NBMC recounted
instances in which advertisers and advertising agencies "deliberately excluded
advertising on minority-owned media despite the fact that minorities were major
consumers of their products or services." Id. at 337. The letter further alleged that many
advertising agencies allocate separate advertising budgets for minority-owned or
minority-formatted radio stations, and that such budgets are significantly less than what
the size of the minority audience and the level of its disposable income would support. Id.
228. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775
(1978). In NCCB the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's cross-ownership policy, which pro-
hibited the granting of a television or radio station license to an applicant who owns or
operates a daily newspaper serving the same market. Id. at 779. In so holding, the Court
rejected the argument of newspaper industry representatives that the FCC lacked
authority under either the Communications Act or the First Amendment to regulate the
print media's ability to own broadcast stations. After dispensing with the dtatutory chal-
lenge by declaring that "the Commission clearly did not take an irrational view of the
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of jurisdiction by the FCC on advertising, in the same way that the
FCC's assertion of jurisdiction to develop its cross-ownership policy
was not a claim ofjurisdiction to regulate newspapers. Rather, it is a
claim of jurisdiction to develop rules and regulations that are "based
on permissible public-interest goals and ... [that] are not an unrea-
sonable means for seeking to achieve these goals .... 229
If the FCC continues to be ideologically disinclined to maintain
and expand policies designed to include minorities in the communi-
cation industry, then Congress ought to intervene and legislatively
provide for such affirmative action policies by codifying current FCC
policies and providing a structure which will enable minorities to be
admitted into the ownership of new communication technologies.
Given the fact that the media has contributed greatly to the consti-
tution of a profoundly negative national image of African Americans,
diversifying the media so as to enable African Americans to engage
in a corrective narrative will destabilize both the negative image of
themselves and the innocent self-image of European Americans.
This is an urgent national issue with which Congress should concern
itself.
Throughout this Article, one concept has been prominent: di-
versity. The FCC has explicitly grounded its minority policies in the
notion of diversity, and diversity is the most secure justification for
inclusive policies. But why is racial diversity important? The theme
of this Article has been that such diversity is likely to contribute to
the destabilization and correction of the dominant discourse which
has seen African Americans as the problem Other. When African
Americans are allowed to interrogate the dominant story and define
themselves rather than be continually defined by the majority, that
ability may transform not only the image of African Americans but
also the image the majority has of itself and of its institutions.
The next section will explore in detail why diversity is the most
secure justification for the FCC's policies. In some sense, this is what
public interest when it decided to impose a... ban on new licensing of co-located newspa-
per-broadcast combinations," the Court held that the regulation was also consistent with
the First Amendment, for "[in the instant case, far from seeking to limit the flow of in-
formation, the Commission has acted ... 'to enhance the diversity of information heard
by the public without on-going government surveillance of the content of speech.' The
[FCC] regulations are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified
mass communications .... " Id. at 801-02 (quoting National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
229. NCCB, 436 U.S. 'at 796. In the event that the FCC declines to assume such
regulatory responsibility, Congress should take up the issue and provide the structure for
regulating discriminatory advertising. See Kennard et al., supra note 219, at 337.
Congress could do so by amending the Communications Act to give the Commission
explicit authority to so act or by creating the legal structure for "the FTC and FCC to
share enforcement responsibility." Id.
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the Supreme Court held in Metro Broadcasting. The Court, however,
never managed to explore the objectives which should animate the
diversity policy. In many ways, the Court's diversity rationale was
an intuitive assertion of the need for inclusive policies in the com-
munication industry. The next part, therefore, will explore the rea-
sons that make necessary the particular notion of diversity em-
braced by the Court. Before I introduce the notion of diversity that I
believe better justifies inclusive policies in this area, however, I
shall examine and reject another possible justification for affirma-
tive action-remedying past discrimination. I shall also explore and
reject other theories of diversity. After all, one may believe in diver-
sity and still be hostile to the sort of inclusive governmental policies
that I advocate, as some of the actions of the Reagan/Bush era mar-
ket-oriented Commission indicated.
V. DIVERSITY: THE FORM OF JUSTIFICATION
The political culture in this country seems to be hostile to af-
firmative action and inclusiveness."0 On one level the hostility to
affirmative action may be seen as part of a general challenge to the
activist state.231 There is some validity to this observation. Themes
of "privatization" and "deregulation" have in recent years become
more prominent in the political discourse than have distributive
concepts, and many of the programs ushered in by the activist state
have been dismantled or limited. 2 Indeed, this is what the FCC has
done to the electronic media regulatory scheme. If one sees the chal-
lenge to affirmative action as part of the attack by mainly the politi-
cal right on the legitimacy and desirability of state intervention,
then the justification for affirmative action is strongly tied to the
justification of the activist state in general.
But I see it differentlyY The current attack on affirmative
230. A 1988 survey indicated that 76-79% of all Americans opposed affirmative
action. See Poll Reports Majority Believe Race Prejudice is Still Strong, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
9, 1988, at A13. The hostile response to the notion of multiculturalism is another
example. See supra note 140.
231. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 790-94 (1987).
232. Id. at 781-82 ("An attack on 'big government' [has become] the organizing theme
of our politics.... [A] myriad of programs [have been] proposed and sometimes instituted
to limit domestic governmental activities, particularly those of the federal government
.... [President Reagan] has managed to put the activist state on the defensive. .. ."); see
also Crenshaw, supra note 45, at 1336-41.
233. Even on a general level, the common perception among liberals that the attack
by the right is an attack on the activist state and a challenge to state intervention is, I
think, generally mistaken. It does not explain why since the early 1980s successive
conservative Republican federal governments have pushed strongly for state intervention
in selected areas of social and political life. Take, for example, the push to criminalize
abortion and to require public school teachers to lead children in prayer; these are not
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action is not just part of a general suspicion of state intervention;
that suspicion is "overdetermined," to use an Althusserian phrase,24
by the historical specificities of race relations in this .country. To be
specific, the long line of discourse that has portrayed blacks as the
negation of the normal and moral order makes resistance to such
policies especially intense. There is in fact no one concept which
divides those who call themselves liberals more than does the notion
of afrmative action." s
Having made this preliminary observation, let me now inquire
into the possible justifications for affirmative action .in the commu-
nication industry. The first and perhaps the most prominent justifi-
cation is the notion of remedying past discrimination. I will show
that this notion is inadequate; a better justification for the FCC
policies is diversity. I will examine three theories of diversity and
show why critical pluralism provides the strongest basis for increas-
ing the numbers of African Americans in the communications indus-
try.
A. Remedying Past Discrimination
Put in general terms, the argument here is this: minorities
generally, and African Americans specifically, have in the past been
institutionally excluded from the communications industry, and are
as a result at a competitive disadvantage. Affirmative action pro-
grams are therefore meant to slightly improve the competitive dis-
advantage. The major premise underlying the argument in favor of
affirmative action is that white males today enjoy a competitive
advantage precisely because minorities, and white women, were
unjustly excluded in the past.
There are actually two versions of the remedial affirmative
action argument. The first version assumes that the industry has
itself consciously or unconsciously excluded minorities in the past,
and that the competitive advantage white males currently enjoy is
linked directly to that institutional exclusion. The second version
claims that it is not essential to prove that a particular institution
actions of a movement which is generally suspicious of state intervention. I think the only
way to understand the political right's attack on the state is to see it as motivated by the
desire for a different kind of activist state. Seen this way, the right's quarrel is not that
the state is activist, but rather with the values that define the domain of its activism.
234. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX 101 (Ben Brewster trans., 1969). Some have gone
further and have argued that race shapes most of the institutions and agendas in
American society. Howard Winant, for example, argues that "[r]acial conflict is the
archetype of discord in North America, the primordial conflict which in many ways has
structured all others." Howard Winant, Postmodern Racial Politics in the United States:
Difference and Inequality, 20 SocIALisT REv. 121, 121 (1990).
235. One could argue that in the past the "Soviet threat" was equally divisive.
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has engaged in discriminatory practice in the past before a remedial
procedure may be instituted in that institution or industry. This
version requires only that there has been past discrimination in
some spheres of the system, whether those spheres are directly re-
lated or not. The focus here is not on the impermissible practices
carried on in a particular sphere, but rather on a system. The as-
sumption is that all spheres are interconnected. Once spheres of
existence are conceptualized this way, the necessary reform is sys-
tem-wide. To reform the system requires the treatment of the vari-
ous spheres of the system as one continuous unit.
To summarize, the first version rejects the autonomy of the
offspring from its parents; the second rejects a parallel claim of
autonomy of spheres. The first version is perhaps less controversial
than the second. Courts embrace aspects of it, and most commenta-
tors are not openly hostile to it. The Supreme Court has, for exam-
ple, recognized that the objective of remedying past discrimination is
constitutionally permissible in some circumstances. 6 Neither the
courts nor the FCC, however, have relied on this justification to
support minority preference policies in the communications indus-
try.2 In my view this is a welcome development, for three reasons.
First, the focus on past discrimination leads us to falsely assume
that discrimination is a thing of the past, and that affirmative action
serves as a means of making up for the sins of the past. The notion
of remedying past discrimination is not essential to any successful
justification of affirmative action, and in fact, unnecessarily compli-
cates the discourse on affirmative action. Discrimination is not a
thing of the past, as the daily discourse about African Americans
demonstrates. The narrative of black collective fall continues to
structure the relationship of African Americans with members of the
236. The Court has held that remedying past discrimination is a compelling
government interest, and that affirmative action may be employed to achieve that goal as
long as the specific program is narrowly tailored to achieve it. Thus, at the state and local
level a governmental entity "has the authority to eradicate the effects of [public or pri-
vate] discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction." City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989). In relation to the authority of the Federal
Government, Chief Justice Burger observed, "It is fundamental that in no organ of
government.., does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the
Congress." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483-84 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice
Powell thought the 10% set-aside "was 'justified as a remedy that serves the compelling
governmental interest in eradicating the" continuing effects of past discrimination
identified by Congress." Id. at 496 (Powell, J., dissenting).
237. Justice Stevens made the following observation: "Today the Court squarely
rejects the proposition that a governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is
never permissible except as a remedy for past wrong. I endorse this focus on the future
benefit, rather than the remedial justification, of such decisions." Metro Broadcasting, 497




Second, at least in the communications industry, the notion of
past discrimination as a justification for remedial action prevents us
from seeing the complete picture of exclusion. When one talks about
remedying past discrimination one is likely to focus only on the
exclusion of minorities as communicators, but the exclusion of
African Americans as communicators is only one of three concerns
here. Indeed, our concern about the exclusion of African Americans
as communicators is informed by the two other aspects of exclusion:
(1) the omission of social issues that concern African Americans, and
(2) the continual reproduction of stereotypical images of African
Americans. The focus on remedies for past discrimination tends to
limit the issue to a simple employment discrimination concern.
Third, and most importantly, the focus on past discrimination
does not deal with the issue that has been central to this Article: the
role of the media in the constitution of the African American Other
and the importance of providing institutional structures to counter
the tendency of the majority to ensure the solidity of its identity by
defining what is different as evil, or The Problem. This is in my view
the most plausible justification for affirmative action in the commu-
nication industry. It can be achieved only by a forward-looking policy
of diversity, not .by a backward-looking notion of remedying past
discrimination.
B. Diversity (Pluralism)
Diversity refers to the existence of multiple perspectives and
viewpoints in the discursive domain, an institutional environment
which enables the multiple voices of individuals and social groups to
contest each other. Why is such a multiplicity of perspectives and
voices important? A number of alternative justifications can be
given. The objectives of diversity, and the institutions assumed by it,
that I embrace and shall explore in detail later are concerned with
the need to constitute more defensible individual and collective
identities. But before I do this, I shall explore, and reject, two other
prominent theories of diversity. The first, and perhaps the most
common, theory of diversity is the Milliane 8 version, which I shall
alternatively call "market individualism." It is that version of diver-
sity to which the Reagan/Bush Commission became increasingly
attracted. The second, and more robust, theory of diversity is what I
have referred to as the "communitarian" view of diversity. I shall
later explore briefly its tenets and conclude that it too has serious
shortcomings.
238. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975).
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1. The Millian Version. The starting point for Mill's theory of
diversity is a belief that there exists a world of "truth," and that
people's capacity to discover it is immeasurably enhanced if they
admit all perspectives and viewpoints. For John Stuart Mill, diver-
sity was crucial to the attainment of truth in three ways. First, the
excluded voice might in fact be the voice of truth. 9 Second, even if
that voice does not embody the entire truth, it might be partially
descriptive of the truth.' 0 Third, even if the excluded voice is the
voice of falsity, it will still be important to allow it a space, for it
might allow us to reflect on and understand better the truth we
hold.4 1
The Millian justification has been invoked in various ways at
various times, 2 and it might not be erroneous to suggest that it
informs a dominant aspect of the free speech tradition in this
country. Two propositions inform the Millian version of diversity.
First, diversity is defined negatively, as the absence of state inter-
vention in the discursive landscape, with the ultimate objective of
clarifying or discovering the truth out there in the world. "Truth"
may not always imply transcendental knowledge, but it does refer to
the notion of a story out there waiting to be told; the objective of
diversity is therefore to enhance the possibility for getting the story
straight. Second, the potential for getting the story straight is as-
sumed to be immensely enhanced if the market acts as the paradigm
of diversity.
As some have argued persuasively,243 and as our examination of
the communication industry in relation to African Americans has
demonstrated, the market filters out that which the dominant dis-
course considers abnormal or illegitimate.' The market is the
239. See generally id. at 18-34.
240. See generally id. at 34-44.
241. See generally id. at 44-50.
242. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 964-65, 968-74 (1978).
243. See Baker, supra note 242; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1414-15 (1986); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 ("Although laissez-faire economic theory asserts
that desirable economic conditions are best promoted by the free market, today's
economists widely admit that government regulation is needed to correct failures in the
economic market caused by real world conditions. Similarly, real world conditions also in-
terfere with the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas .... Consequently ...
state intervention [may be] necessary to correct communicative market failures."); see
also CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLrrICAL-ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS (1977).
244. See Baker, supra note 242, at 980 ("[Ihe marketplace of ideas theory is merely
an ideological construct-the unregulated marketplace of ideas promotes the dominant
group's interests and reflects its experiences of reality. The workings of the marketplace
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means by which the majority stamps truth on itself.245 This is possi-
ble because the market enables the majority to simultaneously con-
ceal the assumptions that inform its outlooks and paint the picture
of the market as a neutral arbiter, supposedly separate from the
interests and perspectives of the majority.
The challenge to the Millian version of diversity is directed not
only at its assumption that the market is the best institution to
foster diversity, but also at the very justification given on its behalf.
The challenge questions the notion that the telos of diversity is
"truth" or "getting the story straight," for there is no story waiting to
be told. As Hans Kellner has written, 'The straightness of any story
is a rhetorical invention." 6 There are multiple ways of organizing
discrete events to tell a story, and hence there are multiple versions
of every story. The telling of a story, the process of describing a phe-
nomenon or an event, is to a great extent a creative act. Media dis-
course, like legal discourse, is "a creative speech which brings into
existence that which it utters.
The political consequence of the notion of "truth" as an inde-
pendent representation of physical and social phenomena is that
alternative forms of explaining are denormalized, and forms of con-
struction inconsistent with the prevailing "regime of truth"?8 are
marginalized and delegitimized. Rather than being a description of
the world "out there," the notion of truth, or the idea of a "straight"
story, quite often becomes an instrument of conquest, an effective
means of silencing different voices or "normalizing" them by renar-
rating the story in a different voice.
As the current state of African American representation in the
communication industry and the image of African Americans in the
media attest, the Millian version of diversity has had undesirable
confirm the dominant group's self-serving belief that in the marketplace of ideas 'the best
ideas for the society will find the most takers.'").
245. There are two ways through which the market ensures that the majority
perspective assumes the status of the normal and the true. First, the different is excluded
outright as being abnormal, false, or evil. Second, even when groups defined as the Other
obtain access, that access is so brief and infrequent that the Other will not be able to de-
velop patterns of conduct that will appear plausible and legitimate.
246. HANS KELLNER, LANGUAGE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION: GETTING THE
STORY CROOKED xi (1989); see also Adeno Addis, In Defense of Crookedness, supra note 31.
247. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYmBOLIC POWER 42 (John B. Thompson, ed.,
Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991).
248. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 133 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980)
("'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain
it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth ....
The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or
ideology; it is truth itself.").
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consequences for African Americans. The assumption that there
exists an objective world whose description does not vary according
to the describer has led to the unreflective endorsement of the racial
majority's view as objective and normal. As a consequence, the ways
of the racial minority are viewed as the negation of normalcy, and
hence as the negation of reality itself. The market has been used as
the institution through which exclusions and injustices are natural-
ized. The argument is typically framed by the question, "why do they
not compete in the market," and the reply, "if they are unable to
compete in the market, then perhaps they deserve -to be excluded."
The irony of this argument is that the majority, which has tradition-
ally seen the minority as its opposite not just in political terms but
also in terms of the identies of each group, has used the market to
"outbid or outvoteH" 249 the minority in terms of the communication
resources needed to present its cultural and political narratives to
the discursive domain. In this society the reality of outbidding and
outvoting seems to be recognized, at least in relation to the society's
political market, and thus electoral and other laws have been en-
acted to deal with this issue.50 If we are suspicious about the politi-
cal market and its capacity to exclude, then there seems no reason
not to harbor similar misgivings about the economic market.
Put simply, the Millian theory of diversity fails to respond to
the tendency of the majority in this country to see African
Americans as the negation of normalcy. Rather, under the Millian
response the market will continue to stamp truth upon the identity
of the majority and consequently "convert differences into otherness
and otherness into scapegoats created and maintained to secure the
appearance of true [and virtuous] identity [and just institutions]."'
Although the Millian version of diversity has gained favor with the
FCC, its history and logic demonstrate that the diversity that flows
from it will be a diversity of multiple versions among one kind, not a
diversity of kinds." 2
249. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 183 (1991). Kymlicka,
for example, defends affirmative governmental support for the culture of Canadian
Aboriginal people by arguing that "the effect of market and political decisions made by
the majority may well be that aboriginal groups are outbid or outvoted on matters crucial
to their survival as a cultural community." Id.
250. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 (West 1981 & 1992 Supp.).
251. CONNOLLY, supra note 8, at 67.
252. Fiss, supra note 231, at 787 ("A fully competitive market might produce a
diversity of programs, formats, and reportage, but, to borrow an image of Renata Adler's,
it will be the diversity of'a pack going essentially in one direction.").
Although the FCC seems to be attracted to the market model of diversity, the
Supreme Court, in Metro Broadcasting accepted the assumption of at least partial market
failure. "[O]ne of the FCC's elementary regulatory assumptions is that broadcast content
is not purely market-driven. ... "Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 571.
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Adherents of Millian diversity also hold an erroneous view of
the relationship between the market and the state. Under the
Millian view of diversity, the market, as the paradigm of diversity
and freedom, is contrasted with the coercive and exclusionary power
of the state, but the reality is different. Not only does the market as
an institution exclude, but it relies on the coercive power of the state
to accomplish that exclusion. By coercively maintaining the existing
allocation of resources, and in the specific case of the electronic me-
dia by making the initial allocation within which the market oper-
ates, the state brings its coercive power to bear upon the market.23
2. Diversity in the Communitarian Scheme. As is argued in the
last section, market individualism is unsympathetic to the notion of
a publicly sanctioned attempt to include marginalized minorities in
the discursive domain because of the belief that all needed diversity
will be ensured through the neutral market.2M A version of commu-
nitarianism, however, may be more sympathetic and supportive of
affirmative inclusion in the electronic media. If the market oriented
FCC seems to be itching to abandon its inclusive policies by embrac-
ing the Millian notion of diversity, communitarians might not only
embrace the current FCC policies and the endorsement of those poli-
cies by the Metro Broadcasting Court, but they are likely to call for
an expansion of those policies to ensure a more substantive process
of inclusion. It could thus be argued that while market individual-
ism will allow otherness to continue by naturalizing differences and
by treating those groups perceived to be different as the negation of
the normal, some version of communitarianism may appear to deal
with difference in a more positive way, and inclusive policies seem to
be implied by its attitude to difference.
253. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
647-48 (1988) ("Every entitlement implies a correlative vulnerability of others.... The
image of absolute freedom and absolute security underlying the myth of the free market
is a false description of social reality and of the rules in force.").
254. I think that the belief in the power of the open market to promote and ensure
diversity in the media is largely what informed the dissenters' conclusion in Metro
Broadcasting. Although the dispute between the majority and the dissent was primarily
drawn on the question of the level of scrutiny to be applied, I think Professor Patricia
Williams was right when she observed that "the split probably would have remained even
had they agreed on this doctrinal issue." Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 (1990). This is so
because the dissent believed that there existed no credible factual evidence to prove that
the market did not include all voices that deserved to be included. The majority believed
that there was sufficient evidence that the market has in fact excluded marginal groups.
Had the dissenters been convinced that the market unjustly excluded the views and
perspectives of minorities, then I think it might have regarded the promotion of diversity
as a compelling government interest. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 618-21
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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There are of course various conceptions of community, and
some versions are as exclusionary, if not more exclusionary, of mar-
ginal social groups as is market individualism. For example, one
version of community might simply adopt the well known majori-
tarian vision that the state or other public bodies can and must
legislatively enforce the preferences and values of the majority.
Under this scheme, the views and perspectives of minorities will be
excluded in so far as- they are seen to be contrary to the views of the
majority. What the market accomplishes in the Millian vision, the
state or its subdivisions do in this conception of community.
Although majoritarianism still plays a role in the domain of ethical-
ity,255 the First Amendment216 prevents the state from intervening to
silence the minority Other. In most circumstances, however, the
market will usher in outcomes that the state desires but might be
reluctant to pursue for various political reasons. It is not official
exclusion that has made the views and perspectives of racial minori-
ties invisible, but rather the market acting as the supposedly neu-
tral arbiter of competing views and visions.
The versions of communitarianism that I claim are hospitable
to inclusive policies are those which view the genuine community as
something more than the mere aggregation of the interests of its
individual members. In the legal academy the most prominent com-
munitarian vision is the recently revived "civic republicanism."
25 7
There are other theories, however, which may also be seen to be
communitarian in important ways, 258 and still others have drawn
from political theories which are communitarian in nature, though
not specifically tied to the American past as is the civic republican
version.219
255. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
256. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
257. Professors Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein are the two most prominent
"revivers" of civic republicanism. See Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic]; Frank I. Michelnan, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman,
Foreward]; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
258. The work of Professor Owen Fiss may be seen as communitarian. Although
Professor Fiss does not explain what comprises a "public value," as opposed to a mere pri-
vate interest, he nevertheless makes the concept of public values the organizing theme of
his work. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979).
259. The most prominent current political philosophers in the communitarian tradi-
tion are Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor. See ALASDAIR
MAOCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISm AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:'
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTIT (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE
SELF]; CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND
MODERN SOCIETY (1979) [hereinafter TAYLOR, HEGEL]; Charles Taylor, Connolly,
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Although communitarians disagree on many points, three
themes seem to be central to all communitarians: first, the emphasis
on tradition as the context which gives our choices meaning; second,
the importance of dialogue in developing a sense of that tradition;
and third, the notion of public values, or the common good, as both
the outcome and the regulative ideal. Given their commitment to the
common good and deliberative politics, it is not surprising that the
communitarian's view of the market is much more skeptical than
the Millian liberal's tends to be. Communitarians see the develop-
ment of the common good, not merely the response to private prefer-
ences, to be the proper role of law and politics, and that those public
values are to be explicated through a dialogic and deliberative pro-
cess.
What would be the implication of the communitarian vision of
politics and law to the affirmative inclusion of minorities in the
communications process? Communitarians will not be averse to af-
firmatively including marginalized social groups by giving them the
resources necessary to take part in the deliberative process. Policies
such as those adopted by the FCC and endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Metro Broadcasting will earn the communitarian endorse-
ment, even though the effect of such inclusive policies may be the
exclusion of some others from the dialogic process who might con-
sider themselves deserving of active participation. Since the market
has traditionally excluded racial minorities, especially African
Americans, from the deliberative process and hence from the consti-
tution of the public good, making the deliberative process genuine
and constituting the most defensible notion of the public good will
require that those who are traditionally excluded by the market be
provided with the necessary resources to intervene in the dialogic
process. There cannot be a genuine community or a defensible
scheme of the common good if a particular tradition and group
within the polity are systematically repressed and excluded. Since
communitarians see the individual as situated in a particular tradi-
tion and culture, 60 and since those cultures and traditions are the
context within which choices are made, to allow the market to sys-
tematically exclude a particular tradition or culture from the discur-
sive domain is not only to deny the excluded group the opportunity
Foucault, and Truth, 13 POL. THEORY 385 (1985) [hereinafter Taylor, Connolly, Foucault,
and Truth].
For a detailed overview of communitarianism, see Adeno Addis, Indiuidualism,
Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAM1E L. REV. 615,
640-48 (1992).
260. See, e.g., MacIntyre, supra note 259, at 221 ("[T]he story of my life is always
embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity."); SANDEL,
supra note 259, at 179; TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 259, at 157.
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to take part in the deliberative process, but to also rob members of
the excluded group of part of who they are. To be unable to have
one's culture and story validated by admission to the discursive do-
main is in some significant way to be unable to have one's self vali-
dated.
A scheme of diversity that affirmatively includes members of
traditionally excluded groups in the communication industry will
have support among communitarians. The defensible community is
one that is able to gather the various traditions and cultures so as to
enable them to interrogate each other, and through such delibera-
tion to reconstitute themselves into a harmonious union. Given such
an outlook, communitarians are sensitive to the exclusionary poten-
tial of the market, especially in relation to marginalized groups, and
are not averse to providing such groups the necessary resources to
enable them to be part of the deliberative process. Deliberative poli-
tics cannot exist when some are excluded, either by systematic de-
sign or by virtue of lack of resources necessary to take part in the
process.
While I am sympathetic to the communitarian vision and to the
idea that affirmative action policies in the communication industry
can be justified under the communitarian vision of social life, I am
unsure of the communitarian attitude to difference. Since the telos
of the deliberative process is the constitution of a rational commu-
nity, a harmonious union which is to be defined by the common
good, the object of diversity in the deliberative process is in fact the
dissolution of difference, although admittedly after a deliberative
process. Notions such as "harmonious union" and the "common good"
in the communitarian .scheme seem to me analogous to the notion of
"truth" in the Millian version of diversity. While market individual-
ism naturalizes otherness, communitarianism tends to dissolve it.
While in theory minorities may engage the majority so that both the
majority and minority will reform themselves into a "rational com-
munity," often in practice the rationality of the community consti-
tuted by that process depends on how faithful the outlook and the
form of the association are to the dominant tradition. As such, the
purpose of diversity in the communitarian vision appears to be to
normalize the minority Other through what William Connolly has
called "gentle assimilation."26'
My quarrel with communitarians is not that their theories are
incapable of including those who have been traditionally excluded
from the discursive domain. Inclusive policies logically seem to be
required by the process of constituting the rational community and
the common good. Nor am I dissatisfied with the notion of dialogue
261. CONNOLLY, supra note 8, at 88.
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or the deliberative process. In my view, the notion of deliberation is
a useful concept, for it implies taking others and their views seri-
ously and engaging in a process of reflection both on one's own and
others' views. What I am uncomfortable with, however, is the objec-
tive to inform diversity in the communitarian scheme, the idea that
there is a substantive common good. The rhetoric of the "common
good" and the notion of the "rational community" have been used as
a means to ensure a process of assimilation. At other times they
have been invoked to justify restricting challenges to forms of asso-
ciation by "obligating people and institutions to reform and consoli-
date themselves in ways that [are] arbitrary, cruel, destructive and
dangerous [when] the pursuit of consensus and commonality are not
[in fact] supported by a harmonious [union]."26 These notions are
quite often only rhetorical assertions. William Connolly was right
when he observed that notions like the common good "close out
other possibilities that would disturb, unsettle, fragment, ambigu-
ate, politicize the achieved sense of unity .... In the communi-
tarian vision, therefore, the place of difference is not very secure. At
best, the fate of the different is to be gently assimilated. At worst,
the concept of community acts in the same imperial way as the con-
cept of truth in the Millian version of diversity.
Liberalism, both in its market individualism and communi-
tarian versions, is uncomfortable with difference. The diversity
assumed in the former tends to turn difference into otherness by
stamping the majority's way of seeing with normalcy and regarding
the minority Other as the negation of normalcy itself.
Communitarianism, on the other hand, regards diversity as a means
by which differences are abolished by normalizing the minority
Other through the process of assimilation. Neither alternative is
attractive to people on the margin. What is needed is a notion of
diversity that simultaneously accepts and respects difference as
being normal, rather than one that instead attempts to exclude it as
the abnormal Other, as market individualism tends to do, or dissolv-
ing it in the name of constituting the rational community, as the
communitarian is likely to do. Otherwise, difference is likely to be
converted into otherness, either when it is regarded as not corre-
sponding to the asserted truth or when it is seen as a challenge to
the rhetorically asserted harmonious union.
3. Critical pluralism2" and Diversity
The true is the whole.
265
262. Id. at 90.
263. Id. at 89.
264. For an overview of "critical pluralism," see Addis, supra note 259, at 648-58.
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The whole is the untrue.2
As I argued above, market individualism views plurality and
diversity in terms of the multiplicity of individuals whose admis-
sions are sanctioned by the market. The individuals so admitted are
more or less seen as having needs, perspectives, and interests that
would be understood without reference to the social groups to which
they belong. Each individual acts as an abstract individual. Market
individualism also assumes that the market treats individuals with-
out reference to the social groups to which they are members. If one
views individuals as unencumbered by the tradition, culture, and
social location of the groups to which they belong, and if one further
assumes that the market is blind to those specific affiliations and
commitments when it distributes dialogue-chances, then there
seems to be some logic to the skepticism of the value of any public
attempt to diversify the communications process by seeking to admit
members of certain groups. But both assumptions are erroneous.
The market does not distribute dialogue-chances equally to indi-
viduals without regard to the social group to which they belong. As
communitarians argue, the notion of the unencumbered individual
is a radical misrepresentation of real life.267 Individuals do not sim-
ply act and speak, but do so from certain perspectives. Such perspec-
tives do not simply descend upon individuals, but are the result of
the attachments and affiliations that are cultivated by the social
groups to which they belong; cultural membership provides the con-
text within which individuals make choices, and make those choices
in a certain order." Communitarians acknowledge this context, and
consequently view diversity as "social plurality,"6 9 and are willing to
affirmatively include those members of social groups who have been
traditionally excluded from deliberative processes such as the com-
munication process. The communitarians' rhetoric of social plurality
seems ultimately to be put in the service of the ultimate goal, the
rational community, the harmonious union, towards which the dia-
265. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, para. 20 (A. V. Miller trans.,
1981), cited in AnthonyJ. Cascardi, Narration and Totality, 21 PHIL FORUM 277,277 (1990).
266. THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (E. B. Ashton trans., 1979), quoted
in Cascardi, supra note 265, at 277.
267. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL.
THEORY 6, 7 (1990).
268. See KYMLICKA, supra note 248, at 164-65 ("[The range of options [about how to
lead our lives] is determined by our cultural heritage .... We decide how to lead our lives
by situating ourselves in these cultural narratives .... "). Kymlicka further observed that
"Freedom... to be pursued for its own sake [is] empty.... [Tihere has to be some
project that is worth pursuing, some task that is worth fulfilling.... [A] valuable life, for
most of us, will be a life filled with commitments and relationships." Id. at 48-49.
269. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 257, at 1533.
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logue among groups is to lead. Social groups are taken seriously only
to be ultimately banished.
Critical pluralism recognizes the existence of social groups and
the power that they have on the lives of individuals, but unlike
communitarianism it does not view social groups as temporary and
normatively undesirable. Social groups give people a sense of who
they are and provide the context in which they make choices and
make sense of their choices. The nature of a social group, and the
manner in which it has constituted itself, might change over time as
the result of a critical dialogue with other groups; there is a degree
of contingency to social groups. But social groups will always have
an important role in the lives and identities of individuals. To say
that they are contingent is not to make the claim that they are
dispensable; that is clearly not correct. People cannot dispense with
their collective and individual identities; it is memberships, attach-
ments, and commitments that give people a sense of who they are.
That being the case, the purpose of diversity cannot be to prepare for
the banishment of social groups, for such "banishment" will lead
only to the suppression of the perspectives of less dominant groups
while the dominant social group will represent itself as the neutral
embodiment of the harmonious union. Rather, according to critical
pluralism, the purpose of diversity is to provide the conditions by
which social groups continually engage and critically interrogate
each other, to check the tendency of the dominant group to see its
perspective as the complete story, and to turn what it perceives to be
different into the problem Other. Through interrogation by other
perspectives and narratives, the dominant group may discover the
contingent nature of its own story and its very identity. In this re-
gard, critical pluralism is in sympathy with postmodernism.2 10 Both
270. Jean-Francois Lyotard has characterized postmodernism as the rejection of
grand narratives and totalizing thoughts and the accentuation of diversity, locality, speci-
ficity, and contingency. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A
REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). Lyotard
believes that because of technological and informational transformations, we have
entered an era where knowledge is constantly changing, where our concept of ourselves
and others is unstable and shifting, and where a teleological view of history can no longer
anchor the meaning of our existence and our relationship with the social and physical
world. Indeed, for Lyotard, the master narrative of the Enlightenment, a narrative of
mastery and liberation, has been nothing less than a discourse of terror and forced
consensus. Id.
Other scholars, including Fredric Jameson, take a different view of the postmodern.
Jameson, uneasy with what he perceives to be a tendency towards nihilism in the
Lyotardian reading of postmodernism, regards postmodernism to be the "cultural logic" of
the latest stage of capitalism, a conception that allows him to retain his grand narrative,
Marxism. While Lyotard seeks to resist those claims that hold themselves out as complete
stories of the human condition and regards such stories as coercive and terroristic,
Jameson argues that postmodernism simply requires the acceptance of Marxism, a
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in its communitarian and individualist versions, modernism yearns
for singularity and unity,2 71 what Jean-Francois Lyotards calls
"totalizing thoughts," grand narratives that simultaneously antici-
pate the questions and provide ready answers.272
Critical pluralism also embraces postmodernism's emphasis on
the constitutive power of symbols and narratives. The social world is
created and re-created by our daily narratives. This is not to say
that there is not a material world, or that we can imagine or unthink
our institutions and the relationships they mediate, because there
are material bases to our institutions which we cannot banish sim-
ply by thinking differently about them. But it is also true that it is
through the stories we tell that we are able to give meaning to them
and see how they are connected with one another, and ultimately,
what these institutions mean to us.2 75 No institution is self-defining
or self-connecting. It needs the daily narratives as a bridge to give it
meaning and to connect it with other institutions.
Unlike postmodernism, however, or at least some postmodern-
ists, critical pluralism takes seriously the historically specific way
that identity-constituting narratives and commitments have devel-
oped and the historically specific functions which they have per-
formed. In order to check the proclivities of the majority in this
totalizing theory of history and society, in a social and technological environment of new
social formations and social space. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERN, OR, THE CULTURAL
LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM x-xii (1991). For the variety of other senses in which the term
"postmodernism" is applied, see Dick Hebdige, Postmodernism and 'the Other Side,' 10 J.
CO1M. INQUIRY 78 (1986).
Some scholars of postmodernism are critical of the very idea of postmodernism. See,
e.g., PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS,
INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 18 (1992) ("Even how one writes the word--'postmodern' or
'post-modern'--signals a position, a bias. The absence of the hyphen has come to imply a
certain sympathy with and a recognition of its legitimacy, whereas the hyphen indicates a
critical posture.").
271. See Addis, supra note 259, at 675:
In their different ways, both individualism and communitarianism yearn for a
totalizing account; they have the itch, as Michael Walzer put it, 'for singularity
and unity, as if these two might provide a relief from moral anxiety, an end to
striving, and therefore a kind of completion.' Individualism does its totalizing
and its completion through its image of the universal individual, who has cer-
tain needs and rights. That individual inscribes every other individual. For the
communitarian, the complete narrative is one that tells the story of a final har-
monious union between the individual [or group] and the political community.
272. See Lyotard, supra note 270.
273. 1 think Edward Said was right when he observed "All knowledge that is about
human society.., is historical knowledge, and therefore rests upon judgment and
interpretation. This is not to say that facts or data are nonexistent, but the facts get their
importance from what is made of them in interpretation." EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING
ISLAM: How THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE
WORLD 154 (1981).
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society to convert racial difference into otherness, there is a need to
understand the geneology of these tendencies. Paradoxically, while
they rightly see differences as contingent, and hence unstable and
transformable, many postmodernists view those differences and
their instability in logical and even epistemological, rather than
historical terms. The notion of difference is seen to inhere in the
very notion of identity, which seems logical enough," 4 but when that
difference is examined with a level of historical agnosticity, for all
practical purposes all identities, and their tendencies to convert
difference into otherness, are seen to raise the same issue.
The claim that identities are socially constructed will be mean-
ingless if one does not take seriously the geneology of differences. It
will also be more difficult to develop appropriate strategies to
counter the specific tendency to convert certain differences into
otherness. To understand the constitution of the African American
Other in this country and to develop these strategies, it is crucial
that we recognize the importance of being historical and engage in
critical genealogies. Diversifying the media and the school curricu-
lum, hence allowing minorities to tell their stories, will be the first
step to such critical genealogy. As Connolly put it, "critical genealo-
gies are indispensable to cultivation of the experience of contingency
in identity/diffe.rence." 75 They provide the condition, to use a
Foucauldian expression, for the "insurrection of subjugated knowl-
edges."276
Narratives from dominant groups tend to prepare the condi-
tions for forgetting the past, both in terms of the crimes committed
against the excluded and the affirmative history of the excluded. In
this country, for example, the dominant narrative in both the popu-
lar media and scholarly literature emphasizes the distant nature of
274. See CONNOLLY, supra note 8, at 8 ("The definition of difference is a requirement
built into the logic of identity, and the construction of otherness is a temptation that read-
ily insinuates itself into that logic.").
275. Id. at 181.
276. FOUCAULT, supra note 247, at 81. Foucault posits that the notion of "Subjugated
knowledge" refers to two things:
[Oln the one hand, I am referring to the historical contents that have been bur-
ied and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation....
[These] historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict
and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is
designed to mask. Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocs of historical
knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist
and systematising theory and which criticism ... has been able to reveal....
On the other hand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should under-
stand something else, something which in a sense is altogether different,
namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to
their task or insufficiently elaborated ....
Id& at 81-82.
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the period when crimes were committed against African Americans,
and the importance of leaving the past behind. Also, it does not take
seriously the positive and affimative history of African Americans.
This narrative of double negation plays an important role in
the abstraction of the marginalized. Not only are exclusion and
disenfranchisement regarded by the majority as things of the dis-
tant past, having very little relevance to the current conditions of
the Other, but the Other is treated as if it did not have a past other
than that which the dominant group has given it. The Other is thus
doubly abstracted. Its history and heritage are excluded from the
dominant narrative, and the polity's constitutive myths are denied
the benefits of the marginalized's past. Also, the very histories that
linked the dominant and subordinated groups and that prepared the
conditions for the current relationships are regarded as being in the
past, unconnected to current conditions. This double abstraction
allows the dominant group to continue to see itself as innocent of
creating the unfavorable condition of the marginalized and to at-
tribute sole responsibility to the marginalized itself. The struggle of
African Americans for admission of their stories into the discursive
domain is in many ways a struggle to save themselves from forced
abstraction, from being a people without history and a people with-
out injury. It is an attempt to concretize the Other that the majority
has abstracted. It is only when the Other is concretized and his-
toricized through its own narratives that we may be able to under-
stand and resist current exclusionary circumstances. This is pre-
cisely Justice Marshall's story in City of Richmond v. J.A Croson
Co.217 Justice Scalia's narrative in the same case, on the other hand,
represents the dominant story, the story of abstraction.27 1
To summarize, critical pluralism, like market individualism
and communitarianism, values diversity. But unlike market indi-
vidualism, it worries about the tendency of the market to allow the
majority to convert difference into otherness by stamping the per-
spective of the majority with virtue and truth and by excluding the
277.488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, Justice Marshall considered it impossible to
understand the propriety of Richmond's remedial program without understanding the
history of the city and its historical treatment of minority citizens. Only by ignoring the
fact that the history of Richmond is partially constitutive of present day Richmond could
one make the mistake of equating "governmental action that themselves are racist and
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism," as did the majority
in Croson. Id. at 551-52.
278. For Justice Scalia, Richmond's history was irrelevant. Nor was it relevant that
there was structural racism. He believed instead that the Equal Protection Clause
demands that current circumstances be abstracted from their historical contexts that
summoned them. Thus ignoring the past, he was able to see a symmetry between




voices of those on the margin as the negation of normalcy and virtue.
In opposition to communitarianism, critical pluralism is suspicious
of the notion of rational community or of the public good, where the
telos is the dissolution of difference in the name of harmonious un-
ion, for such harmony is often bought at the price of assimilation, in
which marginalized voices are recognized only when they are recast
to resemble the majority. Along with the communitarian and the
postmodernist, the critical pluralist acknowledges the constitutive
and transformative power of narratives. To use a phrase popularized
by Alasdair Macntyre, humans are "story telling animals;"
279
through their narratives they give meaning to their institutions and
to their lives. But unlike the communitarian, the critical pluralist
does not see narrative diversity as a means of ushering in the de-
mise of difference and the attainment of a harmonious union, a
rational community. Rather, the critical pluralist sees diversity as a
political medium by which to contest the tendency of the dominant
discourse to associate its own perspective with normalcy and to as-
sign responsibility for evil to those whom it has excluded. It is a
means by which the very notions of normalcy and responsibility are
contested and continually redefined.
The critical pluralist is in agreement with the postmodernist
that the purpose of diversity is to affirm and celebrate differences.
The critical pluralist, however, is uncomfortable with the postmod-
ernist's inattention to the need to provide institutional structures
that will provide the conditions both for a critical ontology of the self
and an ethic toward otherness. The postmodernist often seems unin-
terested in constructive enterprises such as affirmative action, but is
instead content merely to engage in the impertinence of parody and
laughter, describing all attempts to engage in constructive enter-
prise as a carnival,' as if parody and laughter will be sufficient to
279. MACINTYRE, supra note 259, at 201.
280. Connolly's work sometimes shows such a tendency. He writes:
One may live one's own identity in a more ironic, humorous way, laughing occa-
sionally at one's more ridiculous predispositions and laughing too at the predis-
position to universalize an impulse simply because it is one's own. Laughing be-
cause one senses that the drive to moralize difference is invested with the wish
to reassure oneself that one is what any normal being should be. Laughing at
us, too, for the same reasons. Laughing in a way that disrupts this persistent
link between ethical conviction and self-reassurance while affirming the indis-
pensability of ethical judgment in life. Such laughter pays homage to fugitive
elements in life that exceed the organization of identity, otherness, rationality,
and autonomy. It has effects. 'Learn to laugh at oneself as one must learn to
laugh.' Such laughter counters and subverts a Hobbesian sense of humor, where
I show myself to be ahead and you to be behind-though the fact that Hobbes
advances this definition reveals that his own sense of humor exceeds the defini-
tion he offers of it.
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provide the condition for the affirmation of differences. For the
critical pluralist, it is not parody and laughter but institutions such
as the communications process and the education process, that will
enable us to resist the tendencies of identities to solidify, as well as
to stamp those identities with enabling and transformative contin-
gencies. To diversify the communication process is to diversify our
constitutive myths.
What guarantee is there that critical pluralism will lead to the
affirmation of differences and multiplicities? There is no guarantee.
But there are reasons why enabling those on the margin to institu-
tionally interrogate the dominant story with their own stories might
offer us hope for a genuinely plural world where differences are
accepted. First, forcing the dominant narrative to open itself up for
interrogation by the narratives of marginal groups may lead the
dominant group to understand the contingent and specific nature of
its own story and identity. The assumption of solidity and universal-
ity contributes to the process of converting difference into otherness.
The Millian notion of truth and the communitarian vision of the
public good logically lead to the assumption of the solidity and uni-
versality of identity and forms of association. Second, through this
process of institutional engagement, the dominant group will per-
haps come to accept the marginal as a dialogue partner rather than
as a negation or a poor imitation of itself. When social groups accept
the contingent nature of their constitutive myths and the relational
nature of their character, it is likely that they will accept, respect,
and engage the different rather than define it as the abnormal other.
And third, institutional dialogue between the dominant and mar-
ginal groups is likely to lead to a mutual recasting and correction of
the very identities of the groups engaged in that dialogue. If it is
right that identities are relationally constructed, then the process of
dialogue is the means by which the groups themselves are rear-
ranged and reconstituted by emphasizing one group of factors rather
than another. By the process of dialogue the very notion of a
European American story and an African American story might be
recast, and difference itself reformulated. The consequence of that
reformulation may be that a particular factor or trait such as race or
gender will cease to be naturalized and hence determinative in most
circumstances. Critical pluralism is therefore not only about the af-
firmation of differences, but also about their transformation, not
their dissolution.
Two of the most obvious areas where the narratives of the mar-
ginalized could be institutionally empowered to critically engage the
dominant story are the media and the school curriculum. As is obvi-
CONNOLLY, supra note 8, at 180-81.
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ous, my major concern here is clearly with the media, but it is no
accident that the two areas in which the courts have seriously taken
up the notion of diversity are communication and education, for in
those areas we explicitly engage in the production and reproduction
of our identities.
C. Critical Pluralism, the Courts, and Diversity
Diversity is a concept which has been legitimated by the courts
in the areas of education and communication. In the education field,
perhaps the most explicit statement in favor of diversity, and cer-
tainly the most famous, is that enunciated by Justice Powell in
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke.28' In Bakke, Justice
Powell recognized that diversity was a compelling governmental
interest, at least in relation to the composition of the student body in
institutions of higher learning.2" He pointed out that learning takes
place in different settings, and that the interaction among the vari-
ous groups of students is one important level through which stu-
dents learn.2
Justice Powell seemed to recognize that diversity will not en-
sure the mastery of a particular body of knowledge, such as organic
chemistry. Rather, the education process is at least partly a process
through which we define who we are, as well as the identities of
others. A defensible scheme of association, therefore, requires that
identities be constituted interactively rather than unilaterally. Why
might that be important? Three reasons suggest themselves. First,
Powell might have been suggesting that to be an agent assumes, at
the minimum, that the agent has a role in the constitution of its own
identity. To be constituted in one's absence is to lose the claim of
agency; it is to become a subject of deliberation rather than a delib-
erating subject. Second, if the majority continues to constitute the
identity of the minority it has traditionally seen as its negation, then
it is likely that the minority Other will continue to be seen as the
negation of normalcy, while the outlook of the majority will be
stamped with normalcy. In the absence of narratives of the mar-
ginalized to challenge the dominant discourse, the tendency is for
the majority to not reflect on the contingent and contradictory na-
ture of its own identity and the unattractive consequences of that
identity. Third, institutions that are constructed on the assumption
281. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
282. Id. at 312 (Powell, J.) ("The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and crea-
tion'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted
by a diverse student body.") (footnote omitted).
283. Id. at 313 n.48 (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of
Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY, Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
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of a certain communal identity, from whose constitution certain
groups have been excluded are unlikely to respond to the needs of
those who have been excluded. This seems to be what Justice Powell
had in mind when he wrote "it is not too much to say that the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide expo-
sure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples."2' Justice Powell seemed to say that the defensibility
of our scheme of association is critically dependent on the degree to
which we have institutionally included the constitutive narratives of
the marginalized, the degree to which we have diversified our con-
stitutive myths.
Read this way, Justice Powell's view of diversity seems not to
be limited to institutions of higher education, as some have in-
sisted." Rather it appears applicable to all domains where the pol-
ity engages in the institutional production of its identity, including
the communications process. Every day the media narrates stories
which give significance and meaning to our institutions, to our rela-
tionships with those institutions, and consequently to our relation-
ships with each other. The necessity of a diversity of narratives in
this signification process then becomes clear. If we exclude some
narratives, intentionally or structurally, from this process of naming
the world and ourselves, that naming will likely convert those ex-
cluded into the different Other.
The importance of racial diversity in the communications field
has been accepted by the FCC in the- electronic media, and the
courts have endorsed it. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2"6 for
example, held that the FCC's goal of diversification was a suffi-
ciently compelling governmental interest analogous to the diversifi-
cation of higher education institutions.8 7 Although the D.C. Circuit
284. Id. at 313. Such exposure to a wide variety of ideas is important because it is
only in such an environment that students will be able, 'directly or indirectly, to learn
from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply
held assumptions about themselves and their world." Id. at 313 n.48.
285. See, e.g., Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 919
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("The policy decision of schools are...
entitled to special deference, especially when the school seeks to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.... In light of that, I doubt that
the FCC may employ a racial preference in order to promote diverse programming."),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Charles Fried,
Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV.
107, 112-13 (1990) ("[Ilt should be clear that Justice Powell's rationale was intended to
have only the narrowest range of application and has no bearing at all on the situation at
issue in Metro Broadcasting.").
286. 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
287. West Michigan Broadcasting, 735 F.2d at 614 ("[Tlhe FCC's goal of bringing
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in Shurberg Broadcasting attempted to revise its earlier endorse-
ment of diversity in this area,' the Supreme Court in Metro
Broadcasting reaffirmed the principle and two FCC policies.2 89 Not
only did the Court reaffirm the importance of diversity in this
sphere, but it also rejected the assumption that all necessary diver-
sity will occur as a result of the workings of the market.29
Metro Broadcasting involved two consolidated cases, both of
which had been decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. One
involved the constitutionality of minority enhancement in compara-
tive hearing,291 and the other dealt with the issue of distress sales.
292
minority perspectives to the nation's listening audiences would reflect a substantial gov-
ernment interest... that could legitimize the use of race as a factor in evaluating permit
applicants."); see also Citizens Comm. Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
288. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 924 ("ITihe FCC's attempt to justify the distress sale
policy through analogy to the diversity goal recognized... in Bakke is inadequate.").
289. The Metro Broadcasting Court affirmed the FCC's distress sale and minority
enhancement policies. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65. The Court applied an in-
termediate level of scrutiny in finding that the FCC's affirmative action programs served
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress to effect, and that the
programs were substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id. The Court
indicated that the programs might even have stood the strictest scrutiny. It observed that
"the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important
governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the Commission's minority
ownership policies." Id. at 567-68 (emphasis added); see also FCC v. Natl Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978) (observing that "diversification of ownership
would enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints"); NAACP v.
FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976) (observing that the FCC's attempt to encourage
licensees to employ more minorities is justified as a way of ensuring that licensees'
"programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups").
290. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 571 ("The Commission has never relied on the
market alone to ensure that the needs of the audience are met. Indeed, one of the FCC's
elementary regulatory assumptions is that broadcast content is not purely market-driven
291. Winter Park Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Metro
Broadcasting, Inc., Rainbow Broadcasting Co., and Winter Park Communications filed
mutually exclusive applications with the FCC to construct a new UHF television station
in Orlando, Florida. The FCC Review Board awarded Rainbow Broadcasting a substantial
minority enhancement credit on the basis of its minority hiring record and granted
Rainbow Broadcasting the license over Metro Broadcasting despite a finding that the
qualitative comparison between the two was close. The Commission affirmed the Board's
decision. In re Applications of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. et al., 3 F.C.C.R. 866 (1988).
Metro Broadcasting and Winter Park Communications appealed to the D.C. Circuit,
which reaffirmed the Commission's determination. Winter Park Comm., 873 F.2d at 353
("The issue regarding the legality of the FCC's use of qualitative enhancement for
minority ownership is easily resolved because this case is controlled by our decision in
West Michigan .... In considering exactly the same policy at issue here, the court in West
Michigan ruled that 'the FCC's plan easily passes constitutional muster.'"). The Winter
Park court relied on two factors for its decision. First, the FCC's enhancement program is
not a quota system where a number of station licenses are reserved for minorities;
minority status is instead one factor among many considered. Id. at 354. Second, the
FCC's program was instituted in the wake of a Congressional finding that minorities and
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The D.C. Circuit upheld the former as constitutionally permissible293
while striking down the latter as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.294 In Metro Broadcasting the
Supreme Court upheld by the narrowest of margins the constitu-
tionality of both of the FCC policies in question,295 invoking diversity
as the justification in each case.296 The majority made the same sorts
of analogies between the diversity in Bakke and diversity in the
communications industry which were made in West Michigan, hence
confirming the importantly similar role the education and
communication processes play.
297
In both Bakke and Metro Broadcasting the beneficiary was not
only the particular individual admitted to the particular activity or
program, but the entire polity. Diversifying narratives is not an act
of individual charity, but rather is a process through which a polity
engages in self-discovery to build a more defensible scheme of asso-
ciation. This defensible scheme of association will emerge only when
their perspectives are underrepresented in the media. Id. at 355. By explicitly invoking
the two factors-that the program is not a quota or set-aside program, and that the policy
has Congressional support---the court distinguished the case from Croson. Metro
Broadcasting appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
292. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The FCC
designated the television station license renewal application of Faith Center, Inc. for
hearing because of allegations that the licensee had misallocated funds. Id. at 904-05. The
licensee subsequently petitioned the FCC for permission to transfer the license to a mi-
nority entity under the Commission's distress sale policy. Id. at 905. The Commission
granted the petition, but before the licensee was able to find a minority buyer, Shurberg
Broadcasting applied for a permit to build a television station which would be mutually
exclusive with the licensee's pending renewal application. Id. Faith Center eventually ne-
gotiated a sale of its interest to a minority entity and applied to the Commission for ap-
proval to complete the transaction. Id. Shurberg Broadcasting challenged the sale, argu-
ing that the FCC's distress sale policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 906. The Commission rejected Shurberg's contentions and approved
the transfer. Id. at 903. Shurberg appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which by a divided court reversed the Commission on a finding that the
distress sale policy was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Shurberg, 876 F.2d 902.
Astroline Communications, the minority entity which had negotiated the purchase of
Faith Center's interest, then appealed to the Supreme Court.
293. Winter Park Comm., 873 F.2d at 353.
294. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
295. The Metro Broadcasting decision was decided by a 5-4 vote. Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. 547. Moreover, since the decision was handed down in 1990, Justice Brennan,
author of the opinion, and Justices Marshall and White have left the Court.
296. The Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and determined that the
FCC's interest in promoting diversity was an important governmental interest. Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 567-68 ("[W]e conclude that the interest in enhancing broadcast
diversity is, at the very least, an important governmental objective and is therefore a suf-
ficient basis for the Commission's minority ownership policies.").
297. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 596 ("The FCC's plan, like the Harvard admis-
sions program discussed in Bakke, contains the seed of its own termination.").
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we allow the stories and perspectives of those on the margin, the
paradigmatic Other, to interrogate the story of the dominant group
so that the dominant story is no longer seen as the universal story,
and so that its assumption of universality is no longer justified by
unilaterally defining those perceived to be different as the negation
of the normal and moral order.
The need for inclusiveness in the communication process is as
important, and arguably even more important, than it is in the edu-
cation field. As the Supreme Court observed in 1968, the media is
"demonstrably a principal source of information... for a great part
of the Nation's population."28 The communications industry daily
engages in the explicit constitution of the identity of the polity and
of the relationships of social groups in the polity. Specifically, the
media has played an important role in the continual constitution of
an image of African Americans as the negation of the normal and
moral life. Only when institutions are in place which allow the nar-
ratives of the excluded to challenge the dominant narrative, so as to
reveal the very contingency of the dominant discourse itself, will we
begin to destabilize the current tendency of the dominant discourse
to fabricate a virtuous and stable identity for itself with a parallel
fabrication of a demonized African American Other. This is what
critical pluralism attempts to do, and this is what ultimately justi-
fies the inadequately inclusive and inadequately enforced affirma-
tive action policies of the FCC.
Even if there existed an agreement on the desirability of includ-
ing the perspectives and voices of marginalized social groups, there
would still be issues of dispute over the nexus between minority
ownership and employment on the one hand, and the emergence of a
qualitatively different perspective on the other. This question of
nexus is one of the arguments that market individualists advance.
"[1It is not at all apparent," wrote Judge Silberman, an opponent of
the FCC's affirmative action policies and of diversity, "why a station
owner, be she minority or non-minority, would make programming
decisions according to her personal tastes rather than in response to
the demands of the market place."2"
How would one respond to those skeptical of the relationship
between diversity of ownership and employment on the one hand,
298. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968); see also
Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 943-44 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) ("For good or ill, a large portion of
the American polity relies upon the broadcast media as a principal source of information
about the world in which they live. Given the governmental role in selecting broadcast li-
censees, I believe that the state bears a responsibility to allocate franchises in such a way
as to further the ability of viewers and listeners to obtain access to diverse program-
ming.") (citations omitted).
299. Id. at 923.
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and diversity of perspectives on the other? One could of course give
the simple answer, that Congress00 and the FCC3 10 have found that
such a nexus exists.0 2 That would not convince the skeptic who sees
the Congressional and FCC findings to simply be assertions that a
diversity of perspectives will follow from a diversity of ownership. 303
What sort of evidence, or what kind of argument, will be required to
persuade the skeptic? Perhaps the skeptic is looking for statistical
evidence that shows a direct correlation between minority ownership
and employment and the emergence of a distinct minority voice.304
300. See H.R. Rep. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
301. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 159, at 981 ("[O]wnership of broadcasting
facilities by minorities is [a] significant way of fostering the inclusion of minority views in
the area of programming.").
302. The Metro Broadcasting Court found the Congressional and FCC findings of a
nexus between minority participation in station ownership and management and
increased minority representation on the airwaves to be sufficiently substantial as to sat-
isfy an intermediate level of scrutiny. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 582 ("We believe
it a legitimate inference for Congress and the Commission to draw that as more
minorities gain ownership and policymaking roles in the media, varying perspectives will
be more fairly represented on the airwaves.").
Part of the reason for the Court's willingness to go along with the findings of nexus
was, of course, the general deference to Congress that the Court has shown in matters of
factual findings. Id. at 3011. But it is also true that given the fact that there was a great
deal of varied empirical evidence before it, Congress's conclusions about the existence of
nexus was utterly reasonable.
The majority also addressed other factors which courts in the past have considered
relevant in the determination of nexus when the governmental classification is by race.
The first question was whether the government had made an effort to achieve its
diversity objectives by non-racial means. Reviewing earlier FCC efforts to attain diversity
by other means, the Court determined that the Commission had tried and failed to use al-
ternative means, and that only after exhausting such alternative means had it adopted its
racial classification scheme.
For many years, the FCC attempted to encourage diversity of programming con-
tent without consideration of the race of the station owners .... [Tihe
Commission established minority ownership preferences only after long experi-
ence demonstrated that race-neutral means could not produce adequate broad-
casting diversity. The FCC did not act precipitately in devising the programs we
uphold today;, to the contrary, the Commission undertook thorough evaluations
of its policies three times... before adopting the minority ownership programs.
Id. at 584, 589.
The Court further considered the impact of the FCC policy on nonminorities. It
concluded that applicants who lose out to minority applicants because of the FCC
minority policies cannot be regarded as unduly burdened, for they have no legitimate ex-
pectation that had it not been for the minority policies, they would receive the license.
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 597 ("Applicants have no settled expectation that their
applications will be granted without consideration of public interest factors such as mi-
nority ownership.").
303. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 923 (D.C. Cir
1989).
304. Judge Silberman's comment in Sherburg suggests as much. Id. at 922 ("I take
that reasoning [that minority owners are likely to increase diversity of content] to be an
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Evidence exists that demonstrates such a correlation,"' but in
my view this evidence is unnecessary to justify inclusive policies in
the communications field. In many instances much of the qualitative
difference between a minority communicator and a non-minority
communicator might be not so much in the body of knowledge which
individual communicators recount, but in the framework through
which he or she communicates that information."' Both minority
and majority communicators might talk about the same issues, but
given their different life experiences they are likely to present the
issues in different ways. It is unlikely, for example, that an African
assertion of common sense rather than an empirically supported proposition; as such it is
simply another way of expressing racial or ethnic stereotypes.").
305. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 580 & n.31; see also CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, MINORITY BROADCAST STATION OWNERsHIP AND BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING: Is THERE A NExus?, at app. (1988) (65% of all the radio stations with at
least one African American owner target their programming at African American
audiences); Lawrence Soley & George Hough III, Black Ownership of Commercial Radio
Stations: An Economic Evaluation, 22 J. BROADCASTING 455 (1978) (there exists a
significant relationship between black ownership of radio stations and African American-
targeted programming on those stations); Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority
Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 339 (1991) (minority station owners
more likely to program for their own minority groups than are nonminority owners, but
are no more likely to program for other ethnic groups than are nonethnic owners); David
Honig, Relationships Among EEO, Program Service, and Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE TENTH ANNUAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 86, 87-88 (Oscar H. Gandy et al.
eds., 1982) (radio stations owned by African Americans and programmed for African
American audiences tend to employ significantly more minorities, particularly in
management, professional, technical, and sales positions than do white owned and
programmed stations).
306. For a discussion of the importance of "framing" as a method of representation,
see MICHAEL PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: THE POLITICS OF THE MASS MEDIA 220-22
(1986). "Framing" is the manner in which information is presented; elements of
presentation such as the particular words used to characterize and label an event or is-
sue, the tone and expressiveness of the presenter's voice, and the order in which events or
issues are presented work together to frame the event or issue. Id. For instance, Parenti
wrote, "lOin CBS television news Dan Rather referred retrospectively to the Black civil
rights movement and student antiwar movement as 'the civil disturbances of the sixties.'
How different an impression would have been created had. he labeled them 'movements
for peace and justice,' or 'movements against military intervention and for racial
equality." Id. Rather's manner and words framed the events and issues in a negative
light. See also IYENGAR, supra note 30, at 66-67 (The overall pattern of [research] results
for racial inequality suggests that framing and the subject matter focus of the news both
influence attribution [of responsibility for the social ill]. When television news covered ra-
cial discrimination in thematic terms, viewers gave predominantly societal attributions
for racial inequality... Taken together, the five experiments indicate that.., episodic
framing of poverty increased attribution of individualistic responsibility, while thematic
framing increased attributions of societal responsibility .... The results reported here
indicate ... that the well-documented tendency of Americans to consider poor people re-
sponsible [which] may be due not only to dominant cultural values but also to news cov-
erage of poverty in which images of poor people predominate.")
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American journalist will describe African American politicians in
terms of their "threatening" or "non-threatening" posture, as do
white journalists. Evidence further suggests that African American
station owners are more likely than white owners to employ African
Americans in significant positions where decisions about broadcast
content and issue framing are made." 7 The claim here is not that all
African Americans will have a certain perspective and that all
European Americans are unable to possess that perspective. Rather,
given their life experiences, African Americans are on the whole,
likely to view and report certain events in a different way than are
European Americans.
In any case, the objective of racial diversification is not only to
ensure that issues of concern to minorities are not omitted, but also
that issues traditionally considered to be of exclusive concern to the
majority are interrogated by minorities, with the possibility for a
gradual transformation of both the nature of the issue as well as the
majority's perception of itself. This is what Homi Bhabha might
have meant when he observed that narratives of the marginalized
are not simply attempts to "invert the balance of power within an
unchanged order of discourse, but to redefine the symbolic process
through which the social Imaginary-Nation, Culture, or Communi-
ty-become 'subjects' of discourse and 'objects' of psychic identifica-
tion."10 These redefinitions and transformations are rarely easily
measured, for they are accomplished gradually.0 9
307. See Honig, supra note 305 at 87-88.
308. Homi M. Bhabha, Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism,
in THE POLITICS OF THEORY 200 (F. Barker ed., 1983), cited in Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
Critical Fanonism, in 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 457,460 (1991).
309. In any case, those who advance the argument of lack of nexus usually have a
very narrow view of what constitutes nexus. Often it seems that the only factor they want
to look at in the electronic media, especially radio, is African American formatting. But
formatting is not the only way that a station could respond to the needs and interests of
African Americans. A station's record of hiring minorities and others sympathetic to the
cause of minorities might be another indication of the station's responsiveness. The will-
ingness of the station to carry public service announcements related to African American
communities might also be another factor. See Akosua B. Evans, Current Topics in Law
and Policy: Are Minority Preferences Necessary? Another Look at the Radio Broadcasting
Industry, 8 YALE L. & POLY REv. 380, 404-11 (1990). Surveys conducted by Evans and
others show that African American-owned stations tend to have African American
general managers and significantly more minority employees than those owned by
European Americans. Id. at 407. In one survey, 82% of African American-owned stations
had black general managers, compared with only 27% of white-owned stations. Id.; see
also Honig, supra note 297, at 83. Honig found that among radio stations which present
black-oriented formatting and programs, 72% of black-owned stations hired African
Americans in the top job categories-officials, managers, professionals, technicians,
salespersons. On the other hand, only 43% of the white-owned and black-oriented stations
employed African Americans in those top positions. Evans, supra, at 407.
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There is one more thing to say about the doctrinal understand-
ing of diversity. Even if there exists evidence of a nexus between
minority ownership and employment on the one hand, and programs
that reflect the tastes and interests of minorities on the other hand,
and even if critics of diversity could concede the importance of fram-
ing in the communications process, such critics are likely to present
the argument that there is simply no principled way of stopping at
only diversity based on'race.5 10 Why not diversity enhancement pro-
grams for Italian Americans, Irish Americans, Jewish Americans, or
Polish Americans? The argument is offered not to make the point
that some groups are unfairly excluded, but rather to attempt to
demonstrate the unprincipled and incoherent nature of the notion of
racial diversity. The argument, however, is not persuasive.
This fear of slippery slopes is grounded on what I call "the view
from false symmetry."' Those who argue that there is no principled
way to distinguish between the conditions of African Americans and
Italian Americans see symmetry where none exists. In this society,
African Americans are the only group that has been consistently
seen as the paradigmatic Other, whose identity has been constituted
as the negation of the normal and moral order. No other social
group, except perhaps Native Americans, has been summarily ex-
cluded by governments and by the market from participating in the
social and political life of the polity as has the African American
community. Furthermore, given the fact that race continues to
provide the framework for the discourse about social decay and
moral decline in this country, and given that the market continues
to exclude African Americans from taking part in that discourse, it
is cruelly cynical to trivialize the condition of African Americans by
invoking a false symmetry.
310. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 614-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. In affirmative action jurisprudence the Supreme Court has applied two forms of
false symmetry to challenge affirmative action policies. The first form of false symmetry
is the Court's perception of similarity between the conditions of African Americans and
other social groups. The second is its perception of symmetry between the racist actions of
governments employed to the disadvantage of racial minorities and governmental policies
designed to assist and include minorities. As an example of the latter type of symmetry,
Justice Kennedy's attempt to equate the FCC's distress sale policy with both the former
"separate but equal" law of the United States, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
and the apartheid system of South Africa, was particularly egregious. Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 635 ("Policies of racial separation and preference are almost
always justified as benign, even when it is clear to any sensible observer that they are
not. The following. statement, for example, would fit well among those offered to uphold
the Commission's racial preference policy- 'The policy is not based on any concept of supe-
riority or inferiority, but merely on the fact that people differ, particularly in their group
associations, loyalties, cultures, outlook, modes of life and standards of development.' See
South Africa and the Rule of Law 37 (1968) (official publication of the South African
Government).").
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It is not only through their argument of symmetry that some
justices of the Supreme Court attempt to trivialize the notion of
diversity; some have even explicitly announced that the interest in
diversity is a "trivial" one."' There is nothing trivial, however, about
a policy that attempts to provide institutional structures for the
admission of the histories and perspectives of a social group, whose
exclusion has continually led to its being viewed as the Problem
Other, so as to correct that negative image. Only when one is oblivi-
ous to history and insensitive to current social conditions will one
see the supposed danger of slippery slopes3 18 and the triviality that
the dissent in Metro Broadcasting managed to see.
But on one count Justice Kennedy is right. He concluded his
dissent in Metro Broadcasting by repeating the famous words of
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy:314 "The destiny of the two races, in
this country, are indissolubly linked together."35 The question is,
what should be the nature of that link? The objective of racial diver-
sity in the media is to destabilize the current forms of association
that allow the majority to define the identity of the minority and
link the minority to the majority only as a poor imitation of the
majority or as the problem Other.
VI. DIVERSITY AND REPRESENTATION: A BACKWARD GLANCE (IN LIEU
OF CONCLUSION)
The argument for diversity advanced in this Article is likely to
be challenged on a number of grounds. Some might be skeptical of
the constitutive and transformative power of narratives. Most skep-
tics are likely to acknowledge the rather unfavorable conditions,
both material as well as representational, in which African
Americans find themselves, but might dispute that the cultural
industry plays a significant role in that outcome. The corollary of
denying the constitutive power of the media is to deny its transfor-
mative capacity. To such skeptics, narratives are descriptive rather
than constitutive, and thus the preoccupation with narratives and
the media is a misplaced concern.
In some ways I have already responded to the skeptics. To re-
state the argument, the skeptics erroneously assume that the stories
312. 497 U.S. at 633 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree with the Court that
the Constitution permits the Government to discriminate among its citizens on the basis
of race in order to serve interests so trivial as 'broadcast diversity.'").
313. The "slippery slopes" argument offered by some members of the Supreme Court
is rather weak, and even disingenuous. Courts, including the Supreme Court, draw
difficult lines everyday in all areas of adjudication. Drawing and making difficult
distinctions is what courts do.
314. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
315. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 637.
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we tell daily through the media are merely descriptive of actual
conditions. As we tell our stories, we constitute and produce the very
thing we claim to be describing through those stories. Thus, while it
is useful to acknowledge the fact that the material deprivation of
African Americans cannot be remedied until the structural inequi-
ties are addressed, it will be a fatal mistake not to recognize that
these structural exclusions and inequities are sustained and legiti-
mated with a web of narratives, symbols, and rhetorical devices that
define African Americans as the negation of normalcy.
Others might worry that the sort of diversity adyanced in this
Article will lead to discord and strife among members of the polity,
rather than to dialogue and respectful harmony. For such critics, to
embrace narrative diversity in a multiethnic and multiracial society
such as the United States is to write the first chapter in the destruc-
tion of the "we," the common bonds and interests that are supposed
to have held us together. In the educational field, for example,
prominent scholars who consider themselves liberals in other ar-
eas3 16 are on the forefront in sounding the alarm of strife if such
diversity were to be implemented. 17
While I agree with liberals that strife and conflict are undesir-
able, I disagree with their assumption that diversity will lead to
such outcomes, and that absent diversity such undesirable outcomes
are less likely to occur. If recent events are any indication, disunion
is likely to follow in the long run from a situation where a false "us"
has been institutionally imposed on a polity. Richard Sennett is
right when he observed that "the sense of 'us,' the act of mutual
recognition" among people who see themselves to be different from
each other does not occur "as an act of good will," as liberals tend to
think, but rather "through discourse, discourse in which we chal-
316. The well-known Southern historian C. Vann Woodward has described current
challenges by minorities and others, to the educational curricula under the banner of
multiculturalism as an "outburst of minority assertiveness." C. Vann Woodward, Equal
but Separate, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 15 & 22, 1991, at 41, 41 (reviewing ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR, THE DISUNITY OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (1991)). He laments that "the cult of ethnicity and its zealots have put at stake
the American tradition of a shared commitment to common ideals and its reputation for
assimilation, for making a 'nation of nations.'" Id.
317. Actually, conservatives are even more hostile to the concept of diversity than
are liberal critics, but their opposition is motivated by different concerns. Although con-
servatives, like liberals, are concerned with the possibility of strife and conflict, the basis
for at least some conservative opposition is the conviction that the values which marginal
groups seek to introduce to the discursive landscape are not meritorious. Some
conservatives even believe that such values are in fact a challenge to civilization itself, for
they regard the culture and values of the majority as the defining features of civilization.
See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION HAS
FALED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS (1987); DINESH
D'SOUZA, ILLBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991).
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lenge each other's identities."3 18 It is only through such active inter-
rogation of each other's stories that there "would be a truly... social
bond, a bond acknowledging otherness." 19 This is whatiracial diver-
sity in the communication process is meant to do. 2°
Even if my arguments about the value of diversity in this area
are persuasive, they are unlikely to diminish the vigor and fre-
quency with which the FCC's minority ownership and employment
policies are likely to be challenged. Both disappointed nonminority
applicants and conservative forces are likely to continue to attack
those policies; both groups are likely to find a sympathetic ear in the
federal courts.
Challenges from disappointed non-minority applicants are of
course understandable, for those non-minority applicants are denied
a valuable and scarce resource. Given the increased demand for, and
shortage of, desirable broadcast properties, the consequences of los-
ing are bitter. Indeed, at least in the area of radio, existing bands
provide few opportunities for new allotments, and most entries into
broadcasting will therefore be through the acquisition of existing
facilities.3 2' Most of the FCC policies regarding minority ownership
are directed at the acquisition of existing stations. As a result, the
competition for existing stations will continue to be fierce and the
attack on minority policies intense.
No response can be totally persuasive to those disappointed
non-minority applicants. One could, of course, tell them that the
minority policies affect only a small fraction of the broadcasting
licenses, or that the FCC policies do not involve "quota[s] or fixed
quantity set-aside[s]," 22 or that "[n]o one has a First Amendment
right to a license."3 1 These responses are unlikely, however, to be
persuasive to those that have lost. Still, one can do little besides
repeat the cardinal social truth that when a polity engages in the
318. Richard Sennett, The Rhetoric of Ethnic Identity, in THE ENDs OF RHETORIC:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 191, 206 (John Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990).
319. Id.
320. See CONNOLLY, supra note 8, at 94 ("The human animal is essentially incom-
plete without social form; and a common language, institutional setting, set of traditions,
and political forum for enunciating public purposes are indispensable to the acquisition of
an identity and the commonalties essential to life. But every form of social completion
and enablement also contains subjugations and cruelties within it. Politics, then, is the
medium through which these ambiguities can be engaged and controlled, shifted and
stretched .... A society that enables politics as this ambiguous medium is a good society
because it enables the paradox of difference to find expression in public life.").
321. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. Although the AM band has been
expanded to accomodate more users, most entries into the broadcasting industry will con-
tinue to be through the purchase of existing stations.
322. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 599 (1990).
323. Id. at 597 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)).
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implementation of a social policy designed to advance a desired goal,
such as the control of the dominant discourse's tendency to demonize
and exclude minorities from social and political life, some members
of the polity will often be adversely affected. The measure of the
acceptability of that adverse effect can never be couched in terms of
whether those that are adversely affected are "innocent victims," for
the notion of innocent victim is conclusory, assuming legitimate
expectation on the part of those disappointed24 Rather, the measure
of acceptability of the adverse effect of a particular policy must
depend on the importance of the social policy and the extent to
which the means employed to achieve it has been restricted to that
which is required to achieve that policy.
To conservative challengers my response is of two kinds, de-
pending on the nature of the challenge. To those whose challenges
are premised on the unarticulated assumption that the perspectives
of those on the margin have little to offer to the polity, those who
believe in the solidity and virtuosity of the identity of the dominant
majority, my response will simply be to plead that they take seri-
ously Justice Holmes' counsel in Abrams v. United States:3" life, and
in our case, the appropriate form of identity, "is an experiment," and for
that experiment to succeed, people must be skeptical of the foundations
of their thoughts and of the solidity and virtue of their identities.
To those other conservatives, including some members of the
FCC, who may be persuaded by Holmesian skepticism and yet are
convinced that every ingredient necessary for the experiment will be
admitted by the market, I simply restate what I have shown in Part V:
that the market does not always distribute dialogue-chances on the
basis of the value of the information to the polity. Indeed, the market
often simply stamps truth on the outlooks of the dominant majority
and excludes the different as the very negation of truth.
There is one further point that conservative critics might want
to ponder. On a pragmatic level a society which continues to institu-
tionally exclude the voices of its minorities might end up paying a
high price, for when those minorities finally speak it might not be in
a peaceful way. As the 1992 events in Los Angeles clearly showed,
there is a limit to how long people will continue to wait to tell their
stories and wait to be heard.
326
324. The majority in Metro Broadcasting made the point that since no one enjoys a
First Amendment right to a broadcast license, no one is entitled to a "settled expectation
that [his] application will be granted without consideration of public interest factors such
as minority ownership." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 597. For the legitimate
expectations argument to be persuasive, it must also demonstrate that the expectation is
based on just and fair social arrangements.
325. 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
326. An African American woman who draws a weekly comic strip for newspapers
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put it this way:
After the riots in Los Angeles how many folks were saying how surprised they
were that that happened? If mainstream folk understood the black perspective
better, they would not be surprised at the rage we're holding. We know white
people because we're exposed to them, but they do not know us. If we're going to
have a peaceful existence they have to understand our perspective.
Sheila Rule, The 'Girls' Talking With a Black Perspective, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at 16.
For a sample of a general feeling among African Americans (even middle class ones)
of anger and despair that the white majority does not hear (and does not want to hear),
listen, for example, to the anguish of an African American insurance broker:
We have sang 'We Shall Overcome,' we have prayed at the courthouse steps, we
have made all these gestures-and the door is not open. I am just tired. Pretty
soon rll have grandkids and they will want to sing 'We Shall Overcome.' I will
say, 'No, we have sang that long enough'.
Studs Terkel, Under Our Skin, MOTHER JONES, May/June 1992, at 43, 43. Or listen to the
despairing words of an African American journalist.
From the moment our justice system failed Rodney King, like many black
Americans, I have been a walking, bleeding, festering sore. At first, I was so de-
ranged with anger, I actually felt some bizarre satisfaction at the destruction in
Los Angeles. For me, that is alarming. When people like me ... middle class,
suburban, professional, black Americans ... when we cluck as youngsters loot
stores and set cars afire . . when we are consumed by that same rage... some
thing is desperately wrong... I cry for Rodney King... for what he symbol-
izes. Rodney King is my brother.., who could easily meet the same fate. He is
scars on my grandmother's knees.., her gold watch for a lifetime of scrubbing
[white people's] floors.... He is all-white board rooms and keep-them-out coun-
try clubs. He is glass ceilings and David Duke and being watched like a criminal
in department stores.... I do ask my country, how long must its people suffer
before they strike back? My grandmother was far more patient than I... but
since Rodney King, patience seems more a vice than a virtue.
Joyce Davis, Fading Patience and Rising Anger, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 12,
1992, at B-7.
The purpose of including the desperate voices of two African Americans is not to
suggest that the material inequalities and injustices that have led them to despair would
not have existed had the concerns and conditions of African Americans been part of the
regular discourse in the media. That obviously cannot be true. Rather, the purpose is to
indicate that in some ways the desperation among Afican Americans is informed not
only by the level of inequality and injustice that defines the lives of many African
Americans, but also by a feeling that those conditions do not become part of the normal
discourse in the media unless there is violence or upheaval. It is partly the feeling that
one's daily struggles and grievances are invisible to the mainstream. For example, the
misery of life in the inner cities never became a serious concern of the media or the presi-
dential campaigns until the Los Angeles riots. Even then, the issue was dropped by both
not long after the riots.
In addition, it is arguable that if the voices of minorities were regularly heard in the
discursive domain, it might be possible to reduce the probability of reaching such
conditions of desperation that force a disenfranchised group to respond violently, for the
grievances of the group might have been addressed early enough. One African American
journalist writing about the Los Angeles riots observed.
Although most people in my neighborhood had a horror story to tell about their
treatment at the hands of the LAPD long before Rodney King, the papers [and
presumably the electronic media as well] ignored the issue of police brutality. If
it did not happen to the editors driving in from the suburbs then it did not hap-
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pen. No one in my neighborhood was surprised at the brutality of the videotape,
but almost everyone in the newsroom [at The Los Angeles Times, where she
worked] expressed shock. Where had they been?
Shirley, supra note 93, at 26.
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